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CHAPTER I
THE AMERICAN PEASANTS
"Adjustment" to a sick and insane environment is of itself not 
"health" but sickness and insanity.— James Agee
One of the most abiding problems of men on earth has been the 
struggle over the control and use of land. Since ancient times, slav­
ery and tenancy have been the means of oppressing those who till the 
soil. In the United States, despite the large amount of land and the 
relative ease of acquisition, slavery and tenancy fastened themselves 
on the agricultural system, especially in the South. By 1930; more than 
half of all Southern farmers did not own the land they farmed, and nearly 
three out of four cotton farms were operated with tenant labor. More­
over, cotton farms accounted for one-fourth of all farms in the country 
and half of Southern farms.^ There were 1,831;^70 tenant farmers in the 
South in 1935; about 63 percent of all tenants in the nation. Tenants 
produced roughly two out of three bales of cotton in the United States.^
Ŵ. A. Turner, A Graphic Summary of Farm Tenure, U. S. Department 
of Agriculture Mise. Pub. No. 26l (Washington: U. S. Government Printing 
Office, 1936); pp. I-3.
S., Bureau of Census, United States Census of Agriculture: 
1925. The Southern States, II, lOBl
■ 2
Tenancy had been on the rise in the South and the nation since 
1900. The national tenancy rate increased from 35 percent in 19OÜ to 
^2 percent in 1935" It ranged from 70 percent in Mississippi to 6 per­
cent in Massachusetts. In I9OO the part of American farm land operated 
by tenants was less than one-third of all cultivated land, but by 1935 
it was 45 percent. Nor was tenancy confined to Negroes, as was often 
supposed. The rate of white tenancy rose alarmingly after 19OO to the 
point that k6 percent of all white farmers in the country were tenants 
in 1935" Among Negro farmers, 77 percent were tenants, but this figure 
had been fairly constant since I9OO. About half of all Negro tenant 
farmers were at the lowest level of tenancy, sharecropping, and 29 per­
cent of white tenants were croppers. Other statistics indicate that it 
was becoming increasingly difficult to climb out of tenancy,^ that farms 
were changing hands with amazing rapidity, that more and more land was 
being mortgaged, and that farmers as a class were gradually losing con- 
trol of the land.^
As early as 1917, Former President Theodore Roosevelt showed 
concern about developments in land tenure when he wrote an article in
the Ohio Farmer entitled "Will Our Farmers Become a Tenant Class?
The statistics indicate an affirmative answer and also that the Great
%. S., Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the U. S., 
19^1 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 19̂ 2), pp. 8̂1-68$.
E. Ejalmar Bjomsen, "Farm Debt and Farm Foreclosures," Bureau 
of Agricultural Economics, The Agricultural Situation, Vol. 2k, No. 2, 
February, 19^0 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 19̂ 0),
pp. 18-2 1.
T̂urner, A Graphic Summary of Farm Tenure, p. 1.
^Theodore Roosevelt, "Will Our Farmers Become a Tenant Class?"
Ohio Farmer, CIV (October 13, 1917), 31̂ *
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Depression was hastening the process.
Wliat happened to the ideal of farm oiraership? Thomas Jefferson 
dreamed of an intelligent, independent electorate made up mostly of free- 
holding farmers. That dream became American dogma, but it was lost some­
where in the 20th century. Forty-two percent of farm families owned no 
land in Iĝ O, and every year h0,000 more joined their ranks. National 
land policy during the 19th and 20th centuries was dedicated to indi- 
vidual ownership of family-size farms, and yet in 193Ô President Frank­
lin D. Roosevelt was forced to admit that, "we have fallen far short of
8achieving that ideal."
The President's pronouncement came only after careful study of 
farm tenancy by several government agencies and a special committee. For 
years,.many of the key men in the federal government concerned with land 
problems had been gravitating toward the conclusion that something was 
basically wrong with the national Isuad tenure system. They did not come • 
out and say it, but they implied in their writings that a change was 
needed. What they had in mind was not clear--perhaps communal ownership 
for some groups, perhaps guaranteed tenure, perhaps governmental limita­
tions on the freedom of farmers to mortgage and sell their land. One 
official blamed "freedom of disposition," or the unlimited right of the 
landowner to sell the land, even if it was not in his own best interest,
7Paul V. Maris, "Farm Tenancy," Yearbook of Agriculture, 1940.
U. S. Depeirtment of Agriculture, 76th Cong., 3rd Bess., House Doc. 695 
(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 19̂ 0), pp. 887-888.
Q
Franklin Roosevelt, Farm Tenancy, tfessage from the President 
Transmitting the Report of the Special Committee on Farm Tenancy, 75'th 
Cong., 1st Sess., House Doc. No. 1̂ 9 (Washington: U. S. Government 
Printing Office, 1937), P- 1-
for much of the trouble. He felt that it led to land speculation and 
9tenancy.
Fscrm tenancy existed in all parts of the United States during the 
1930's, but it was worst in the Southern states, especially in cotton 
areas. Cotton farms were mostly small and low in value, averaging less 
than half the size and a third the worth of other types of farms in the 
nation. Three out of four cotton farmers were tenants, chiefly because 
cotton lent itself to tenancy better than any other American crop.^̂
Cotton is a tropical plant which was adapted to the mildly trop­
ical parts of the United States. It thrives on hot weather and moderate, 
timely moisture. Since frost is deadly to cotton and the growing season 
is long, it cannot be grown profitably north of the line where there 
are fewer than 200 frost-free days each year. Thus, in the 1930's the 
"Cotton Belt" covered most of Texas, southern Oklahoma, Arkansas, Lou­
isiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, 
western Tennessee, and northern Florida.Since it was the big money 
crop of the South, cotton monopolized the richest land— the alluvial 
soils of the numerous river valleys and the fertile prairies of Texas
and Oklahoma. Yet it was also the crop of the small upland farmer who
1 ?scratched out an existence on marginal and sub-marginal land.
L̂. C. Gray, "Our Major Land Use Problems and Suggested Lines 
of Action," Yearbook of Agriculture, 19̂ 0, pp. 404-409.
'̂̂ Turner, A Graphic Summary of Farm Tenure, pp. 1-3-
^^Rupert Vance, Human Factors in Cotton Culture (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, I929), pp. i and iL.
^̂ Ibid., pp. 14-2 3.
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Where cotton culture was the most intensive, tenancy was the 
greatest. ' The Mississippi Delta, the Black Belt of northern Mississippi 
and Alabama, and the Piedmont Plateau of South Carolina were areas where 
tenant farmers far outnumbered landowners, and these were also the cen­
ters of cotton production. There were 69O counties in the country, 
mostly in the South, where there were more tenants than landowners.
Texas had the most tenants, but Mississippi had the worst tenancy. In 
Mississippi, there were more than twice as many tenants as owners. More 
than half of the tenants were Negroes, but they had one million less 
acres of land than white tenants. Negro and white sharecroppers, about 
on equal terms economically, made up hO percent of the farm population 
of Mississippi but occupied farms worth only 23 precent of the total, 
value of farms in the state.
Southern tenancy, like slavery before the Civil War, was an 
institution "peculiar" to the South. It was not only an economic but a 
social and political order, the origins of which lay clearly in slavery 
and the plantation system.In order to operate effectively, a plan­
tation must have abundant and fertile land, cheap, docile labor, social 
as well as economic management of the labor, and an imperishable crop 
with a ready market. When emancipation of the Southern slaves took 
place after the Civil War, the cheap labor and the social and economic 
controls were removed. This situation forced planters to seek ways to 
return the workers to the soil. They tried year-long wage contracts,
^ T̂urner, A Graphic Summary of Farm Tenure, pp. 1-25.
^^Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract, 19̂ 1, p. 689.
^̂ Vance, Human- Factors in Cotton Culture, pp. 3̂ -37*
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but the Negroes did not understand contracts and refused to work for a 
year without pay. If the Negroes were paid for shorter work periods, 
they often left after the first pay day and did not return until their 
money was spent. Under the Black Codes passed by the Southern states 
soon after the War, Negroes could be imprisoned for vagrancy and their 
labor bought by planters, but these codes were wiped out when the federal
16governmnet imposed radical Reconstruction on the South.
For years, large tracts of land lay vacant in the South until
gradually a solution to the labor problem was found--share tenancy. The
plantations drifted quite naturally into it. The Barrows plantation in
Georgia is a good example. It consisted of 1,000 acres and had about
twenty-five Negro families.• For several years following emancipation
the field hands worked in two gangs under Negro foremen and received a
portion of the crop in lieu of wages. But after a while the two squads
split into smaller groups and there was much squabbling and inefficiency.
At that point Barrows reorganized the plantation and divided the land
into family tenant tracts. Each family worked its own piece of land and
the gang system was abandoned. One by one, the workers moved their
cabins from where they were grouped behind the plantation house to their
own tract. The method of sharing the crop was replaced by rent, paid in
17cotton to the landowner. Under this new plantation system, soon common 
throughout the South, planters maintained the necessary cheapness and 
docility of labor, and social and economic control. Wrote one apologist
^^Arthur F. Raper, Preface to Peasantry (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1936), pp. 96-9Ü.
C. Barrows," A Georgia Plantation," Scribner's Monthly, CXX
(April, 1881), 830-8 3 5.
T
in 1927 : "The slave was probably predestined to be what he has since 
very largely become--a peasant farmer.
This explanation of how emancipated slaves became tenant farmers ' 
does not apply to the 1,202,17^ white tenants in the South in 1935- The 
traditional rationale in the South for the existence of white tenants 
was that they were "poor whites," an ignorant, shiftless, lazy class of 
people for whom tenancy would be a step up. But there were never enough 
"poor whites" in the South to account for the millions of white tenants
19and their families. Many of these fell into tenancy because they could 
not afford to buy land. Others were jobless urban workers who moved to
OQfarms during times of depression.^ Some were former landowners who 
lost their farms because of crop failure, low cotton prices, laziness, 
ill health, poor management, exhaustion of the soil, mechanization of 
agriculture, excessive interest rates, or inability to compete with ten­
ant labor. Many tricks of nature could cause a cotton farmer to lose 
his crop and perhaps his farm: drought., floods, boll weevil, untimely 
rain, frost, hail, high winds, root rot and many other plant diseases.
As the Southern tenancy system developed, it became stratified 
into economic and social classes. There were fundamentally three types 
of tenants with many variations: the cash-tenant, the share-tenant, and 
the sharecropper— often simply called "cropper." The cash-tenant was at
^^Robert E. Park, "The Anti-Slavery Movement in England," Ameri­
can Journal of Sociology, XXXIII (September, 1927), 290-291.
^^Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract, 1941, p. 687.
20Edmund de S. Brunner and Irving Lorge, Rural Trends in De­
pression Years (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), PP* 1-11.
Vance, Human Factors in Cotton Culture, pp. 8O-IO7 .
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the top of the tenancy heap. - If any tenant was in a position to move 
into ownership, it was usually the cash-tenant. He owned his own work 
animals and inclements and was able to provide for himself and family 
throughout thé year and to buy fertilizer and feed. He paid a fixed 
cash rent each year, all profit above rent and operating going into his 
own pocket.
The share-tenant was next in status. He owned most of the neces­
sary work animals, tools, and machinery and could furnish seed, feed, 
and two-thirds or three-fourths of the fertilizer. Some share-tenants 
could provide for their families during the crop season, but when they 
could not the landlord extended credit. For use of land and house and 
the privilege of gathering wood for fuel, the share-tenant paid one- 
fourth or one-third of the crop, depending on how much the landlord had 
to augment his work animals, implements, seed, and fertilizer.
The lowliest tenant was the sharecropper. He had only the labor 
of himself and his family to offer. The landlord furnished land, house, 
fuel, half the fertilizer, work animals, implements, supervision, and
the necessities of life, on credit. The sharecropper paid half of his
^  22 crop in rent.
A tenant who was neither cash nor share-tenant but a little of 
both was the standing renter. He paid rent in a fixed amount of pro­
duce and furnished everything he needed to make a crop. His social and 
economic status was usually slightly below a cash-tenant and above a 
share-tenant, but it could be considerably lower when he was a "bale-a-
A. Goldenweiser and E. A. Boeger, "A Study of the Tenant 
Systems of Farming in the Yazoo-Mississippi Delta," United States De­
partment of Agriculture Bulletin 337 (Washington: U. S. Government 
Printing Office, 1916), passimT"
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plov" tenant. Under this arrangement used on some large plantations, 
the tenant farmed only about twenty acres, received nearly everything 
needed to make a crop including a plow, and paid a bale of cotton per 
year in rent.
A high percentage of cash-tenancy in an area reflected the dis­
integration of the plantation system. Where the plantations were strong, 
sharecropping was likely to be most prevalent, and there was much com­
petition between white and black croppers— to the detriment of both.
In reality, the sharecropper was little more than a wage hand being 
paid in kind, and the statutes of some Southern states recognized him 
as such rather than a tenant. Cropper farming, requiring close super­
vision by the landlord and obedience and servility by the tenant, gave 
small reward to individual initiative and self expression. Essentially, 
it was a form of debt peonage.
Share-tenancy was considered in parts of the South to be an ex­
clusively white institution. It developed in the mountain and Piedmont 
areas of the Old South before the Civil War and was still mof.t prevalent 
there in the 1930'b . Often, white farmers on a plantation would be in
this status while black ones would be sharecroppers. Cropper farming
23was a child of the Reconstruction period and was most common in the 
Piedmont, Black Belt, and Delta. White sharecropping was not as intense 
in the Delta and was more wide-spread throughout the Cocton Belt than 
Negro cropping. Also, there were considerable numbers of white croppers
plion tobacco farms in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia.
^^aper. Preface to Peasantry, p. 1À9.
^^Tumer, A Graphic Summary of Farm Tenure, p. 31 •
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The most unfortunate of Southern farm workers was the day- 
laborer or wage-hand who had a precarious existence without any assur­
ance of work, food, or housing from one day to the next. Many planters 
might have preferred this type of labor except that it required contin­
uous outlays of cash throughout the growing season and allowed less 
control of workers.
As the Great Depression of the 1930's worsened, tenancy became 
recognized as a serious national problem. Writers like John Steinbeck, 
James Agee, and Erskine Caldwell wrote about it, and the tragedy of 
tenancy was depicted in plays, best-selling novels, and movies. Sev­
eral government agencies made extensive studies of the problem. It was 
ironic that tenancy did not become a celebrated cause until the entire 
country was in serious economic difficulties, but the reason for this 
was that liberal writers, trying to show the need for action in the 
Depression, used the most extreme examples of privation and poverty—  
the Southern tenants.
Southern tenancy was a vicious, self-perpetuating system. On a 
26tenant plantation the workers were little more than serfs, held to 
the land by debt, ignoreuice, poverty, and dependence on the landlord. 
That was the way the planter wanted it. He could not afford to let 
his tenants become too independent or self-reliant because he would lose 
control over them and this would cut his margin of profit. The planta-
25Raper, Preface to Peasantry, pp. l46-1̂ 7.
^^In 1910 the Bureau of Census began using the term "tenant 
plantation" which it defined as ". . . a continuous tract of land of 
considerable area under the general control or supervision of a single 
individual or firm, all or part of such tract being divided into at 
least five small tracts which are leased to tenants." U. S., Bureau of 
the Census, Thirteenth Census of the United States; I9IO. Agriculture, 
V, 878.
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tion system taught the tenant certain things--how to plow, hoe and pick 
cotton, fix wagon wheels, build make-shift houses, slaughter animals, 
and cook turnip greens--but it could not allow tenants to rise above 
this menial level. In the Black Belt, to give a Negro a formal educa­
tion was to "ruin a good nigger."
What kept the tenants from escaping? Could they not seek other 
jobs? Some did, but they were the aggressive ones. The ordinary tenant 
knew nothing but farming and could not imagine himself doing anything 
else. And then it was hard to escape. If a tenant had debts, and most 
did, the state laws in many Southern states practically tied him to the 
land until the crop was made. Moreover, there was a sort of gentle­
men's agreement among planters that they would not hire tenants from 
another plantation without the consent of the planter concerned. The 
tenant who "slipped off" to escape his debts faced flogging, murder or 
lynching, especially if he were a Negro.
With plantation labor virtually trapped on the land, there en­
sued an endless game where the planter tried to get all he could from 
the tenant and the tenant all he could from the planter. Although the 
tenant usually made little or no profit at the end of the season, he had 
at least made a living through the year by buying on credit at the 
plantation store. Tenants habitually took all the credit they could 
get, and the planter was saddled with the worry of preventing them from 
getting deeper in debt to him than they could hope to pay. Landlords 
were often dictatorial and autocratic, but tenants also learned tricks
27to get what they wanted.
27Raper, Preface to Peasantry, pp. 171-173*
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The hopeless part of the tenancy system was that there was no 
room for improvement, n̂e landlord was forced to depend on unstable, 
irresponsible, inefficient labor. If he attempted to improve the qual­
ity of his tenants by raising their standards of living, he was likely 
to drive himself into bankruptcy. His profits depended on the poverty 
of his tenants. On the other hand, most tenants were probably paid as 
much as they were worth to the landlord considering what they produced. 
The fact that the most unscrupulous landlords were the ones who made 
the best profits led the cotton economy into a vicious downward spiral, 
the final outcome of which seemed destined to be a class of sub-human
people--serfs or worse who were completely dependent and who would be
?Ra definite liability to the landowner and the country in general.
It was generally true that the exploitation of the cottonfield 
workers was in direct proportion to the size of the plantation. The 
larger the plantation, the more vicious the exploitation. Often the 
owners of the great plantations were absentee landlords, syndicates, 
or corporations, some European, who hired managers to run the planta­
tions. These managers were expected to show a profit each year; if
cotton prices were down, they had to make the profit from their ten- 
29ants. ^
Cotton plantations were such marginal operations that they were 
forced to exploit the soil as well as the workers. Planting cotton as
28Harold Hoffsommer, "The AAA and the Cropper," Social Forces, 
XIII (May, 1935), 494-502.
^^Howard Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers (New York: Covici- 
Friede Publishers, 1936), pp. 3&-39-
13
they did every year on every available square foot of land, even up to 
the front door of the tenant shacks, eventually caused the soil to wear 
out. In parts of the Carolinas and Georgia, the plantation system had. 
run its course, leaving in its wake a barren land and broken people.
When the land began to play out, planters and more alert tenants left. 
All that remained were decadent tenant families, made so by generations 
of poverty, lack of education, poor food, blind prejudice and hard work. 
According to Arthur Raper, who made a study of them in Georgia, they 
were now ready for permanent "peasantry.
The attitude of planters toward their tenants, especially in the 
Old South, has been called "paternalistic," but it is hard to imagine a 
father exploiting his children the way a planter did his tenants. True, 
many planters looked upon their tenants as "childlike" people who would 
starve to death without supervision, and often it was to the planter 
that a tenant turned when he had a problem or was in trouble. Most 
planters felt that tenants would not tend gardens or cows if they had 
them, and could not be counted on to do anything on their own initiative. 
Some even held back part of their tenants' annual pay knowing they would 
spend it foolishly if paid all at once. The typical planter believed 
that keeping tenants on the ragged edge of privation was the best way 
to make them work. The fear of hunger was the only thing that would 
drive them into the fields. "The man working for food not only works 
regularly," explained one Georgia planterj "he works gladly; he takes 
orders cheerfully, is seldom sullen— all in all, he's the most satis-
oi ■factory farm worker."^
^̂ Raper, Preface to Peasantry, p. 4.
^^Ibid., pp. 157-159*
Ik
Like his ante-bellum prototype, the planter had social control 
over his workers. On some plantations, community and family matters 
were subject to his review. >fany planters, for instance, would not allow 
couples to live together without being legally married. The planters 
determined all holidays and customarily gave an annual picnic-barbecue 
for their workers. Some provided primitive schools and churches for 
tenants and others helped support such endeavors.
Race relations played an important role in the plantation system. 
White supremacy was the gospel of Southern life. The Ku KLux KLan, 
although waning, was still active during the 1930's, and plantations were 
the best place to find "unreconstructed rebels." In Georgia, Sherman's 
march to the sea was mentioned daily. A Negro did not question the word 
of a white man in anything; he did what he was told to do, and he did 
it in a servile manner if he cared much for his personal safety. To the 
typical Southern white, the only likeable Negro was one who "knew his 
place."
Politically, the most Democratic part of the nation was probably 
the least democratic. Negro office holders were practically unknown, 
and most Negroes were prevented from voting. In public schools, money 
spent on the education of white students varied from six to sixty times 
the expenditure for colored children. 3̂
The bane of the tenant, and yet the blessing, was the "commissary" 
or plantation store where he could buy tools, utensils, food, and some 
clothing. Some planters required their tenants to use the commissary,
3^ance, Human Factors in Cotton Culture, pp. 77-78•
38Raper, Preface to Peasantry, pp. k-6.
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and most extended credit for food, fertilizer, and clothing only throu^ 
their own store. From the time the season began until the crop was made, 
the tenant was likely to be completely dependent on the commissary for 
"furnish," or food and clothing. Planters made good profits from their 
stores. According to one Georgia landowner, there was only one way for 
a planter to make money using hired labor, and that was to have a com­
missary and keep the books himself, "making sure that at the end of the 
year he has gotten it all, and his labor has 'just lived,' as one would 
say."3"
Prices at the commissary were often considerably higher than at 
stores in town, and there was a limit set on each tenant's credit. How­
ever, if one man's crop looked promising, his credit limit was raised; 
another who was sick or whose cotton was infested with boll weevil or 
Johnson grass might find his ability to buy food severely restricted.
All commissaries charged interest on their advances, ranging from 10 to 
60 percent per annum.
"Settlement day," after the cotton was picked and ginned and 
when the landlord settled with his tenants, was keenly anticipated all 
season long by the tenants. Parents whose children asked to buy things 
told them, "Jus' wait 'til settlement day." During the weeks of the 
brutal labor of picking, as the great day approached, the tenants grew 
more and more excited. Most tenants in the lower levels had no idea 
what was coming to them. They knew whether they had made a good crop 
or not, and perhaps they had some idea of cotton prices, but most of
^̂ Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, pp. 42-43.
Arthur F. Raper and Ira De A. Reid. Sharecroppers All (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941j, pp. 22, 3̂ -39; 42, 68-6 9.
l6 . ■
them kept no account of their credit. Many did not know enough arith­
metic even to approximate what their settlement should be. They simply 
hoped for the best. When they were disappointed, they tended to blame 
their landlord for cheating them. This was warranted in some cases but 
not in others. Ordinarily, the tenant was a poor judge of whether he
36had been cheated or not.
In addition to half of the proceeds from the cotton and cotton­
seed taken in payment of rent on settlement day, the landlords on tenant 
plantations deducted the year's "furnish" with interest, any advances 
of cash or charges for breakage, a fee for supervision and management 
usually amounting to ten percent of the advances at the commissary, and
a charge for the use of plantation roads and ditches which was ordinarily
37ten cents per acre farmed.
Before the depression, in the years when crops were good, most 
tenants cleared at least a few hundred dollars on settlement day. A few 
lucky ones in the higher levels got a thousand or more. But during the 
depression, many tenants finished the year in debt, and many had debts 
of more than one year's standing. Estimates of average tenant income 
varied from $103^̂  to $^+59 per year.^^
^̂ New York World Telegram, February 28, 1935  ̂p. 2j and T. J. 
Woofter, Landlord and Tenant on the Cotton Plantation, Works Progress 
Administration Monograph No. 5 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing 
Office, 1936), p. 8 2.
37Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, pp. 49-50-
oQ
Hoffsommer, "AAA end the Cropper," Social Forces, XIII, 494-495<
39Cotton Section, Agricultural Adjustment Administration, "Arkan­
sas Plantation Study," National Archives, Washington, D. C., Record 
Group 145, Records of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Here­
inafter cited as NA, RG 145.
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A survey of three large ' Arkansas plantations nonducted by the 
Cotton Section of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the 
University of Arkansas found that actual cash income of tenants was 
about $300 in 193^ including government benefits. One of the three 
plantations grossed $132,004 that year, of which the tenants got only 
$29,842.^^ Tenants in the East studied by the Works Progress Adminis­
tration averaged $309 per family, or about $73 per capita. They were 
able to spend only $13 per month for food, fuel, medicine, and clothing 
while awaiting settlement. The Farm Security Administration, in spot 
studies in Mississippi, Alabama, and Arkansas found tenant income to be 
about $132, only one-fourth as much as that of com tenants in Nebraska. 
Sociologist Arthur Raper, in a classic study of two cotton counties in 
Georgia, learned that Negro tenant families spent only $92 for food, 
clothing, and tobacco in 1934 and white families $161. Another author­
ity, Rupert Vance, told the National Country Life Conference in 1938 
that "unless one has actually observed the way tenants live, the meaning 
of such low incomes is hard to visualize.
Each year after a settlement was made, tenants began to move. 
Perhaps they were dissatisfied with their profits, perhaps they were 
evicted, or more likely they were simply hunting for the better place
40Ibid.
41Woofter, Landlord and Tenant on the Cotton Plantation, p. 8 3.
42Carl Taylor, Helen Wheeler, and E. L. Kirkpatrick, Disadvan­
taged Classes in American Agriculture, Farm Security Administration 
Social Research Report No. 8 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing
Office, 1938).
^^Country Life Conference, Lexington, Kentucky, 1938, Disadvan­
taged People in Rural Life (Chicago, 1938), p- 3-
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they seldom found. During the cold, rainy months of December and Jan­
uary the highways and roads of the South were clotted with displaced ten­
ant families, their wagons and junk cars loaded with pitiful belongings 
and dirty, underfed children. But for all their trouble, moving seldom 
raised the status of tenants and often lowered it.
The mobility of some tenants was amazing, especially sharecrop­
pers. Statistics gathered by the Cotton Section of AAA showed that a 
considerable percentage of tenants had moved six or seven times since 
they started farming and a few had lived on as many as fifteen farms.“*'̂ 
The average tenure of tenants in two counties in Georgia was 3-7 years 
for Negroes and 2.9 for whites. Among Negro sharecroppers, the tenure 
was only 2.8 years and with whites only 2 .4 .̂  ̂ An extensive study by 
AAA of 13,575 tenant families on relief revealed that U0 .6 percent made 
some type of move in 193^-^^ Admittedly, relief tenants were not rep­
resentative of all tenant families, but one source estimated that U3 
percent of all tenants were on relief in 1935 -̂ ^
Every group which studied the tenancy problem during the 1930's 
was appalled by it. A special commission appointed by Arkansas Governor 
J. M. Futrell in 193& found "illiteracy, poverty, wretchedness, with
U8destruction to health and character." Norman Thomas, traveling through
44
45
AAA, Cotton Section, "Arkansas Plantation Study," NA, RG l45-
Raper, Preface to Peasantry, p. 6 1.
46"Agricultural Adjustment Administration-Federal Emergency Re­
lief Administration Survey," File II9, NA, RG l4$.
^ R̂offsommer, "AAA and the Cropper," Social Forces, XIIIj 494-495,
^^Govemor's Farm Tenancy Commission, Findings, in the files of 
the National Agricultural Workers' Union, Washington, D. C.
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cotton country, saw worn-out people going to work on worn-out land and 
commented that there were "few drearier sights in the world." An in­
dependent study sponsored by a group of prominent citizens^^ and con­
ducted by Rupert Vance of the University of North Carolina and Charles 
S. Johnson of Fisk University gave credence to the worst things being 
said about tenancy. Their report concluded that although cotton farmers 
in the South contributed a billion dollars annually to the world economy, 
they were "the most impoverished and backward of any large group of
CQproducers in America." President Roosevelt's Commission on Farm Ten­
ancy in 1936 found that one-fifth to one-fourth of the nation's farm 
population lived in extreme poverty, were chronically undernourished and 
subject to pellagra, malaria, and hookworm, were often without medical 
care, and were usually poorly clad.^^
Tenant housing, by all accounts, was the worst in the land.
Houses were usually two-room, clapboard shacks, unpainted, weatherbeaten, 
and in the process of falling down. Wind and rain came through holes in 
the roofs and walls. Plumbing was unheard of and outhouses were con­
sidered a luxury. A tenant's personal possessions usually consisted of 
a few rickety chairs, a table, a bed or two, a few ragged quilts, a
kgThis group included William Green of the American Federation 
of Labor, Clark Howell, editor of the Atlanta Constitution, Governor 
Frank 0. Lowden of Illinois, William Allen White, editor of the Emporia 
Gazette, and Gen. Robert E. Wood, President of Sears, Roebuck and Com­
pany.
^^Charles Johnson, Edwin Embree, and W. W. Alexander, The Col­
lapse of Cotton Tenancy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1935), P" 1 and passim.'
^^President's Committee on Farm Tenancy, Report, 75th Cong., 1st 
Sess., House Doc. No. 1 9̂ (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office,
1937), p. 1.
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broken washstand, some boxes, a few dishes, a pig or a dog, and once in
' 52 •a while, some' chickens. It was generally recognized that if a tenant 
hoped to get ahead, he had to acquire work animals, implements and a 
wagon. The best way to do this was by-sucn sidelines as raising cows, 
chickens, and pigs and taking extra jobs.^^ And yet 60 percent of the 
Negro tenants studied by Raper in Georgia owned neither mules nor horses, 
31 percent had no cows, I7 percent no pigs, and 10 percent no chickens.
Tenants worked from dawn to dusk, or from "can' to can't" as they 
said in the Arkansas Delta. On most plantations, a bell rang at da'wn 
summoning the workers to the fields, and those wno did not respond were 
severely disciplined. Children began working in the fields when they 
were six; women worked each day until time to fix meals or do housework. 
The hardest work was picking the cotton at the end of the season. James 
Agee describes this as "simple and terrible work" which required "all 
the endurance you can draw up against it from the roots of your exist­
ence .
Tenant children attended school sporadically in schools which 
were usually open less than half the year. Throughout the rural South, 
schools were customarily closed during the cotton picking season. Tiie 
average abbendance of the childre'i of 3̂ 9 tenant families in Arkansas 
was only 3*8 months in 193̂ - Hundreds of one-room Negro schools had
^̂ Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, pp. 40-̂ l, 43-̂ 6.
53Texas Division of Public Welfare, Studies in Farm Tenmcy in 
Texas, University of Texas Bulletin No. 21 (Austin, I915), p. 36.
^̂ Raper, Preface to Peasantry, pp. 8I, 8 6.
James Agee and Walker Evans, Let Us Now Praise Famous Men 
(Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1960), pp. 32̂ -348.
56'AAA, Cotton Section, "Arkansas Plantation Study."
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no windows or desks. While most white children in rural areas could
ride to school in buses, most Negro and some white students nad to walk.
Rural teachers were poorly paid and inadequately trained. Their sal-
57aries were below thirty dollars per month in many counties. A high 
percentage of adult tenants were illiterate, and all but a few were 
totally incapable of absorbing, correlating, or critically examining 
any idea or physical fact beyond the simplest and most obvious.
The diseases of malnutrition, filth, and immorality were always 
with tenants. Their diet of cornbread, molasses and sow-belly (fat 
salt-pork) eaten three times a day caused pellagra. Their lack of sani­
tation led to malaria, t̂ qmioid and many other diseases. Working in the
fields barefooted gave them hook-worms. Immorality caused their vene-
59real disease rate to oe high. Families were big out the birth rate 
was even higher. The tenants studied by Raper averaged about six living
r""
children, but the death rate was 10.8 percent among white tenants and 
20.4 percent for Negro sharecroppers.^^
The prospect of ever escaping tenancy seemed so dim that when 
tenants got a few dollars they tended to spend them on things they 
wanted instead of necessities. What they wanted most was a car, and a 
surprisingly high percentage of tenants in the Old South owned some sort 
of old jalopy. During the late IghO's and the Ig Ô's, a story circu-
'̂̂ Raper and Reid, Sharecroppers All, p. 24.
^ Âgee and Evans, Let Us Now Praise Famous Men, p. 30b.
'̂ Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, pp. 1̂-̂ 2.
^̂ Raper, Preface to Peasantry, p. JO.
^̂ Ihid., pp. 157-161, 174-176.
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lated through the country of how the Russian government decided to let
their people see the film The Grapes of Wrath because it showed the
failure of American capitalism but had to cancel it when their people
o2were amazed to learn that the "Oakies" had their own cars. This story 
gave great comfort to certain Americans who liked to think that even ■ 
the poorest people in America were better off than the average Russian.
But Steinbeck's novel also tells what it cost the "Oakies" to buy their 
cars. Few tenants in Oklahoma had cars; so they had to sell everything 
accumulated in a lifetime of work— animals, plows, harness, cooking 
utensils, and most tragic of all, their tenuous right to the land because 
when they lost these things they lost their status as tenants.
Literary travelers in the South during the 1930's taxed their 
talents to describe tenancy. English author Naomi Mitchison wrote, "I 
have traveled over most of Europe and part of Africa, but I have never 
seen such terrible siglits as I saw yesterday among the sharecroppers of
6k.Arkansas. Frazier Hunt, reporter for the New York Wprld-Telegram, 
commented that cotton pickers reminded him of Chinese coolies working 
in the fields; however, he added that he had seen no children working in
65China as he had in the South.
Erskine Caldwell, whose literary reputation was built on writing 
about the seamy side of Southern rural life, pulled out all the stops:
"Oakies" was a name applied to displaced tenants and small farm­
ers who migrated from Oklahoma to California in the 1930's.
^^John Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath (New York: Viking, 1939)> 
pp. 83-8 9. The used-car lot scene, described in these pages, is one of 
the most striking and poignant in depression literature.
6kStatement given to Howard Kester. Quoted by Kester, Revolt 
Among the Sharecroppers, p. 51*
^%ew York World-Telegram, July 30, 1935 «
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Near Keysville ^Georgi^ a two-room house is occupied by 
three families, each consisting of man and wife and from one to 
four children each . . . .
In one of the two rooms a six-year-old boy licked the paper 
bag the meat had been brought in. His legs were scarcely any 
larger than a medium sized dog's leg . . . .  Suffering from 
rickets and anemia, his legs were unable to carry him for more 
than a dozen steps at a time;'. . . his belly was swollen sev­
eral times its normal size. His face was bony white. He was 
starving to death.
In the other room of the house, without chairs, beds, or 
tables, a woman lay rolled up in some quilts trying to sleep.
On the floor before the open fire lay two babie ,̂ neither a year 
old, sucking the dry teats of a mongrel bitch.
James Agee and Walker Evans, a New York magazine writer and a 
government photographer on leave from the Farm Security Administration, 
probably reached the greatest literary heights in Let Us How Praise 
Famous Men. For weeks they lived with the families of Bud Woods, George 
Gudger, and Fred Rickets, white tenant farmers in Alabama. They ate 
abominable food, slept in a bed crawling with bedbugs, fleas, and lice, 
and in general tried to live as tenants lived. A key to Agee's charac­
ter is that, although he spent all of one night fighting the vermin in 
his bed, he did so as quietly as possible so that Gudger and his family 
sleeping in the next room would not hear him and be hurt. Agee seemed 
unwilling to leave anything undone which would help him understand the 
families. At night, he wrote the text of the book, often by the flick­
ering light of a kerosene lantern on a barren kitchen table while the 
tenants slept on the other side of the wall. His Muse was a bottle of 
cheap whiskey.
Let Us Now Praise Famous Men has undergone a revival since it 
was republished in I960, which is difficult to understand since there 
has been no great surge of interest in tenant farmers. The attraction
^̂ "Bootleg Slavery," Time, March 4, 1935, pp. 13-l4.
2k
of the book is probably its high literary quality and the stark, other­
worldliness of the photographs. Agee's winning of the Pulitzer Prize, 
posthumously, for another book in 1957 may have something to do with it.
Reading Agee's book and looking at Evans's photographs is prob­
ably the closest one can come to real knowledge of tenant life. Evans's 
pictures are in four parts, one for each family and one of rural and 
town scenes in Alabama. The eyes of the tenants stare from the pages 
witn some intense message, and when the reader finds the following words 
by Agee he knows what they are saying:
How were we caught:
What, what is it has happened? What is it has happened that 
we are living the way we are?
The children are not the way it seemed they might be:
She is no longer beautiful :
He no longer cares for me, he Just takes me when he wants me:
There is so much work it seems like you never see the end of it: 
I'm so hot when I get through cooking a meal it's more than I 
can do to sit down, and eat it :
How was it we were caught.
Evans's pictures are of faces, young and old, of kitchens, hearths, 
corners of rooms, bare walls, a sleeping child, a man standing in a field, 
a pair of worn-out shoes lying in the dust, a fresh grave with only a 
dime-store dish to decorate it. They are painful enough without knowing 
the people, but when the reader, constantly shuffling from text to pic­
tures, comes to know that Annie Mae Gudger, although she looks fifty 
yeans old, is only twenty-seven, and that little Valley Few Gudger 
(Squinchy), aged twenty months, is so sickly he will probably not live 
out the year, the photographs become a]most unbearable.
Agee was twenty-seven when he wrote the book. According to
^ Âgee and Evans, Let Us How Praise Famous Men, p. 8l and passim.
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Evans, he was full of "paralyzing, self-lacerating a n g e r . L i k e  many 
"angry young men" of his time, he considered himself a Communist. He 
approached his subject with much fear and confusion. He said that if 
is were possible, he would do no writing at all. His book would be all
photographs and fragments of cloth, bits of cotton, lumps of earth, re­
cordings of speech, pieces of wood and iron, phials of odors, and plates 
of food and excrement. And he added, "A piece of the body torn out by
the roots might be more to the point. "
Agee told his reader to get the loudest radio possible and listen 
to Beethoven's Seventh Symphony— really listen to it. He said to get 
down on the floor and jam the ear as close to the loudspeaker as pos­
sible and stay there, breathing lightly and not moving, and neither eat­
ing nor smoking nor drinking. The sound might hurt the ears. It would 
not be pretty, or beautiful, or legal, or acceptable, but it would be 
"savage and dangerous and murderous to all equilibrium."^^
Indeed, the story of the Southern tenant farmers was savage and 
dangerous and murderous to all equilibrium.
68Agee and Evans, Let Us How Praise Famous Men, pp. ix-xii.
^Ibid., pp. 7-1 6.
CHAPTER II
THE AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT
Like the entire economy, American agriculture in 1933 was in 
danger of complete collapse. Farm prices, which had never completely 
recovered from the post-war depression of 1920-1922, plunged to such 
depths in the Great Depression that some crops were not worth the cost 
of harvesting. During the 1920's, a hard core of farm leaders such as 
George N. Peek, Chester Davis, Charles Brand, and M. L. Wilson fought 
continuously for some sort of relief for agriculture through federal
plegislation. The various McNary-Haugen Bills proposed during the
1920's were designed to raise farm prices artificially to a level of
"parity" so that farmers would have their fair share of the national 
2income, but the bills were killed by two Presidential vetoes. The 
agrarians also turned their attention to the export-debenture plan, a 
different approach to the same goal, but it too met with little suc­
cess . ̂
■̂ ndwin Nourse, Joseph Davis, and John D. Black, Three Years of 
the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (Washington: The Brookings 
Institution, 1937),PP- 3-5*
Ĝilbert C. Fite, George N. Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity 
(Norman : University of Oklahoma Press, 195̂ ); pp. 60-63-
Chester C. Davis, "The Development of Agricultural Policy Since 
the End of the World War," Yearbook of Agriculture, 19̂ 0, pp. 308-312.
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Pressure from farmers eventually forced Congress to pass the 
Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929, which had the support of the Hoover 
Administration. The purpose of this measure was to promote effective 
merchandising of agricultural goods and to stabilize prices by making 
government loans on farm surpluses to cooperatives. Stabilization cor­
porations were also provided to deal with unusual surpluses. After this 
program had lost nearly $350,000,000, Congress abandoned it as a fail- 
ure.
In the presidential election of 1932, the successful candidate, 
Franklin Roosevelt, emphasized the need for farm legislation,^ and during 
the lame-duck session of Congress which met after the election, friends 
of agriculture in Congress made serious efforts to pass helpful legis­
lation. But the strong likelihood that President Hoover would veto 
destroyed hopes for a farm bill during that session.^ Other obstacles 
were a lack of agreement among farm leaders and agricultural experts 
on what should be done, the refusal of the President-elect to reveal 
his intentions until he entered office, and the fact that the Senate
could not make reasonable progress until certain members had left of-
7fice.'
Franklin Roosevelt became President on March h, 1933- In his 
inaugural address he called for "definite efforts to raise the values 
of agricultural products and with this the power to purchase the output
Harold G. Halcrow. Agricultural Policy of the United States 
(New York: Prentice Hall, 1953Ü, P* 260.
N̂ew York Times, September 15, 1932, p. 1.
^George N. Peek, Diary, January 5 through February 1, 1933-
7New York Times, March 5, 1933, sec. 21, p. 1.
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Q
of our cities." Roosevelt's agricultural advisers, Henry Wallace, 
Rexford Tugwell, Henry Morgenthau, and others had been at.work for some 
time on a new farm bill which they planned to get passed in the special 
session of Congress which began on March 4.̂  They proposed that the 
bill contain parts of four major farm proposals so that Congress would 
not be forced to choose one over the other. This was an especially 
appealing idea politically since each plan had its own powerful support­
ers. Roosevelt laughed and said, "Well, we can try."^^ The President 
then ordered Wallace, his new Secretary of Agriculture, to call a meet­
ing of farm leaders, lock himself in a room with them, and not come out 
until they had agreed on a program for agriculture.^^
Wallace got the conference of farm leaders to agree to most of 
the Administration's ideas. A memorandum adopted by the conference 
called for parity prices and asked that the President and the Secretary 
of Agriculture be given powers to lease land to curtail production, 
"regulate and supervise" agricultural marketing, implement a plan whereby 
surplus cotton owned by the government could be sold to cotton farmers
at less than the cost of production, levy a tax on agricultural products,
■  12 and assume all powers necessary to put the plans into effect.
George Peek later described the farm bill as a "hodgepodge of
8Ibid., sec. 1, p. 3-
^Henry A. Wallace, New Frontiers (New York: Reynal and Hitch­
cock, 193̂ ), PP« 162-163.
^^Rexford G. Tugwell, The Democratic Roosevelt (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday, 1957), P- 275.
^^Russell Lord, The Wallaces of Iowa (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 
19k7), p. 388.
%̂ew York Times, March 12, 1933, P* 1-
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conflicting notions compromised into a bill which had to be passed in
13order to get action." Russell Lord termed it "an omnibus measure, 
but a fantastically elastic omnibus." With journalistic license he 
wrote, "The measure as drawn sought to legalize almost anything anybody 
could think up.
The real authors of the farm bill, despite the pretext of the
farm leaders' conference, were Wallace, Tugwell, and Mordecai Ezekiel.
Also consulted were George Peek, Henry Morgenthau, General Hugh Johnson
and Bernard Baruch. The legal drafting was done by Frederick Lee and
Jerome Frank. The bill was completed five days after the farm leaders'
conferenceHowever, it must be added that most of the basic ideas
in the bill had been proposed many times before, some of them in previous
sessions of Congress.
On March l6 Wallace and Tugwell went to the White House to hand
the President the final draft of the bill.^^ Roosevelt, his imagination
stirred by the concepts of the proposals, had already written a long-
17hand message to accompany the bill to Congress. The measure was intro­
duced in the House that same day. Thus the agricultural recovery bill, 
which in Tugwell's words, was drafted "over a weekend, sponsored by a 
hastily convened meeting of farm leaders, and approved within a few
^^George N. Peek, Why Quit Our Own (New York: D. Van Nostrand 
Co., Inc., 1936), p. l4.
^̂ Lord, The Wallaces of Iowa, p. 330.
^Wallace, New Frontiers, p. lok, and Louis Bean (USDA econo­
mist), interview with author, August 1, 1999-
^^George N. Peek, Diary, March 16, 1933, Peek Papers.
■ 17Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deed., Vol. II, 
The Age of Roosevelt (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1959), P- 29-
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l8days," was ready for legislative approval.
In truth, the bill was one of the most imaginative and far- 
reaching measures ever seriously considered by Congress. Behind its 
radically different programs'was an intent to intervene in the economy 
on the side of the underdog which marks a major turning point in the 
philosophy of the American government. In the years since, few ideas 
have developed in connection with the farm problem which were not con­
tained in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933^^ and its amendments. 
The principle of parity for farmers, the guiding light of the bill, re­
mains today as a key feature of farm programs, whether Democratic or
Republican.
The .avowed purpose of the Agricultural Adjustment Act was
... to relieve the existing national economic emergency by in­
creasing agricultural purchasing power, to raise revenue for
extra-ordinary expenses incurred by reason of such emergency, to
provide emergency relief with respect to agricultural indebted­
ness . . . , and for other purposes.
Title I declared a state of emergency in agriculture partly be­
cause of "a severe and increasing disparity between prices of agricul­
tural and other commodities" and added that this disparity was destroy­
ing the purchasing power of farmers and impairing agricultural assets
supporting the national credit structure. The bill committed the gov-
21ernment to three basic policies: to raise farm prices to parity; to
18Tugwell, The Democratic Roosevelt, p. 2j6.
19This name for the act did not appear until it was placed in the 
United States Statutes at Large. While being considered by Congress, it 
was known as "the farm relief bill."
20U. S., Statutes at Large, XLVTII, Part I, p. 35-
21The act defined parity as farm prices which wouJ.d give "a pur­
chasing power with respect to articles that farmers buy eq.uivalent to the 
purchasing power of agricultural commodities in the base period." The 
base period was defined as August 1909 to July 1914 (except for tobacco).
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correct "present inequalities." gradually but as rapidly as national needs 
would permit, and to "readjust" farm production to a level which would 
be fair to both farmers and consumers. . -
The Secretary of Agriculture was given the power to reduce pro­
duction for market, through, acreage control of any basic commodity by 
making agreements with the producers, or by other voluntary methods. He 
was authorized to provide rental or benefit payments to farmers who re­
duced production on any basis which he deemed "fair and reasonable."
Also, the Secretary could enter into marketing agreements with processors 
or commercial handlers of agricultural commodities as a means of raising 
prices.
To provide money for the rental and benefit payments to cooperat­
ing farmers, a tax was placed on the "first domestic processing" of 
agricultural commodities. The tax was to be set by the Secretary of 
Agriculture based on the difference between the farm price and the parity 
price. However, this tax level was to be approached gradually. In addi­
tion, the Secretary could adjust the tax if.it appeared to be causing an 
accumulation of surpluses or seriously impeding traffic in a certain 
commodity. The tax was to be collected only on that portion of the com­
modity to be domestically consumed. Cotton ginning was specifically 
exempted. To avoid profiteering, a rather weak provision authorized the 
Secretary to publish information regarding the costs and prices of 
processors.
A provision which drew much political fire was one allowing the 
Secretary to appoint officers and administrators in all salary brackets 
under $10,000 per annum. This meant that these employees would not be 
subject to regulations of the Civil Service Commission. The Secretary
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could also establish state and local committees or associations of pro­
ducers, and he could permit cooperative associations of producers to 
receive rental benefit payments for their members. Otherwise, rental 
and benefit payments would be made directly to producers. The act did 
not specify how this would be done and it did not make it clear whether 
the payment would be made to the producer personally. Moreover, the 
law did not clearly define a "producer"— a notable omission since a 
"processor" was defined. If the bill had specified that producers were 
to be paid individually and if it had defined sharecroppers and share- 
tenants as producers, much of the difficulty later encountered in admin- 
istering the law might have been avoided.
With the approval of the President, the Secretary could make
such regulations "with the force and effect of law" as were necessary
to carry out the provisions of the act. He could also assess penalties
not to exceed $100 for violations of his regulations. Decisions on
rental and benefit payments were subject to review only by the Secretary
of Agriculture and the Secretary of Treasury. In order to assist in
enforcement, the Secretary was given powers to require information from
individuals and concerns and to hold hearings to obtain pertinent infor- 
22mation.
For the purposes of the act, basic agricultural commodities were 
defined as wheat, cotton, field com, hogs, rice, tobacco, and milk and 
its products. The sum of $100,000,000 was to be appropriated for rental 
and benefit payments until proceeds from the processing tax became suf­
ficient. The President was given the power to terminate the act or any
S., Statutes at Large, XLVIII, Part I, pp. 35-36.
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part of it when he deemed the national economic emergency o v e r . 3̂
Henry Wallace and others looked upon the Agricultural Adjustment
Act as the culmination of the farm legislation battles of the past
twelve years— a final victory for old war horses like George Peek and
2kother farm leaders. And there is much truth in this view. Yet, in 
some ways the act was not what the old-line farm leaders had been fight­
ing for at all. Old ideas such as export dumping and the guaranteed 
cost of production were not present. Instead, the new bill followed 
the economics of scarcity and provided for acreage reduction--ideas 
completely abhorrent to some farm leaders.
President Roosevelt's message to Congress emphasized the experi­
mental character of the bill. The President asserted that "deep study 
and the joint counsel of many points of view went into the bill," but 
he said, "I tell you frankly that it is a new and untrod path . . . ."
The unprecedented conditions of the country called for "the trial of new 
means" to rescue agriculture. Roosevelt urged Congress to speedy action 
because planting time was coming soon. He promised that if a "fair 
administrative trial" of the measure failed to produce the hoped-for
results, he would "be the first to acknowledge it" and to advise Congress 
25accordingly.
The 73rd Congress, to which Franklin Roosevelt submitted the 
agricultural recovery bill, was overwhelmingly Democratic. That party
23
Ibid., pp. 36-̂ 1 .
2kWallace, New Frontiers, pp. 150-159j and Chester Davis to 
author, October 1, 1959-
S., Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1933, 
LXXIII, Part I, 528V
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held sixty seats in the Senate and 3IO in the House. The Republicans 
had only thirty-five senators and 11% representatives. The Farmer- 
iabor Party had one senator and five representatives.
Like many other Congresses, the 73rd vas at times ruled by the
Western and Southern agrarian elements. This vas due in part to the
single party system in Southern states vhich alloved representatives
and especially senators to be re-elected many times and to build up
seniority. Thus the Southerners and Westerners vere able to dominate
key committees. In the Senate, all the important chairmen vere South-
26emers or Westerners.
In such a Congress, an Administration farm bill vhich contained 
most of the current schemes for relieving fam distress had every chance 
of passing. And yet there vere congressmen vho had their ovn ideas 
about vhat kind of farm legislation should be passed, and there vere 
those vho resented executive usurpation of congressional bill-writing 
functions. Moreover, the Republican minority, although sincerely -wish­
ing to do something for the farmers, vas not anxious to see the Democrats 
get all the credit for saving them.
Consideration of the bill began in the House on March 21.
William Bankhead, an Alabama Democrat and one of the Administration's 
spokesmen, moved that debate on the bill be limited to four hours, and 
that a vote be taken without amendments. Republican Leader Betrand 
Snell of Rev York objected. "I am pleading with you," he said, "to let 
us have an opportunity to find vhat is in the bill. Let us offer amend­
ments, and ve will go along with you and do everything that is possible
^̂ Ibid., p. 142.
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to relieve'agriculture . . . The Democrats countered that it was 
amusing to hear Snell pleading against a gag rule when he had used the 
device so often when he was majority leader.
The vote on the gag rule was probably the most important one in
the House, for once debate was limited, there was little chance the bill
would not pass. Yet this crucial vote was not recorded. Snell demanded
a count on the motion to vote, but when it carried l84 to 102, he allowed
27the gag rule to pass without even calling for a recorded vote. The 
Democrats immediately pushed through another rule limiting consideration 
of the bill to five legislative days.
Even as they debated the gag rule, the representatives slipped 
in remarks about the farm bill. Bankhead implied that it was the last 
hope for agriculture. Snell said the Republicans had. an alternate plan 
which included reduced interest on farm mortgages, lower taxes on farms, 
and alleviation of the high transportation costs of farmers. Republican 
Joe Martin of Massachusetts complained of the dictatorial powers granted 
by the bill and said bitterly, "We are on the way to Moscow." Charles 
Gifford, Republican of Massachusetts, charged the bill would set in 
motion "an army of taxgatherers and spies . . . all . . . deserving 
Democrats.
The Democratic Chairman of the House Agriculture Committee,
Marvin Jones of Texas, led off debate on the bill. Jones,.a lawyer by 
education, had practiced in Amarillo, in the Texas Panhandle, before 




or received national publicity, but the House recognized him as an
authority on agricultural matters. In the previous session of Congress,
he sponsored the Jones Bill which incorporated the ideas of the domestic
29allotment plan and parity prices for farmers. Jones expressed the 
prevailing sentiment in the House when he explained that, although he 
had his own ideas about what ought to be done, he was only one repre­
sentative. Because of the emergency, he was "going to follow the man 
at the other end of the Avenue [the Presiden^.
Opponents of the Administration bill made maximum use of the 
short time allotted. Republican John D. Clarke of New York gave his 
own derisive explanation of the bill by saying it was a "child of the 
jigsaw puzzle age." Concerning the cotton option plan, he said it gave 
an option to the farmer of "heads he wins, tails Uncle Sam loses." He 
claimed the processors would pass on the processing tax to the general 
public, that the measure was unconstitutional, and that it was the 
"most difficult, complicated" piece of agricultural legislation ever 
presented to Congress.3̂
Clifford Hope of Kansas, ranking Republican on the House Agri­
culture Committee, opposed the bill because it was "impossible of suc­
cessful administration." Another Republican, Michael Hart of Michigan, 
stated that he had backed the President on banking and economy legisla­
tion because the President had consulted with leaders in banking and 
government in writing the bills. But in the case of the farm bill. Hart
^^Congressional Directory, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., January, 1934,
p. 1 1 7.
^̂ U. S., Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1933, 
LXXIII, Part I, 669-677.
3^Ibid., pp. 675-682.
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said the President had "fallen in with a dishonest lot when he fell in 
with the famn leaders," the same farm leaders, he said, who engineered 
the Agricultural Marketing Act. Hart drew applause from the House when 
he declared, "This bill bears all the evidence of a brainstorm . . . .
I imagine these gentlemen /^gwell, Ezekiel and the others/ gathered 
in the Department of Agriculture, ate something indigestible, and this 
brainstorm is the result.
Another vehement opponent of the bill was Fred A. Britten of 
Illinois, a Republican. He read portions of Roosevelt's 1932 campaign 
speeches which promised "practical . . . sound . . . /non/ visionary" 
programs. Then Britten quoted the President's message to Congress, 
enrphaLsizing the admission that the proposed farm programs were experi­
mental and untried. "Quite a difference between the President's official 
presentation of the measure to the Congress and the cocksure promises 
he made during the campaign," Britten commented sarcastically.
Other representatives, most of them Republicans, charged the 
bill would lead to another Farm Board scandal, that it was an "abandon­
ment of American principles," that impractical considerations would be 
used in computing parity, that sows of "subnormal intelligence and bad 
home environment" could not be taught to voluntarily limit their pro­
duction of little pigs, that the bill was written by "self-styled farm 
leaders," and that it involved executive usurpation of Congressional 




Count that day lost whose low descending sun 
Views no new message from the President c o m e . 83
The supporters of the farm bill avoided speaking of its specific 
provisions. They talked instead of the great need of the farmers and the 
necessity to follow the President's leadership in the crisis. Democrat 
Samuel Pettengill of Indiana told the House: 'Ve cannot have a 'new 
deal' from the President unless we give him the cards." Although he had 
some misgivings about the bill, Pettengill trusted the President to 
execute it in the best interests of the country. 3̂
Charles Truax, an Ohio Democrat, stated flatly that the pending 
bill was the last hope for agriculture. "Organized agriculture," he 
said, "has . . . failed; cooperative marketing associations . . . have 
failed; Congress . . . has failed; former President Hoover . . . failed. 
Leave it to Congress again and Congress will fail again." The only 
answer, according to Truax, was to turn over the necessary powers to 
the Administration.35 To counter charges that the bill gave too much 
authority to one man. Administration supporters argued that Secretary 
Wallace, who would receive the broad powers, had an agricultural back­
ground and was universally respected among farmers.
Tom McKeown, Oklahoma Democrat, told the House there was no 
reason for so many members to complain of not understanding the bill.
"The language may be confusing," he said, "but the principle is not 
. . . .  It gives elastic power to the Secretary of Agriculture to try
33lbid., pp. 694-700, 737-744, 746-747. 
^̂ Ibid., pp. 694-700.
3̂ Ibid., pp. 738-744.
3^Ibid., pp. 686-687•
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several plans, and, if he finds a particular plan does not work . . . 
he may • . . try another one.'
As the debates were concluded, supporters of the bill mentioned 
repeatedly that they expected it to be amended in the Senate while 
opponents complained bitterly of the ban on amendments in the House.
The vote on the farm relief bill came late on March 22. For all the 
violent opposition voiced by speakers in the short time allotted, the 
opponents polled only ninety-eight votes. With ^ 6  representatives 
voting for the bill, it passed by better than a three-fourths majority.39 
Thus the Administration's agriculture bill, without a word changed, 
passed the House after two days of debate and only six days after the 
President transmitted it.
Undoubtedly, much of the opposition to the farm bill was partisan, 
but much of it was also sincere— the result of serious economic and con­
stitutional objections. Even so, because of limitations on debate and 
amendments, the opposition had little opportunity to form. The only 
organized resistance came from the Republicans, and a large part of 
this was sheer partisanship. Had full debate and amendments been allowed, 
it is possible that a strong movement might have developed among north­
ern and urban Democrats which, combined with Republican strength, could 
have posed a threat to the bill.
Judging from the speed with which the measure passed and the 
casual way exact provisions were discussed in the House, most supporters
37rwd., pp. 7̂ 9-750.
^̂ Ibid., pp. 750-762.
^̂ Ibid., p. 7 6 6.
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of the bill took it largely on faith. They felt if agriculture vas to
be saved the time had come to give the President the powers he re­
quested; moreover, they had been told by some of the agricultural 
experts that the bill would work. Add to this the heavy pressure from 
home to vote for the measure, and it is clear why so many legislators 
voted for it. However, few cast their votes gladly and many expressed 
misgivings. The big factors in their minds were the need for action 
and the absence of any alternative.
Democratic leeiders felt when the farm bill passed the House 
that it would be radically changed or even completely re-written in the 
Senate. Senator Ellison D. Saith, Chairman of the Agriculture Committee, 
announced he would oppose the bill as passed by the House, except for 
the part containing the cotton-option plan.^^ if the Administration 
hoped to ram the agriculture bill through the Senate as it had in the 
House, it was due for disappointment. Although the senators were under 
great pressure from home to act swiftly, many would not allow the bill 
to pass without due consideration and amendment. In the Senate there
is no limitation on debate.
Before the bill came to the floor, there were five days of hear­
ings before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. The purpose was 
to examine the House bill and make a report to the Senate. The chair­
man of the committee, Ellison D . "Cotton Ed" Smith, revealed at the 
beginning of the hearings a conversation with the President in which 
Roosevelt emphasized the experimental nature of the bill. The President 
said, according to Smith, that he intended to enforce it only one year.
koHew York Times, March 23, 1933, PP* 1 and 3*
kl
Roosevelt indicated that if certain features of the bill worked, he 
could continue with them; otherwise, he would terminate the entire act. 
Rexford Tugwell, present at the hearings in his capacity as Assistant 
Secretary of Agriculture, gave marketing agreements as an example of one 
part of the bill the Administration might wish to retain permanently.^^
The witnesses at the hearings were Administration officials, 
farm leaders, representatives from producers' and processors' associa­
tions, farmers, and businessmen. Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace 
appeared first. He explained that the Administration was dedicated to 
the principle of restoring the purchasing power of farmers. To accom­
plish this, he asked for "broad and flexible" powers, and urged the
k2senators to speedy action because the planting had already started.
Throughout the hearings, little attention was given to the 
problems or position of tenant farmers under the proposed act; however, 
on one occasion committee members inquired of Wallace how tenant farmers 
and landlords would be paid for reducing acreage under the domestic 
allotment plan. The Secretary replied that this would be a matter of 
administrative regulation, presumably by him. When Senator George 
Norris, Republican of Nebraska, suggested that rental payments be split 
between landlord and tenant the same way the crop was usually divided, 
Wallace tacitly agreed. Another senator asked point blank if tenants 
would have the same "advantages" as landlords under the act, and Wallace 
replied, "Of course, that is a matter of regulation." With this somewhat
S. Senate, Hearings before the Committee on Agriculture and 
Forestry on H.R. 3835, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. (hereinafter cited as Sen- 
ate. Hearings on H.R. 3835), PP- 9̂-50.
UpSenate, Hearings on H.R. 3835, PP- 1̂ 8, 128-131-
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nebulous assurancê  the senators dropped the matter.
One of the star witnesses was George W. Peek.' He told the com­
mittee in his emphatic manner that it would be a mistake to reduce pro­
duction by the domestic allotment plein and that the plan would probably 
not work anyhow. He cheirged, that one of the greatest reasons for low 
farm prices was profiteering by the processors and handlers of agri­
cultural goods. To remedy this, he placed faith in the licensing and 
market agreement features of the bill. When a senator asked him if he 
favored the bill as a whole, he said yes.^^
John Simpson, president of the National Farmers Union and also 
representing the Farmers National Holiday Association, followed Peek to 
the stand. He flayed the Administration's bill, saying it was a price- 
fixing measure which would yield the farmers less than half the cost of 
production. Simpson attacked the basic idea of reducing farm surpluses. 
The problem, he said, was not over-production but under-consumption. The 
only over-production in the country was in "empty stomachs and bare 
backs.
On March 27, Ed O'Neal, President of the American Farm Bureau 
Federation wrote a11 members of the committee requesting that he be 
allowed to testify. He protested that John Simpson's presentation before 
the committee did not reflect the views of the thirty-four farm leaders 
who attended the conference called by the Secretary of Agriculture on
^^ibid., p. 38.
^^Ibid., pp. 74-83, 104. 
^^Ibid., pp. 104-116.
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March 10. O'Neal stated that the conference formulated and agreed upon
the principles which were written into the Administration's farm bill.
But he did, not get a chance to testify because the hearings ended the
day after he wrote the letter.
In executive session the Agriculture Committee voted to report
the Administration's bill favorable and Chairman Smith did so on April 5-
Two days later he began an explanation of its complicated provisions.
According to Senate protocol, he also acted as floor manager for the
measure.Smith's key role was unfortunate for those desiring speedy
passage because, although he favored the bill, he had many reservations.
"Cotton Ed," having entered the Senate in 1909, was the ranking Demo- 
48crat. In some ways he fitted tne standard definition of a Southern
demagogue. He was an outspoken advocate of white supremacy, the poll 
taoc, and states' rights, and an opponent of anti-lynch laws. When a 
Negro rose to deliver a prayer at the 1936 Democratic National Conven­
tion, Smith stalked out, muttering, "The man is black--black as melted 
t i49ink. Three things were sacred above all else to him: game birds,'
cotton, and, during elections. Southern womanhood.He was proud of
^^O'Neal to Elmer Thomas, March 27, 1933- Thomas Collection, 
Division of Manuscripts, University of Oklahoma Library, "Legislation 
File," 73rd Cong., "Agricultural Legislation."
47U. S., Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1933, 
LXXIII, Part II, 1281.
^^Congressional Directory, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., p. l60.
49 /James M. Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York:
Eai'court Brace and Company, 195̂ ), p. 341.
*̂̂ John A. Rice, "Grandmother Smith's Plantation," Harpers, 
CLXXVII (November, 1938), 579-
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being a cotton planter, with tenants on his South Carolina plantation, 
and he often introduced bills in the Senate to benefit cotton farmers, 
hence his nickname, "Cotton Ed." In the early 1920's. Smith had been a 
member of the Farm Bloc.
As Smith explained the farm bill to the Senate, many senators 
asked questions concerning its operation. Often he was forced to answer 
that in matters of specific execution, all would depend on the decisions 
of the Secretary of Agriculture. Senator Simeon Fess, Republican of 
Ohio, finally remarked rather hopelessly: "Are we not embarrassed in not 
knowing what is likely to be done? Is not that one of the weaknesses 
of the bill?" Cotton Ed could only answer that-"those who represented 
the authors of the bill" thought it necessary to hand over discretionary 
powers to the Secretary. Some senators were genuinely alarmed at this 
prospect, and worse yet, they realized that because of tremendous pres­
sure from the public,the press, and farmers, the bill was sure to pass.52
Wnen Senator Smith finished his less-than-enthusiastic presenta­
tion of the bill. Senator Joseph, T. Robinson of Arkansas took the floor 
to offer the major Administration arguments for the bill. As the Major­
ity Leader, Robinson was a power in the Senate and in the Democratic 
Party. In 1928 he had been the party's candidate for vice-president, 
and more any other senator he spoke for the Roosevelt Administration.
In his early career, Robinson had been state representative. United 
States representative, and governor of Arkansas before going to the
^^Theodore Saloutos and John D. Hicks, Agricultural Discontent 
in the Middle West 1900-1939 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1951), pp. 321-341.
S., Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1933,
LXXIII, Pai't II, 1390-1391-
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Senate in 1913* He was a skillful speaker and parliamentarian who 
looked more like a New York banker than an Arkansas politician.To 
the poverty stricken sharecroppers of his home state, he was "Greasy 
Joe" Robinson.
.Robinson emphasized parity prices for farmers as the basic idea 
of the farm bill. He explained, however, that the Secretary of Agri­
culture intended to push farm prices up to parity levels gradually, 
since precipitous action might harm the national economy. To calm the 
fears of consumers, Robinson asserted that the bill would not neces­
sarily cause a great increase in the cost of living. Doubling the price 
of cotton, he explained, would add no more than two cents to the cost 
of a dollar cotton shirt, and if the price of wheat rose three-fold it 
would add only one cent to the cost of the wheat in a loaf of bread.
In answer to charges made by Republicans that the bill authorized
an "army of taxgatherers" and other employees, Robinson declared that
the existing macninery, supplemented by the state land grant colleges,
experimental stations, and county agents could administer the act. And
55farmers would be asked to execute "their end of the program."
After Robinson finished, the Senate began several days of rather 
aimless debate in which Senators Smith and Huey P. Long were the star 
performers. Long, the "Kingfish" and virtual dictator of Louisiana, had 
been in the Senate only one year. Most sophomore senators wisely stay
CO
Congressional Directory, 73rd Cong., 2nd.Sess., 1934, p. 6.
54Sharecroppers Voice, May, 1935*
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out of the limelight, but Huey Long loved it. When addressing the 
Senate he seemed to aim his remarks' more at the galleries, especially 
the reporters' section, than at his fellow senators. In his short 
time in the Senate the "Kingfish" had acquired many cordial enemies, 
especially among other Southern senators. During consideration-, of 
the farm bill he was fighting an attempt to oust him from the Senate 
which originated from a group of Louisiana citizens led by a former 
governor.
Long was one of the most violent critics of the farm bill. He 
felt that the real New Deal reformers had been "sold out" and that 
someone ought to "go down to the White House and tell the President 
wliat ^ady happened." He charged the Administration's farm bill was 
"a half-baked scheme that comes out of the penman who was left . . . 
by Mr-. Arthur Hyde ^oover 's Secretary of Agriculture}̂  when he left 
office." The "penman" was Mordecai. Ezekiel, and one of Long's favorite 
ways of entertaining the galleries was to read selected obscure passages 
from the pen of the Department of Agriculture economist. Once Long had 
the Senate clerk read a fantastically complicated equation included by 
Ezekiel in a pamphlet on computing the parity price for hogs.^^ While 
reading the clerk was interrupted by laughter, and Senator Burton K. 
Wheeler, Democrat of Montana, called out, "Mr. President, are they still 
talking about hogs?" Huey Long said, "Mr. President, this is a table 
relating to hogs. It clears the matter up." Evidently most of the 
hilarity had a Republican flavor and was at the expense of the farm
^̂ "The regressive equation is as follows:
(l) log = -0.9443 log Xi plus 0.15888 log Xp - 0.21986 
log X3 -0.23675 log X4 -0.07250 log Xc plus 2.23777 log Xg 
plus 0.04759 log Xv plus 0.02659 log %  plus 1.63099 log 
X10-"
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bill because Majority Leader Robinson intervened to remark sourly,
. . it is perfectly manifest that higher mathematics has not much 
recognition in this body." Nonetheless, the subject of Ezekiel's 
"hogarithms" came back many times in later debate to plague the sup­
porters of the bill.
Cotton Ed Smith told the Senate he did not intend to throw 
"monkey wrenches into the machinery," but if he had been asked to write 
the farm bill it would have been vastly different. He spoke of the 
inconsistency of raising farm prices when it was common knowledge that 
millions of consumers did not have the money to pay current low ones.
He described how the farm bill had been "furnished to Congress ready­
made" by the Department of Agriculture and how the Department had let 
it be known that no amendments were welcome. Smith felt the President 
was asking the Senate to suspend its judgment and "give him a chance." 
The aging South Carolinian admitted that sometimes he felt like resent­
ing these encroachments,' but when he remembered what Congress had al­
lowed to happen in agriculture, he thought perhaps the President was 
right. Smith made it clear that nis solution for the farm problem and 
for all the country's economic woes began with some sort of monetary 
inflation, and he intimated this would be the answer in the long run. 
Many other senators felt the same way.5®
On April 11, Chairman Smith began offering amendments suggested 
by the Agriculture Committee. Most of them were minor, designed to 
correct defects in wording or to delineate more carefully the powers
57u. S., Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1933, 
LXXIII, Part II, l473-l475•
5^Ibid.; and ibid., pp. 1951-19̂ 3*
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granted. But one committee amendment was of great importance— the cost 
of production plan. This was a scheme whereby minimum prices, no less 
than the cost of production, would be set by law on seven basic com­
modities. Opposed by the Administration, this idea had many supporters, 
and the effort to include it in the bill was the first real rebellion 
in the Senate against the Administration's railroading tactics.
The supporters of the cost of production plan felt it had two 
great advantages; it guaranteed farmers what was considered a fair 
return and it appeared to be easier to administer since no tax would be 
collected. But there were obvious disadvantages pointed out by various 
senators : the scheme would tend to restrict rather than stimulate trade 
in the commodities involved; arriving at a realistic figure for the 
cost of production was difficult; and the plan did not solve the problem 
of existing surpluses. In connection with the last objection. Senator 
Bankhead called attention to the possibility that if the price of cotton 
were fixed artificially high, buyers would buy only surplus cotton from 
previous years, since the fixed price would not apply to this cotton. 
Therefore, none of the 1933 cotton crop would be bought.
Leaders of the cost of production revolt were senators of great
stature: Wheeler, Norris, Vandenberg, and McNary. The first two had 
been key members of a group of senators in previous sessions of Congress 
known as the "sons of the wild jackass" because of their intransigence 
toward Republican administrations. Henrik Shipstead, the lone Farmer- 
Laborite in the Senate, had also been a member of that group, and he
too favored the cost of production plan. Norris, Vandenberg, and McNary
^̂ Ibid., pp. 1545-1550.
9̂
were Republicans^ but Norris had reached a point where party ties were 
of small consequence. Significantly, the four leaders came from upper 
Mid-Western and'Far-Western states.
Administration spokesmen such as Robinson, Bankhead and Hugo 
Black of Alabama fought hard to battle down the cost of production 
amendment, which had the backing of the influential Farmer's Union.
They said it was not what the President wanted, would not be admin­
istered if passed, and was not constitutional. Senator Norris answered 
that the whole farm bill was probably unconstitutional, but the emer­
gency required drastic action. Tlie Supreme Court, he said, would let 
the bill stand during the emergency, and he thought it should. Norris 
admitted he was so desperate that he favored any proposal which sincere 
men thought would work. Therefore, he was going to vote for the other 
plans, and he hoped his colleagues would vote for the cost of production. 
He wanted to let the Secretary have a number of programs to try. Maybe 
one of them would work.°^
When the Senate voted on the cost of production amendment, it 
carried forty-seven to forty-one. Eighteen Mid-Western Republicans 
voted for the amendment and thirteen others against. Passage of the 
amendment was an important set-back to the Administration's hopes of 
speedy passage of the farm bill exactly as submitted to Congress. More­
over, it opened the door for possible drastic revision of the bill.^^
After the cost of production fight, the Senate returned to con­
sideration of the entire farm bill, with partisan tempers now beginning
^°Ibid., pp. 1556-1559, and pp. 1636-1637- 
^^Ibid., pp. 1636-1637.
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to show occasionally. As the senators expressed themselves, the pat­
terns of their support and opposition emerged. Proponents of the bill 
placed faith in it to accomplish overall agricultural recovery and were 
willing to accept obvious inequities to consumers. They argued that, 
although the bill might cause higher prices to consumers for agricultural 
goods, the increase would return purchasing power to farmers and allow 
them to buy more goods and services, thus stimulating the entire econ­
omy and making higher agricultural prices a lesser burden to consumers.
Raising prices was only a short-range goal to the supporters of 
the bill; The Administration spokesmen believed its real value lay in 
its salutary long-range effect on the entire economy. It was obvious 
to them that the nation could not recover as long as forty percent of 
the population, the farmers, were permanently depressed. And if agri­
cultural recovery required drastic action, the end would justify the 
means. The opponents of the bill divided into two general groups : 
those who felt it would not work, and those who believed that whether 
it would or not, it was not worth trying because of the immediate hard­
ship to consumers and because of the threat to the American system of 
government. The opponents charged, for example, that the bill, in 
authorizing the employment of personnel not under Civil Service, would 
make possible the organization of a tremendous political machine which 
could tip the balance of political power in some states. Also, they 
condemned the bill because it was designed to raise the price of food 
and clothing at a time when millions were ill-fed and poorly clothed.
When the senators had finished their speeches about the farm
^^Ibid., pp. 1790-1795.
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bill in general. Majority Leader Robinson began pushing toward final 
passage. He offered a number of perfecting amendments suggested by 
Secretary Wallace which the Senate passed readily. But he struck a 
snag with a provision that all marketing agreements made under the act 
were to be exempted from the anti-trust laws. This amendment had been 
violently opposed in committee by Senators Wlaeeler, McNary, and Arthur 
Capper, Republican of Kansas, and had failed to pass there. The idea 
behind it was to allay the fears of certain processors, particularly 
meat packers, that the marketing agreements might violate the anti­
trust laws. Many senators objected to specifically exempting processors, 
and to satisfy them the wording of the amendment was changed to insert 
the word "legal" before "marketing agreements" so that only "legal" mar­
keting agreements were exempt from the anti-trust laws. Thus modified, 
the amendment passed easily.
When Robinson began offering the perfecting amendments, he opened 
the door for general amendments from the floor. Many new amendments were 
presented, some of which would have drastically changed the bill. One 
of the amendments offered at this time was a package of political dyna­
mite. It became the greatest threat of all to the Administration's 
bill. Characteristically, it came from Huey Long and was an attempt to 
inject monetary inflation into the bill as a means of aiding farmers 
and the entire country.
For twelve days the Senate debated various schemes to achieve 
inflation while the administration stewed over the fate of its farm bill.
^^Ibid., pp. 1970-1977.
°̂ Ibid., pp. 1741-1742.
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When it became evident that some sort of inflationary amendment to the 
farm bill would pass. President Roosevelt wisely decided to let the 
senators have their own way. With the backing of the administration. 
Senator Elmer Thomas of Oklahoma introduced an' amendment authorizing 
the President to place money in circulation through the purchase of 
government bonds by the Federal Reserve system, to issue fiat money up 
to $3 billion if needed, to accept silver in payment of international 
war debts and issue silver certificates on the silver thus acquired, 
and to lower the gold content of the dollar.Senator David Reed, 
Pennyslvania Republican despaired that the amendment embodied "every
; i
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variety of unsound money that the wit of man can suggest,but t
passed over the principal opposition of New England Republicans.
While the Senate moved toward a vote on the Thomas Amendment, 
it worked concurrently on other amendments in order to clear the way 
for a final vote on the farm bill as soon as the Thomas Amendment passed. 
Beginning on April Ig, several senators attempted to amend the bill to 
include important crops in their nome states as "basic agricultural com­
modities." Carter Glass, Democrat of Virginia, was successful in get­
ting peanuts added by amendment, and Edward P. Costigan, Democrat of 
Colorado, inserted sugar cane and beets by the same means. When Senator 
Wheeler proposed to include rice and flax. Majority Leader Robinson
^^Elmer Thomas, "Forty Years a Legislator," Unpublished manu­
script in Thomas Collection, University of Oklahoma Library; and Thomas 
Collection, Correspondence and Paper, 73r& Cong. File, "Inflation Amend­
ment to Farm Bill."
^̂ U. S., Congressional Record, 73r& Cong., 1st Sess., 1933, 
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^^Ibid., pp. 2551-2552.
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called a halt. He stated that the Increased list of basic commodities
would make the bill impossible to execute, and he called on all friends
of the measure to oppose further inclusions.
The Wheeler proposal to include rice and flax was defeated, and
the vote to include peanuts was reconsidered and reversed after a hard
parliamentary fight. The Administration seemed back in the saddle at
this point, and Robinson suggested to Minority Leader McNary that a
final vote on the farm bill be taken on the next day, April 20. But
this was not possible; delaying tactics by opponents consumed nine more 
68days.
At last on April 28, the Senate was ready to vote. The Thomas 
Amendment having passed earlier that day, the entire bill was engrossed 
and read a third time. Then, on the final vote, the bill passed sixty- 
four to twenty, with eleven not voting. There were five "pairs" which 
would have meant five more votes for each side had the votes been cast. 
Sixteen Republicans, mostly from New England, voted against the bill, 
and they were joined by only four Democrats.
On May 3, the House of Representatives voted on the eighty-five 
amendments passed by the Senate. All but one were turned down by a 
margin of 307 to eighty-six. Thus, it was necessary to send the bill 
to a conference committee. After four days of hard work, the conference 
made its report. The senators gave in on six of the Senate amendments 
and the representatives on sixty-seven. The remaining twelve required 
compromises. When these were worked out, the result was a bill not
68U. S., Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1933; 
LXXIII, Part II, 1933-19̂ 5, 1982-198U.
69Ibid., pp. 2552-2562.
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vitally different from the original Administration measure, except.for
the Thomas Amendment.
The conference committee was able to reach agreement, on every
point but the cost of production amendment. On that score the House
conferees remained adamantly opposed, and the matter was submitted to
the House. There, the conference report was adopted, and after a short
but heated debate, the cost of production amendment was voted down 109
to 283 with forty not voting. It was an important victory for the Admin- 
70istration. Tiie Senate grudgingly voted to accept the bill without 
the cost of production plan. The same day the bill was signed by the 
President.
Five days earlier, on May 5, President Roosevelt had explained
to the American people in a fireside chat the principles behind the new
legislation. He blamed the economic plight of the country on a lack of
planning. The new concept was to bring farming and industry into a
partnership with the government. This was not to be a partnership in
profits, and it did not imply government control. The partnership
would be achieved through mutual planning and "agreements" enforced by 
72the government. '
The nation seemed to regard the signing of the AAA with guarded 
optimism. On the Cotton Exchange there was a spurt of trading in futures 
and a rapid increase in prices, but almost immediately a reaction of 
profit-taking set in and the market closed only slightly higher. The
s., Congressional Record, 73r& Cong., 1st Sess., 1933, 
LXXIII, Part II, 30éO-3079-
7^1bid., pp. 3060-3073, 3114-3123.
^^ew York Times, May 8, 1933, PP* 1-2.
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next day it dropped considerably. The security and commodity markets 
slowed down, and speculative activity and fluctuations were curtailed. 
Milo Reno, President of the National Farmers Holiday Association, con­
demned the farm act as unsatisfactory, but canceled the nationwide farm­
ers' strike scheduled for May 13«^-
The Agricultural Adjustment Act was a hastily written and experi­
mental measure, although parts of it had long been advocated by agricul­
tural reformers. Its objectives were not as radical as the means used 
to reach them. It was passed at a time when the normal legislative 
processes were not in operation and by a Congress which had grave mis­
givings and suspected that the law was unconstitutional. The reason for 
strong support was that something--anything--had to be done for agri­
culture. The Congressmen were also under tremendous public pressure to 
"back the President" in the emergency. The extraordinary discretionary 
and even law-making powers were grudgingly handed over to the Secretary 
of Agriculture in the hope that he could do what Congress, had been 
unable to do--accoraplish agricultural recovery.
To some people, like George Peek, who was to be its first admin­
istrator, the act was a simple measure to raise farm prices, but to the 
advocates of a "planned economy" in the New Deal it was part of the 
great goal of eliminating from the American scene the harmful inflation- 
déflation cycle. To the planners, the act was "a new charter," a depar­
ture into the realm of Franklin Roosevelt's "partnership" between gov­
ernment and industry. In this partnership, the government would regulate 
the production, flow, and sale of food and fiber to make supply meet
73Ibid., May 13, 1933, PP- 1, 3, 17, and May l4, 1933, P- 1̂ -
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demand and no more. Surpluses would be eliminated. Prices would be 
determined by what was fair for all. Exploitation and unfair competi­
tion would be ended. Anti-trust laws would no longer be needed because 
the government would become the trust.
These radical ideas were not presented in Congress as arguments 
for the farm bill. Had this been done, it might not have passed. In­
stead the measure was pictured as what the farmer needed and what the 
President and the majority of the people wanted. Few senators and 
representatives could oppose that combination, although many wanted to.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act gave the President and the Sec- 
.retary of Agriculture the most comprehensive powers yet granted in time 
of peace. The Secretary was offered a whole cluster of farm relief 
schemes, any one of which he could enforce or Ignore as he saw fit. He 
could have had others, including the cost of production plan, had he - 
wanted them. He had power to raise and lower processing taxes, to make 
regulations with the force of law, to adjudicate appeals from his own 
decisions, to raise tariffs, to regulate the planting, harvesting, and 
marketing of commodities through contracts and agreements, to hire and 
fire employees at will, and to spend money earmarked for his use without 
regard to budgets or appropriations. To say the Secretary was made the 
"Czar of Agriculture" is to take only a little literary license. It is 
difficult to escape the conclusion that Congress handed over these great 
powers because it did not know what else to do.
Throughout the writing, consideration, and passage of the Agri­
cultural Adjustment Act the consequences for millions of tenant farmers 
and sharecroppers were hardly mentioned. Many hours and thousands of 
words were used in weighing the probable effects on farmers in general.
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consumers, processors, manufacturers, and even farmers in the Philip­
pines and Puerto Rico, but little heed was given to the possible tragic 
results of the bill on the lower classes of farmers. Not a voice was 
raised to protest that drastic acreage reduction might mean the differ­
ence between a bare living and no living at all for marginal and sub­
marginal farmers. No one warned that it would bring the eviction and 
displacement of thousands of tenant farmers and sharecroppers and the 
firing of many farm hands. But sharecroppers and'hired nands had little 
representation in the high councils of the Department of Agriculture 
or, for that matter, in the 73r& Congress. As it turned out, this was 
the blind side of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.
CHAPTER III 
THE COTTON PROGRAMS
Even while the first draft of the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
was being prepared, Secretary Wallace and President Roosevelt gave 
thought to administration of the act. They decided to create a new 
agency under the Department of Agriculture, to be called the Agricul­
tural Adjustment Administration. The selection of a head for the agency 
was important. The administrator must be extremely capable, sympathetic 
with the goals of the law, and acceptable to Congress and farm leaders.
Wallace felt the logical choice was George N. Peek,^ who somewhat reluc- 
2tantly accepted.
Before assuming responsibility as administrator. Peek wanted it 
understood that the power granted to the Secretary of Agriculture by 
the Adjustment Act should be transferred to him and that he should have 
free access to the President in disputes.^ Wallace agreed to delegate 
responsibility "insofar as that can be done," but he made it clear that 
he and the Department of Agriculture had final responsibility. He felt 
that if there was a difference of opinion, he and Peek should go to the
Wallace, New Frontiers, pp. 168-I6 9.
P̂eek, Diary, April 5, 1933, and April 7, 1933-




• When Peek took over as administrator on May 1), he began sur-' 
rounding himself with many of the men who had been with him in the fight 
for farm parity during the 1920's. To head the Division of Information 
and Publicity he picked Alfred D. Stedman. Chester C. Davis, his lieu­
tenant in the McNary-Haugen fight, became chief of the Production Divi­
sion. Oscar Johnston, a Southern cotton plantation manager, was chosen 
head of the Finance Division.^
But Peek appears to have had little to say about who headed two 
other divisions under him. The Consumers Counsel was largely the crea­
tion of Secretary Wallace. One day while walking across a street near
the huge South Agriculture Building in Washington, he remarked to Louis 
Bean, an economic advisor, that along with the attempt to raise agri­
cultural prices someone should look after the interests of the consumer. 
Bean suggested Frederic Howe, an old-line progressive who had once led 
a campaign against the high cost of living, and Wallace approved.°
Peek also had no part in choosing the General Counsel of AAA. 
Wallace wanted Jerome Frank, a protege of Felix Frankfurter, whose 
appointment was being urged by Rexford Tugwell, But Peek found Frank 
objectionable because ". . .he had no experience with farm organizations 
or farmers . . . , he had been a city lawyer, and . . . his personality
was such as not to inspire the confidence of farm leaders." Peek asked
President Roosevelt to have Frank transferred to another department.
LWallace to Peek, May 12, 1933, Peek Papers.
F̂ite, George N. Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity, pp. 284.
6Louis Bean, Interview with author, August 10, 1959-
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The President agreed, but Wallace prevailed on both men to let Frank stay. 
Later, Peek reasoned that Assistant Secretary Rexford Tugwell was behind
7the desire to keep Frank in AAA.
At a conference on July 17 Wallace and Peek decided that AAA 
would endeavor to keep its organization small and would turn over "duties 
of a continuing nature" to the Department of Agriculture, particularly 
those that might go on after AAA went out of existence.^ The two men 
had different ideas on tne organization of AAA. Wallace wanted a sep­
arate division for each commodity which would handle both production 
and marketing problems with production control clearly being the para­
mount concern. Peek placed faith in marketing agreements to accomplish 
the goals of the act; so he proposed two sets of commodity sections, 
one to handle marketing and the other production. The two men took 
their problems to President Roosevelt, who resolved the question in
9favor of Peek. This created a situation where two sets of workers, 
each responsible to different chiefs, worked on wheat, cotton, and 
corn-hogs. In the course of practical operation, it became apparent 
that marketing agreements were effective in raising prices only for a 
limited number of commodities, namely, dairy products and fruits and 
vegetables. In the other commodities there seemed little use of sep­
arate divisions to handle marketing, and these marketing divisions were
10eventually abolished.
7Peek, Why Quit Our Q-wn, pp. 21-22.
O
Record of Council Meeting, July 17, 1933- Peek Papers.
9As indicated by Table 1.
*̂̂ Nourse, Davis, and Black, Three Years of AAA, pp. 51-57-
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Secretary Wallace felt that some of the old war horses of the  ̂
farm movement now in AAA, such as Peek, Brand, and Davis, would have to~ 
"modify" their long-held ideas to fit the world situation. Peek and 
Brand, for instance, would have to change their views concerning the 
need for export sales at less than domestic prices, or "dumping.But 
George Peek had no intention of changing his views. Soon after he took 
over as administrator he issued a crisp statement of policy wnich said: 
"The sole aim and object of this Act is to raise farm prices." During 
his seven months in office he never deviated from this restricted concept 
of AAA which conflicted sharply with that of Wallace and Tugwell that 
AAA was the agricultural phase of a planned economy. Mistrusting the 
"planners" in the Legal Division, of which there were many. Peek arranged 
that his own salary be paid to Frederick Lee, who would serve as his 
personal aide.^^
AAA worked closely with already existing agencies in the Depart­
ment of Agriculture. The Bureau of Agricultural Economics, which for 
years had been aiding agriculture through research and education, provided 
AAA with statistical information. The technical bureaus of the Depart­
ment such as Plant Industry, Animal Industry, and the Division of Crop 
and Livestock Estimates supplied their records and expert knowledge.
For help in field work, AAA sought the assistance of the Extension Ser­
vice, especially the county agents and teachers of vocational agricul-
13ture.
^^Wallace, New Frontiers, pp. 168-I6 9.
12Lord, The Wallaces of Iowa, pp. 3̂ 2-3̂ 5>
^^Nourse, Davis, and Black, Three Years of AAA, pp. $1-34.
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Wallace vas determined not to build up a bureaucracy. His 
decision to use county agents as local administrators reflects this 
determination. Also, in keeping with M. L. Wilson's^^ ideas of demo­
cratic local control, Wallace decided to leave many decisions to county 
associations of farmers organized for the purpose. State committees 
made up mostly of AAA or Extension Service employees would form the 
link between the county associations and Washington. Wallace hoped the 
county associations would become forums where farmers could express 
their desires which would be transformed into programs in Washington.
This plan worked to some extent with the farmers of the Midwest, but
Southern cotton farmers showed little initiative in planning their own 
15programs.
Theoretically, the center piece of the entire administrative 
system was the county association. When a grower signed a production 
control contract, he automatically became a member of his county asso­
ciation- These associations were organized with a board of directors, 
president, vice president, secretary, and treasurer. Often the important 
post of secretary was held by the county agent. In some counties, the- 
farmers took an active part in administering the programs, the county 
agents serving merely as sources of information and advice. In other 
counties, the local organizations were so apathetic that the agents be­
came the administrators.^^
1̂4-M. L. Wilson was a former Montant State College professor who 
served during the 1920's as head of the Division of Farm Management in 
the Department of Agriculture. With John D. Black and Beardsley Ruml 
he formulated the domestic allotment plan before the crash of 1929* 
Schlesinger, Coming of the Hew Deal, p. 36.
^^Nourse, Black, and Davis, Three Years of AAA, pp. 68-75•
^^Ibid., PP. 68-78.
Gh
The job of the county association vas to supervise production 
control. This responsibility was delegated to an allotment committee, 
usually called the county committee. The members were either chosen, 
by the county agent, or elected by the board of directors or the asso­
ciation members. The committee's first task was to check data concern­
ing past production submitted by farmers in applying for contracts.
.Later, it was charged with seeing that acreage reduction was carried
f
out and with making adjustments in acreage allotments. In most agri­
cultural areas, three-man community committees were set up to break
down acreage allotments and check compliance. The various committeemen
17received per diem for their services. Farmers could.complain about
any inequities arising out of the program to their community or county
committee and could appeal to state boards of review created for that 
18purpose.
But AAA did not leave the checking or compliance solely to 
county and community committees. The commodity division in Washington 
chose supervisors of compliance from a list of nominees submitted by 
the county committees. The supervisor's job was to visit every con­
tract farm to determine that the terms had been carried out. They had 
to certify compliance before the county committee could clear the con­
tract for payment of benefits from Washington. They were paid by the 
committees out of funds allotted to them for benefit payments; however, 
they were not under control of the local committees and reported directly
^^USDA Form Cotton 4, December 10, 1933; NA, RG 145.




The days and nights of Tate spring and early summer, 1933, were 
hectic ones in the Department of Agriculture. The halls of the huge 
USDA building on the south side of the Mall in Washington were crowded 
with farmers, processors, distributors, manufacturers and representa­
tives of cooperatives, each wanting immediate benefits for his own 
particular interest. Wnile the lawyers were drawing up marketing agree­
ments for the milk sheds of the larger cities, the Wheat and Cotton
Sections were planning their programs and the higher-ups were putting
20the finishing touches on the organizational structure of AAA.
It was late spring before AAA had formulated its acreage reduc-
21tion programs for the major commodities. By that time the cotton had 
been planted and was beginning to sprout. The situation looked desper­
ate with thirteen million bales--three years' supply--already on hand.
In 1932, cotton had dipped to a pathetic price of five cents a pound 
or about half of parity, and prospects were even worse for 1933 if 
something was not done. For several weeks Wallace and his advisers 
were led astray by a few experienced cotton traders who liked cheap 
cotton because it improved their positions on the international market, 
but when Wallace realized these traders had only selfish interests he 
worked out an effective, if drastic, course of action.
The plan was simple. The AAA would pay farmers to plow under 
ten million, acres of cotton, a fourth of the crop, so that the market
^̂ Nourse, Davis, and Black, Three Years of AAA, pp. 68-77- 
20Wallace, New Frontiers, p. 172.
21Ibid., p. 172.
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would be less glutted at the end of 1933- Growers would be induced to
plow up by benefit payments sufficiently large to be attractive. The
money for these payments would come from the processing tax on cotton.
The big question was whether farmers could be induced to plow under
their own cotton. The agricultural leaders knew they had at least one
factor working in their favor--the threat of five-cent cotton in 1933
22if acreage was not reduced.
There were some cogent arguments against the cotton plow-up pre­
sented at the time the proposal was made. One was the obvious fact 
that if a fourth of the crop was destroyed, approximately one-fourth 
less labor would be needed to cultivate and harvest what was left, and 
one-fourth less ginning would be done. The whole cotton economy would 
be operating at only three-fourths of capacity. Reports from county
agents indicated that landlords were worried about being able to keep
23their tenants if acreage was reduced. The leaders of AAA took this 
into consideration, but they were so anxious to get some kind of cotton 
program under way, and they were so dedicated to the idea of increasing
oilprices through enforced scarcity, that they went ahead with their plans.
The next problem was to work out the details of the plow-up. How 
would the arrangements be made with farmers? How would they be paid for 
plowing their cotton? How would their compliance be checked? Part of
Z^ibid., pp. 172-173.
^̂ A. L. Schoffner to C. B. Schwab, May 26, I933, File 3I, NA,
RG 145.
24-Henry I. Richards, Cotton Under the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 193̂ ); and Calvin Hoover, 
"Human Problems in Acreage Reduction in the South," hereinafter cited 
as "Hoover Report," Landlord Tenant File, NA, RG 14$, pp. 17-19-
the procedure for payment had been provided by Congress. The Agricul­
tural Adjustment Act included some special provisions concerning cotton. 
Because of the operations of the Farm Board and the Cotton Stabilization 
Corporation, the government already had on hand millions of bales of 
cotton which the Act transferred to the control of the Secretary of 
Agriculture. The Act authorized the Secretary to offer to sell this 
cotton to cotton farmers at a very low price in return for reducing 
their cotton acreage. For every pound of cotton a producer agreed by
contract not to produce, the government could sell him a pound of sur­
plus cotton. The producer signing such a contract had the option of
buying the cotton any time before January 1, 193̂ j at the average price
paid by the government or of allowing the government to sell the cotton
for him, in which case he would receive only the profit from the sale.
The producer was not liable for any loss if the sale price was less than
25the average price paid by the government.
How could cotton farmers benefit by having an option to buy 
cotton from the government? The entire plan was predicated on the 
economy of scarcity. If the 1933 crop was appreciably reduced, the price 
of cotton would rise. Cotton farmers could buy government cotton at 
less than what it would have cost them to-raise it, and sell at the 
higher prices brought about by enforced scarcity. In addition to the 
cotton option plan, the leaders of AAA decided to offer payment in cash 
to the farmers who signed plow-up contracts if they preferred it.^6 
AAA set the benefit payments for destruction of the cotton at seven to
S., Statutes at Large, XLVIII, Part I, pp. 33-3̂ *
26Johnston, Memo to Mr. Cobb, August 20, 1933, NA, RG 1̂ 5•
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twenty dollars an acre, depending on the average yield of acres destroyed. 
If the farmer elected to be paid in cotton options, he received from six 
to twelve dollars in cash per acre plus an option to buy an amount of 
cotton equal to that destroyed at six cents per pound. The government 
agreed to sell the option cotton for the farmer at any date designated 
by him and to turn over to him all money received in excess of six cents 
per pound plus administrative costs. These transactions were handled 
by an organization under control of AAA called the Cotton Pool. Tne 
head of this agency, a Mississippi planter named Oscar Johnston, was 
active in formulating cotton policies within AAA.
Those farmers who were willing to agree to reduce acreage signed 
an "Offer to Enter into Cotton Option-Benefit or Benefit Contracts."
They were told that "only if a large majority of cotton farmers agree
27to help can the plan be carried out." The leaders of AAA felt that 
farmers would have to agree to destroy at least 3,500,000 bales for the
pAprogram to be effective.
The way the cotton program was set up, the producer would save 
the work and expense of harvesting, ginning, and marketing the cotton 
on his "contracted acres," but he would lose the income from the cotton­
seed. Wallace, Davis, Peek, Cobb, and Johnston saw it as an advantage 
that the labor costs of contract signers would be reduced, and although 
it occurred to them that this might work a severe hardship on farm work­
ers, they did not allow it to affect their plans. They decided, however, 
not to let any farmer reduce his acreage more than 50 percent in order
27Richards, Cotton Under AAA, pp. 1-6.
28Yearbook of Agriculture, 193^ (Washington, 193^), P* 29.
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that the effect on his farm workers would not be completely disastrous 
Of the two plans for payment for acreage reduction, the cotton- 
option plan was a far better deal for the producer if ne did not need 
all of the money immediately. Producers with tenants were in a favor­
able position to take advantage of the option plan because they needed 
no large outlay of cash to get their crop harvested, this being the 
responsibility of their tenants'.
The Cotton Section of the Commodity Division of AAA had charge 
of planning and implementing the cotton plow-up. Head of the section 
was Cully Cobb, former editor of the Southern Ruralist published in 
Atlanta, and one-time Assistant Director of Extension in Mississippi. 
Cobb came from a Tennessee farm family and was educated at Mississippi 
A. and M. College, now Mississippi State University. He was a capable 
administrator, familiar with the Southern scene and not anxious to 
reform it radically.His two assistants, E. A. Miller and W. B. Camp, 
were of the same type, with Southern agricultural college extension 
service backgrounds. Cobb also brought five regional consultants from 
various parts of the Cotton Belt into the section to advise in the 
processing of the cotton contracts. .
A Rental and Benefit Audit Unit was organized in AAA to handle, 
analyze, check and tabulate the contracts received in all the commodity 
programs.This unit grew to such proportions that is employed as many 
as 3,000 people. Since it was housed in one big building, it was often
^̂ Cobb, Ifemo to Mr. Davis, November 15, 1933, NA, RG 1̂ 5- 
^̂ Cobb to author, June 13, I96I.
^^Cotton Section File No. 3I, NA, RG IÀ5.
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32called, "the factory." ' The state extension offices, county agents,
and county and community committees rounded out the organizational
structure set up to administer the cotton- program. 3̂
The first sign-up campaign began in mid-June, 1933- George
Peek spoke over the Columbia Broadcasting System to explain the plow- 
3kup. In addition to the 733 county agents in cotton producing counties, 
2k'J emergency agents and 22,000 volunteer workers participated in the 
huge task of explaining and negotiating the acreage reduction contracts. 
Governors of cotton states proclaimed a "Cotton Week." The program 
was explained in newspapers and at county and community meetings. 
President Roosevelt said in a press release, "... every cotton grower 
should go along . . . for the benefit of the whole country . . . 
to reduce an over-supply of cotton and thereby obtain a better price 
for what he grows.'
Farmers who signed the contracts, or "offers" as tney were 
called before they were approved by AAA., estimated their 1933 produc­
tion and offered to plow under part of it. One member of each local 
committee was required to inspect each farm and estimate the yield. If 
he and the farmer could agree on the probable yield, both signed the 
contract offer. The papers were then reviewed by the co’onty committee, 
although many committees let the county agent or clerks handle this.
Tiie approved contracts were signed by the county agent and forwarded to
3%ourse, Davis, and Black, Three Years of AAA, pp. 59-o0.
33gee Table 2.
Radio remarks of Georgp N. Peek, CBS, June 19, 1933* Peek
Papers.
^̂ Richards, Cotton Under AAA, pp. 18-20.
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Washington. By July 19, Administrator Peek was able to pronounce the 
sign-up a success. He told a national radio audience that the nation's 
farmers had taken a long step on the trail to "practical and sensible 
planning for agriculture."37
In Wasnington, the cotton section carefully examined the offers, 
especially the reasonableness of yield estimates, and the large offers. 
Most of them were accepted, although many had to be returned first for
38more information.Altogether, AAA made 1,030,433 contracts which 
removed 10,487,991 acres from production with an estimated yield of 
^>^89,467 bales. Counting both cash payments and advances on cotton 
options, AAA paid out $161,771,897 to farmers for the plow-up.39
The wide acceptance of the cotton plow-up by farmers and the 
general public was a tribute to the adaptability of Americans and their 
faith in the New Deal. When farmers first heard of the program their 
reaction was sheer amazement, but after it was fully explained they 
found it attractive. It guaranteed at least six cents a pound for cot­
ton that would not have to be harvested, and it offered opportunity for 
considerable profit through the option plan, depending on how much cot­
ton prices rose. To the big planters and landowners the idea was par­
ticularly appealing because all the payments would be made to them and 
they could collect on debts from their tenants before giving them their




Radio remarks of George N. Peek, CBS, July l4, 1933- Peek
 ̂Cotton Section, File No. 31, NA, RG 145.
39Yearbook of Agriculture, 1934, p. 722.
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share of the benefits.
But to the simple minds of tenant farmers, there seemed some­
thing basically wrong with plowing under cotton. One Georgia planter 
took his tenants out late in the summer of 1933 to mark off the acreage 
to be plowed ̂ 'The tenants helped him silently, and when he left they 
sought the shade of a Chinaberry tree. One of them said, "You know, I 
ain't never pulled up no cotton stalks befo', and somehow I don't like 
the idea." Another groaned, "I been feelin' sorter funeral-like all 
afternoon." A third relieved the gloom somewhat by saying, "Let's swap 
work that day; you plow up mine, and I'll plow up yours
Publicly, leaders of AAA were enthusiastic about the plow-up, 
but privately some of them had mixed emotions. The farm-bred Secretary 
of Agriculture saw the program as an amazing demonstration of what a 
united people could do wnen there seemed to be no alternative. He 
consoled himself that the 1933 crop would be worth more, including AAA 
benefit payments, than the larger 1932 crop; nevertheless he grieved 
over the destruction of a growing crop. To him it was a "shocking com­
mentary on our civilization." He could tolerate it only as a cleaning 
up of the wreckage from the old days of unbalanced production. "Cer­
tainly, " he wrote later, "none of us ever want to go through a plow-up 
campaign again, no matter how successful a price-raising method it 
proved to be.
In truth the plow-up was only moderately successful at raising 
prices. The average price received by producers of cotton was 6 .52
40 ,Arthur Paper, Preface to Peasantry, pp. 243-240.
'allace. New Frontiers, pp. 173-175•
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cents per pound in 1932 and 9 .72 cents in 1933 (cotton had reached 35.4 
cents in I9 1 9). Production in 1933 was 13,047,000 bales, actually 
slightly greater than the 13,002,000 bales in 1932 .̂  ̂ Critics of the 
New Deal have used these statistics to discredit the cotton program, 
saying that, although farmers plowed under millions of acres, they used 
more fertilizer on the remaining land and produced as mucn as ever.
Tills assumption seems unwarranted since the use of fertilizer was only 
slightly greater in 1933 than in 1932 and not nearly as much as usual.^3 
Also, if a farmer used extra amounts of fertilizer on his remaining 
cotton, he violated the 1933 cotton contract. The reason for the in­
creased cotton production in 1933, despite AAA's efforts, was that 1933 
was a better year for cotton than 1932. Production per acre was up even 
in those areas of Oklahoma and Texas where fertilizer was never used, 
and it might well have reached 17,000,000 bales, as it did in 1931, 'with­
out AAA's plow-up.Department of Agriculture economists estimated 
that the 1933 acreage reduction had added a quarter of a billion dollars 
to the season's income of cotton growers. They based this estimate on 
gross income including benefit payments compared to five and one-half
45cent cotton without the program. Wallace and the AAA chiefs had no 
illusions about the plow-up. They knew it was only a stop-gap measure, 
and that a long range program spanning several years would be necessary
^^Yearbook of Agriculture, 1934, p. 459•
43Yearbook of Agriculture, 1935, P . 734.
^^Richards, Cotton Under AAA, pp. 64-05.
^ P̂eek, "The First Four Months Under the Farm Act," New York 
Times, September 17, 1933* Peek Papers.
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to adjust cotton production to demand, and to raise prices to parity.
Considering the scope of the plov-up and its radical departure 
from past policies, the program was remarkably well administered. The 
county agents and committeemen checked zealously to see that the cotton 
was plowed under as agreed, and reports of chiseling were scarce. No 
checks were mailed by AAA until word came from the county committee that
the cotton had been destroyed. There was a lag of about one month
between the time AAA received the report of compliance and the mailing 
of the check, and occasionally processing at the local level took con­
siderable time. Tiius, it was late September before federal money began 
to flood into the cotton country. By that time, many farmers had begun 
to complain about the slowness of payments.Meanwhile, cotton prices 
peaked at 10.6 cents per pound in July and declined to 8 .8 cents in 
mid-September. Consequently, farmers and politicians grew restless and
It 7began bringing pressure for some sort of price-fixing for cotton. '
Oscar Johnston, AAA's Director of Finance, suggested that the
government loan farmers ten cents a pound on their 1933 crop using
the cotton as security. This would allow farmers to hold the cotton 
off the market until the price rose to ten cents or, if it did not, 
give the cotton to the government for cancellation of the loan. Pres­
ident Roosevelt, under pressure from the cotton states, ordered Jesse 
Jones, Chairman of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, to begin 
making the loans. Accordingly, Jones set up the Commodity Credit Cor­
poration with Lynn P. Talley, his assistant in RFC, as the Director,
^̂ T. Roy Reid to Wallace, January 10, 193̂ , NA, RG IÀ5.
kvRichards, Cotton Under AAA, pp. 70-71-
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and Oscar Johnston as Assistant Director. The CCC loaned about $l60
million on 4.3 million bales of 1933 cotton, part of which was option
cotton held by 1933 contract signers. This technique of supporting
prices proved eminently successful and was soon adopted for other com- 
48modities.
The 1933 cotton program was put into effect with such speed that 
little thought was given to the special problems raised by farm tenancy 
in the South. AAA's actions toward tenants in 1933 seem to have been 
dictated by the lack of a clear general tenant policy. With no guide 
lines, administrators tended to fall easily into the pattern of the 
Southern tenant system, and the 1933 program served only to perpetuate 
that evil in all of its forms.
However, the Administration had early warning of the possible 
consequences of framing a cotton program without giving consideration 
to tenants. George McClellan, a Washington attorney who had been with 
the Crop Production Loan Unit of the Farm Board, wrote in April, 1933, 
to President Roosevelt that in the absence of safeguarding provisions, 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act would allow landlords to lease their 
land to the government for a safe and sure rental apd leave tens of 
thousands of tenants and their families to "idleness and beggary."
Said McClellan, "No group of Americans are as voiceless and undefended 
as these small farm tenants. His letter was referred by Louis Howe
48Ibid., pp. 9̂ -95; and Schlesinger, Coming of the New Deal, p.
6i.
^^McClellan to Wallace, April L, 1933, NA, RG l6. An earlier 
letter to Roosevelt is described in this letter.
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to Secretary Wallace.
McClellan recommended that cotton contracts contain provisions 
preventing landlords from decreasing the number of their tenants or in- . 
creasing the acreage farmed by them, and that violations be punished 
by withholding rental payments to the landlords. It was important, 
according to McClellan, that no payment be made before July 15 in order 
that the government might cancel payments to contract violators. 5̂
Wallace referred McClellan's recommendations to Mordecai Ezekiel, 
who advised the Secretary that there was probably considerable ground 
for the lawyer's fears concerning tenants. Ezekiel reported that some 
Southern farmers had already told him that when they rented part of 
their land to the government they would re-adjust by having fewer ten­
ants to handle the remaining acres. Ezekiel commented that this would 
have "exceedingly unfair consequences." He suggested that the Secretary
write McClellan that his point of view would be taken into account in
52making cotton policies. Paul Appleoy, Assistant to the Secretary, 
wrote a letter to this effect,but unfortunately, most of McClellan's 
ideas were soon lost in the rush to get the 1933 cotton program under 
way. Some of them were eventually incorporated into the 193^-35 prog­
ram.
The 1933 cotton contract did not even mention tenants. It 
required producers to obtain the consent of all "lien holders" and
5°Howe to McClellan, March 22, I933, NA, RG 1 6.
^^McClellan to Wallace, April h, 1933; NA, RG I6.
^ Êzekiel, Memorandum to the Secretary, April 6, 1933; NA, RG I6 .
^^Appleby to McClellan, April 10, 1933; NA, RG I6.
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"persons who appear to have an interest in the crop" before agreeing to 
the plow-up, but it did not specifically take into account tenants and 
sharecroppers. Following accepted Southern practices, only landowners 
were allowed to sign the 1933 contracts, but most of them worked out 
arrangements with their tenants before signing. The Adjustment Admin­
istration instructed landlords to divide the payments received for the 
plow-up among their tenants according to the interest each tenant held 
in the crop. Thus, a sharecropper was to receive one.-half of the pay­
ments, a share-tenant two-thirds or three-fourths, and a cash tenant 
all.
The idea of making payments to landlords and letting them dis­
burse the money to their tenants originated with the Cotton Section and 
was approved by Chester Davis as chief of the Commodities Division, by 
Peek, and by Wallace. The men of the Cotton Section had intimate knowl­
edge of the tenancy system of the South, and they knew it would be dis­
turbing to the normal workings of the system if the government made
55payments directly to tenants. In this they were right. The tenants 
had no legal claim on the crop in most states, and the relationship with 
their landlord was often paternalistic. Tenants were normally dependent 
on the landlord in most economic matters, so it seemed only natural to 
the Cotton Section that the landlords should receive the tenants' share 
of the benefit payments. In addition, they knew that landlords would 
resent the government's dealing directly with tenants, especially if
USDA, Form No. Cotton la, Cotton Acreage Reduction Contract, 
193^-1939, NA, RG 145.
^̂ Cobb, Memo to Mr. Christgau, September 8, 193̂ , NA, RG l4$.
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such dealings provided the tenants with a separate income which would
56make them less dependent.
Frankly, the Cotton Section saw things from the landlords'
57paternalistic point of view. Many landlords, they knew, felt a duty 
to maintain their tenants even though they were financially unable to 
do so. A survey of 809 landlords in Alabama showed that 89 percent of 
them felt this way. Like most Southerners, the men of the Cotton Section 
regarded tenants and croppers as a class apart, incapable of making wise 
decisions or handling affairs in their own best interests. In the same 
Alabama study, 40 percent of the landlords opposed granting relief to 
tenants because they might learn they were not completely dependent on 
the landlords and because it migh'c. raise their standard of living and 
improve their bargaining position. The feeling was common among land­
lords and in the Cotton Section that it would be better not to give 
the tenants and croppers money since they would only spend it foolishly 
on things like phonographs and used cars when their families needed the
58necessities of life.
In their own way. Cully Cobb and others in the Cotton Section 
were concerned about the welfare of tenants and croppers. When an early 
proposal was made that the most economical method of reducing cotton 
acreage would be to reduce the number of tenants and croppers, they
^^Calvin Hoover, Hoover Report, NA, RG l4$.
^^Paul Appleby, Memo to Mr. Cobb, December 27, 1934, NA, RG l4$.
58Harold Hoffsommer, "The AAA and the Sharecropper," Social 
Forces, XIII (May, 1935), 497-498; Raper, Preface to Peasantry, pp. 157- 
159; szid Cotton Section, "Resume of Tenant Problem," January 9, 1934,
NA, RG 145.
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objected on the grounds of the obvious disastrous social effects. They 
felt the tenants would be better off if they stayed on the farm where the 
landlords would "more or less" take care of them; therefore, they de­
cided to deal primarily with the landlords and let them handle their 
OTO tenant problems. They felt that the landlords, by having all benefit 
payments made to them, would be placed under a moral obligation to treat
their tenants fairly and that local public opinion would lend support to
59the feeling of obligation. This is a curious line of reasoning if 
one stops to analyze it. If the same idea were followed elsewhere by 
the federal government, it might lead to some startling situations. For 
instance, the government might have turned relief money over to employ­
ers in the hope they would be placed under a moral obligation to give 
jobs to needy people.
In addition to the reasons already cited for dealing through 
the landlords, there were administrative factors involved. The Cotton 
Section was appalled by the prospect of naving to process more than a 
million cotton contracts with landowners. Had contracts been made also 
witn tenants and croppers, the number would have been much higlier.
But the most compelling reason for favoring the landlords over 
the tenants was that unless AAA got the voluntary cooperation of the 
landlords the cotton program would fail. Chester Davis, then nead of 
the Production Division, put it this way: "Our problem . . . was to go 
the limit'in protecting sharecroppers on the land while getting the
59Richards, Cotton Under AAA, pp. 111-112; and Johnston, Memo to 
Chester Davis, January 26, 1935, HA, RG 1̂ 5.
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contract signed. If it wasn't signed; we had no program.
Thus; AAA took a course of action which perpetuated and even 
strengthened the Southern tenancy system^^ largely because of the 
exigency of the moment. A program was needed to destroy part of a 
standing crop. This would be hard enough to sell to the farmers in­
volved without making it more unpalatable by threatening to disturb 
relations with their tenants.There was probably no course open to 
AAA but the one it took, for in a program where the benefits went with
the land there was little place in the scheme of things for landless
fanners.
Much more thought and work concerning tenants went into planning 
the 193  ̂ cotton program, but by tuen the die was cast. A large part of
the 193  ̂ plan was formulated by Oscar Johnston, who was asked by Peek
to take part in the planning conferences. Later this seemed a sinister 
choice to some tenant farmer groups because Johnston was one of the 
biggest planters in the South. But at the time it was only natural for
Peek to choose Johnston in view of his broad experience in cotton.
Johnston drafted a preliminary outline of the cotton program which was 
considered at several high-level conferences and generally accepted.
The plan was then presented at three public producers' meetings in 
Dallas, Atlanta, and Memphis, with Cully Cobb, J. Phil Campbell, and 
Johnston each presiding over one of these meetings. When the three men
^%avis to author, June 15, 1959j and Calvin Hoover, Hoover
Report, NA, RG 1̂ 5, I6 .
^^Committee on Minority Groups in the Economic Recovery, "Fore­
word" and "Conclusion" of the Rosenwald Study, NA, RG 1̂ 5, I8 .
^^Calvin Hoover, Hoover Report, NA, RG 1̂ 5, IT*
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returned to Washington reporting general acceptance of the plan, the 
Cotton Section began a draft of the contract. Alger Hiss, Principal 
Attorney of the Legal Division, provided legal counsel and Oscar John-
O ̂ston served as general adviser.
Basically, the idea in 193̂  was for the government to rent
fifteen million acres of cotton land to keep it out of production,
which would leave only about twenty-five million acres in cultivation.
The leaders of AAA also decided that in 1935 they would reduce acreage
by ten million acres and negotiate the 1935 contracts at the same time 
, 6kas those of 1934.
In return for taking his land out of production a farmer re­
ceived a rental payment based on the average yield of lint cotton com­
puted from figures supplied by the farmer. The rental was three-and- 
one-half cents per pound, but could not exceed eighteen dollars an 
acre. In addition, the contract signer received a "parity" payment of 
"not less than one cent per pound" of the "farm allotment," which was 
computed by multiplying 40 percent of the total acreage of the farm 
times the average yield of the farm in the years 1928-32.^^ Forty 
percent was the usual percentage of total production used domestically. 
This was in keeping with the Adjustment Act, which provided that prices 
would be artificially raised only on that portion of the crop which was 
to be consumed at home.
^%emo to Chester Davis (Johnston), January 26, 1935, NA, RG 14$.
°̂ USDA, Form Cotton 4, December l8, 1933, RA, RG IA5.
^̂ USDA, Form No. Cotton la. Cotton Acreage Reduction Contract 
for 1934 and 1935, NA, RG 1̂ 5.
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The rental payments were made in two equal installments, the 
first between March 1 and April 30, just before planting time, and the 
second between August 1 and September 30, just before harvest. The 
timing of the payments was devised to reduce the credit needs of cotton 
farmers. Half of the payment was made before there was any proof that 
the signer really intended to reduce acreage. This was done in an effort 
to increase the farmers' purchasing power, but it could create havoc if 
many farmers decided not to live up to their part of the bargain after 
they had received half the money.Another weakness of the program 
was revealed when a landlord refused to deal fairly with his tenants. 
Although this violated the contract, AAA's severest punishment was to 
withhold all payments--no great penalty when the landlords had already 
received half of what was due them.°^
Any "owner, landlord, casn tenant or managing share tenant who 
operates or controls a cotton farm" could sign a 193^-35 contract if 
his farm was normally planted in cotton or if he had fulfilled a 1933 
contract. A cash tenant could sign without the owner of the land sign­
ing if he could furnish evidence of a lease. The determination of who 
qualified as a "managing share tenant" was left to the county committees. 
An owner and any type of tenant could enter a "side agreement" concern­
ing payments if both were willing. This was an important provision 
because quite often the owner was in a position to pressure his tenants 
to make such agreements.
The land taken out of production by the contract was called the
66 nRichards, Cotton Under AAA, pp. IO8-IO9 .
^̂ Hoover, Hoover Report, NA, RG IU5 .
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"rented acres." Each contract signer was given an allotment of acreage 
which he could rent to the government. Tlie allotment was based on 40 
percent of production in the base period of I928 to 1932 and was deter­
mined by the county committees. However, decisions of the county com­
mittee could be appealed to the state committee and ultimately to the 
Cotton Section of AAA. The rented acres could be used to plant soil- 
improving or erosion-preventing crops such as peas, clover, vetch or 
lespedeza, or the soil could lie, fallow or be used to grow food or feed 
crops for consumption on the farm. The producer could not include waste, 
gullied, or eroded land in the rented acres. He could not increase the 
total acreage planted over 1932 and 1933 including rented acres, nor 
could he increase the acreage planted in any basic commodity or the 
number of livestock kept for sale or profit.
The contract signer was required to allow any authorized agent
of AAA access to his fai.-m and to any records pertaining to the production
and sale of cotton and had to expressly waive any right to have such
68records kept confidential.
Tae tenant provisions of the 1934-35 contract were the most 
fateful action taken by AAA concerning tenants. During the planning 
conferences, the basic question was raised as to whether the contracts 
should contain any provision for non-managing share tenants and share­
croppers, or whether matters should be left completely to landlords as 
in 1933. This prompted Cully Cobb to make a series of recommendations 
concerning landlord-tenant relations which were generally accepted.
68USDA, Form No. Cotton la. Cotton Contract, 1934-35, NA, RG 145; 
and USDA, Form No. Cotton 4, December I8, 1933, NA, RG 145.
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However, Alger Hiss objected to them, saying they gave inadequate pro-
69tection to tenants.
Hiss got nowhere with his objections in the planning conference; 
so he took this problem to his boss, Jerome Frank. He reported to Frank 
that certain provisions in the contract proposed by Cobb were "not le­
gally enforcebale." For instance, Cobb's proposals required landlords 
to keep the normal number of tenants on the farm in 193  ̂and 1935 "inso­
far as possible." Hiss felt this phrase was vague and a matter of 
opinion left to the landlord which the government could not success­
fully challenge even in court. In addition, Cobb recommended that a 
landlord could evict any tenant who became a "nuisance" or a "menace," 
and again the determination was left to the landlord. Hiss also ques­
tioned Cobb's idea of making parity payments to landlords and requiring 
them to make a "proper distribution thereof" to their tenants. He said 
it was improper and "contrary to the traditional method of handling 
government funds" to pay money to one private individual for payment to 
other private individuals.
To remove some of the defects he found in the proposed contract, 
Hiss suggested a sentence be Inserted to read, "The determination of 
the Secretary that any . . . violation or misstatement has occurred 
shall be final and conclusive." This left matters of opinion up to the 
Secretary; he would have the final say, for instance, on whether a ten­
ant had actually been a "menace" or a "nuisance."
All of Hiss's recommendations, in the form of a legal opinion.
14.5.
Johnston, Memo to Chester Davis, January 26, 1935, NA, RG
86
70were approved oy Jerome Frank but disapproved by Chester Davis.
Because of the disagreement, Davis called to Washington D. P. Trent of 
Oklahoma, one of the outstanding state Directors of Extension, to serve 
as Assistant Director of the Commodities Division. Trent was an expert 
on tenancy and participated in conferences with Cobb, Davis, Hiss and 
Johnston, but still they could not agree. Finally, the matter was 
submitted to Administrator Peek, who turned it over to his Executive 
Council made up of the heads of departments. The council settled most 
points in favor of the Cobb-Johnston position and instructed Alger Hiss 
to draft tenant provisions for the contract in accordance with their 
decisions.
When Chester Davis presented the final draft of the contract to 
George Peek for his approval, he pointed out that a provision in it 
requiring landlords to keep the normal number of tenants was not legally 
enforceable. Also, he recommended adoption of Hiss's suggested sentence 
which made the Secretary final arbiter in matters of opinion concerning 
the contract. Peek approved Hiss's sentence, and this might have been 
a fearful weapon in forcing compliance with the contract had AAA chosen 
to mak.e it such. Final approval of the contract was made at a confer­
ence of Peek, Fred Lee, Cobb, Hiss, Trent, Davis, Frank, and Wallace?^ 
in October, 1933-
In all of these deliberations, there was no one to represent 
sharecroppers and tenant farmers. Alger Hiss did what he could to
70Hiss, Memo to Mr. Frank, January 26, 1933, HA, RG 1̂ 3; and 
Hiss, Legal Memo Re Draft of 11/3/33 of Cotton Contract, November 8, 
1933, NA, RG 1̂ 5.
Johnston, Memo to Chester Davis, January 26, 1933, NA, RG 1̂ 3.
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protect them legally, but he had little effect on policy decisions.
The ones who won the fight were Cully Cobb, Oscar Johnston, and Chester 
Davis--practical men whose primary concern was planning an effective 
program to limit cotton production and raise prices. Cobb and Johnston, 
because of their backgrounds, tended to favor landlords, perhaps uncon­
sciously. It was inconceivable to them that payments should be made 
directly to sharecroppers and non-managing tenants. This would disturb 
the wnole Southern economy. It is little wonder that a city-bred.
Harvard lawyer like Alger Hiss was able to do no more to protect land­
less farmers, and that despite nis efforts, the 193^-35 contract remained 
a remarkable piece of pro-landlordism.
Most of the tenant provisions in the contract were found in 
paragraph 7 , which became famous during the next two years.
Tlie producer shall . . . endeavor in good faith to bring 
about the reduction of acreage contemplated in this contract in 
such a manner as to cause the least possible amount of labor, 
economic, and social disturbance, and to this end, insofar as 
possible, he shall effect the' acreage reduction as neeir ratable 
as practicable among tenants on this farm; ŷ he/ shall, insofar 
as possible, maintain on this farm the normal number of tenants 
and other employees; /he/ shall permit all tenants to continue 
in the occupancy of their houses on this farm, rent free, for 
the years of 193  ̂and 1935; respectively (unless any such tenant 
shall so conduct himself as to become a nuisance or a menace to 
the welfare of the producer); during such years /he/ shall afford 
such tenants or employees, without_cost, access to fuel to such 
woods lands ae te may designate; /he/ shall permit such tenants 
the use of an adequate portion of the rented acres to grow food 
and feed crops for home consumption and for pasturage for domes­
tically used livestock; and for such use of the rented acres /he/ 
shall permit the reasonable use of work animals and equipment in 
exchange for labor.
Obviously, the paragraph was full of good wishes for the tenants, 
but it was purposely made unenforceable by qualifying phrases. Actually,
^^SDA, Cotton Contract, 193^-35, NA, RG l4$. Author's italics.
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Oscar Johnston and Cully Cobb did not intend that the paragraph should 
be enforceable. Its purpose, they felt, was to place a moral obliga­
tion on landlords to look after their own tenants and permit them to
73snare in the government benefits.
As in 1933, the contract provided that rental and parity pay­
ments would be made only to contract signers who were to distribute 
tne money among their tenants and croppers on a basis of acreage. The 
contract specified that this was not Intended to establish the right 
of any tenant to such payment; it was done only to obligate the pro­
ducer to pay his tenants a "proportionate benefit." At any time within 
thirty days after distribution of benefit payments,■AAA could require a 
producer to show written receipts for his payments to tenants of money 
or "supplies and other benefits." In the event a producer refused to 
make distribution to his tenants or croppers, or refused to slîow the • 
receipts of such payment, he agreed in the contract to forfeit all pay­
ments, and pay the Government twice the amount due his tenants and crop­
pers. The idea was that the money would then be paid directly to the 
tenants and croppers; however, this provision was never enforced. 7̂
Following the rule that the benefits went with the land, share­
croppers and non-managing share tenants received none of the rental 
payments. Cash-tenants got all of the rentals, and managing share ten­
ants half. Parity payments were divided according to the tenant's 
share in the crop. Cash tenants got all, share tenants, both managing
73Johnston, Memo to Chester Davis, January 2o, 1935, NA, RG 1̂ 5-
ihR. R. Elliott, Acting Comptroller General of U. S., to Wallace, 
March 10, 1937, Records of the Solicitor, NA, RG l6 .
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and non-managing, received their usual two-thirds or three-fourths, and 
sharecroppers one half. The sharecroppers' share also depended on the 
portion of the farm which they normally farmed.7̂
Thus, the best a sharecropper could hope for was half of the 
parity pa;yment, or half-a-cent per pound of cotton normally grown for 
domestic consumption. His landlord got tne other half-cent of the 
parity payment plus a rental of three-and-one-half cents per pound of 
cotton not g r o w n . A s  one critic of the program pointed out, this was 
"a curious eignt to one d i v i s i o n . "77 overall effect was that a
cropper whose landlord did not reduce acreage got his usual half of the 
entire crop, but one whose landlord had a 193^-35 contract got half of 
60 percent of the crop and one-eighth of the benefit payments on the 
remaining J+O percent. Indeed it was bad news for a tenant when his 
landlord signed a cotton contract. Significantly, the tobacco con­
tracts were more favorable to tenants. Sharecroppers, for example, got
78one half of all payments. Table 3 indicates statistically the extent 
to which the cotton contracts favored the landlord over non-managing 
share tenants and sharecroppers.
The chiefs of AAA had faith in AAA's voluntary programs to raise 
cotton prices in 193̂ , but many Southern farmers were resentful of the 
fact that those farmers who had not voluntarily reduced acreage in 1933
7̂ USDA, Form Ho. Cotton la. Cotton Contract, 193^-35, HA, RG 1̂ 5<
^^George Bishop to Senator Joseph Robinson, January 10, 193̂ ,
HA, RG 145.
77Horman Thomas, Plight of the Sharecropper (Hew York: Covici- 
Friede Publishers, 1934), p. 30.




Landlords and Non-Managing Share Tenants (l/2 Share)
Basis; 40 acres farmed by one tenant. Cotton prices at 6 .5 cents per 
pound in 1932 and 1 2 .6 cents per pound in 1934, taken from the 
Yearbook of Agriculture, 1933, P- 426. Previous and .1934 pro­
duction of 200 pounds of lint cotton per acre.
Assumptions : Tnat without AAA's cotton programs, prices would have 
remained at the 1932 level in 1934.
Landlord with no 
Contract but with 




With no AAA 
Program
Landlord Tenant Landlord Tenant Landlord Tenant
Rental Payments 
(based on 3•5 
cents per pound 
on 40$ of acreage)
Parity Payments 
(based on 1 cent 
per pound on 4o^ 
of acreage)








$504 $302.40 $302.40 $260 $260
$504 $430.40 $318.40 $260 $260
Conclusions : Tenants' income was increased 22.4̂ ; landlord's income was 
increased 6 5.5̂  by AAA's cotton program. Landlords who 
did not sign cotton contracts were better off than those 
who did and their tenants were much better off.
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had benefited handsomely by the increase in prices. Throughout the 
South there was sentiment for some sort of compulsory program, and when 
indications of this feeling reached the Department of Agriculture, Sec­
retary Wallace ordered 41,000 questionnaires mailed out to farmers in
the South asking if they favored "compulsory control . . .  to compel all
79producers to cooperate in the cotton adjustment programs.' The answer
was overwhelmingly in favor of compulsion, 95 percent of the 25,000
80replies being affirmative. Later, Senator Tiiomas P. Gore, a Democrat
from Oklahoma, charged in the Senate that the questionnaire was rigged,
saying that of the 41,000 queries, 21,000 went to people who were in
some way employees of the government and were therefore prejudiced in
favor of compulsionActually, Gore was mistaken in his statistics
but seemingly correct in his assumptions: all of the 4l,000 were in some
way employees of the government. One thousand of them were county
agents; 10,000 were county committeemen; and 30,000 were official crop
reporters who received small stipends for reporting crop and climatic 
82conditions.
Congress responded to the pressure from the Cotton Belt in 
April, 1934, by passing the Bankhead Cotton Control Act. The measure 
provided that if two-thirds of all cotton farmers agreed to it in a
referendum, a tax of fifty percent of the average market price would
79USDA, "Questionnaire on Cotton Reduction Plans," NA, RG 145.
80Richards, Cotton Under AAA, p. 120.
81U. S. Senate, Hearings Before the Senate Agriculture Committee, 
"Confirmation of Rexford Tugwell," 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 193^j P- 149*
82Richards, Cotton Under AAA, p. 122.
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be placed on all cotton ginned by a farmer over his given allotment.
In many ways, this idea was the progeny of M. L. Wilson's domestic ' 
allotment plan. The Banldiead Act was to apply only to 193̂1-; and for 
that year, the maximum amount of cotton exempt from the tax was fixed 
by the law at ten million bales. All farmers were to be sent certifi­
cates for the amount of tax-free cotton allotted them. When their cotton 
was ginned they could present these certificates and get a bale tag for 
each bale within their allotment. For all over their allotment they 
would have to pay the yO percent tax to get the bale tag, which was 
required on all cotton bales.
Anticipating that what they were passing might be unconstitu­
tional, Congress inserted in the Bankhead Act a statement that "it is 
prima facie presumed that all cotton and its processed products will 
move in interstate or foreign commerce." This, Congress hoped, would 
bring the act clearly under the powers to regulate interstate and 
foreign commerce granted to Congress by the Constitution.
The act instructed the Secretary of Agriculture to take into 
account recent droughts and other unusual conditions in computing allot­
ments. Penalty for violation of the act was set at $1,000 or six months 
in prison, or both. The Secretary was authorized to make regulations 
necessary to carr}- out the act, and maximum penalty for violation of 
these was two hundred dollars. The act instructed the Secretary to make 
regulations "protecting the interests of share-croppers and tenants in 
the making of allotments and the issuance of tax exemptions certifi­
cates .
S., Statutes at Large, XLVTII, Part I, pp. 598-607-
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Using the questionnaire sent to hi,000 people as temporary 
farmer approval, A M  set the Bankhead plan in motion. By July, 193̂ , 
Cully Cobb was able to announce that county committees had been set up 
throughout the South to decide how much of the county allotment of tac 
free cotton would be given to each farmer. These committees nad instruc­
tions to base their decisions on acreage and previous production. In 
order to obtain their exemptions, farmers had to -apply to their county 
committee. Landowners, cash tenants, and'managing share tenants could 
sign their own applications. Sharecroppers and share tenants who oper­
ated a separate farm might submit an application Jointly with their
landlords, or the committee might allow them to sign separately if the
84circumstances seemed to warrant.
The allotment for all cotton states, including California and 
Missouri, was 10,460,251 bales. Most states exceeded their quota in 
actual production, but the drought-stricken states of Texas, Oklahoma, 
Louisiana, and Arkansas fell short by almost 1 .5 million bales. Although 
other states exceeded their quotas, the net result was that national 
production failed to reach the national quota by 745,000 bales. In the 
drought states, the tax exemptions served as a form of crop insurance, 
because farmers were able to sell the exemptions they did not need to 
growers in other parts of the country who did.^^
84USDA, Press Release, July 17, 1934, KA, RG l45; and Davis to 
Robinson, August 29, 1935, NA, RG 145.
^^Congress had authorized 10,000,000 bales of 500 lbs each. The 
average weight of cotton bales was 478 pounds, so A M  converted the 
original allotment into 478-pound bales.
^^SDA, Yearbook of Agriculture, 1935, P- 696; and Cobb to Sen. 
Joseph Robinson, August 26, 1935, NA, RG 145.
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The Bankhead controls proved so popular that Congress renewed 
them for 1935• Perhaps because of criticism of the limited referendum ' 
used in 193̂ , AAA decided this time to submit the matter to all cotton 
farmers for approval. The voting took place in December, 193̂ - Not 
since carpetbag days had so many Negroes voted in the South; said one 
gray-haired Georgia Negro, "We don't vote much, but we likes to." But 
still less than half the 2,000,000 eligible cotton farmers participated.
Tliroughout the South, the pattern in the election was for the 
landlords to encourage and occasionally threaten their tenants to vote 
for the controls. In Georgia, planters told their tenants that if the 
Bankhead plan failed to pass, they would plant no cotton next year. 
"Nothing could be worse than five and ten-cent cotton," announced one; 
"the Bankhead Bill has given us twelve-cent cotton, and the folks work­
ing with me had better vote for it." The outcome of the election was 
ten to one, 1,060,226 to 99,650, in favor of the Bankliead controls.
Only Oklahoma and California, of the seventeen cotton states, failed 
to pass the measure by the desired two-thirds margin.
With the 193^-35 contract, commodity loans, and the Bankhead 
controls, the pattern of AAA's cotton program during the early New Deal 
was set. The elements were present for either fair or unfair treatment 
of sharecroppers and non-managing tenants. Much depended on how the 
programs were administered.
^̂ Newsweek, December 22, 193̂ , P- 1} and Raper, Preface, p. 2̂ 9; 
and Cobb, Memo to Chester Davis, January 5, 1935, NA, RG lk5.
CHAPTER IV
AAA'S TENANT PROBLEMS
By the fall of 1933, hundreds of painfully scrawled letters
from tenants were arriving each month in Secretary Wallace's office.
Some complained of receiving no payment for the plow-up:
Sire I write you concern of my account and plowing up. I 
plowed up suppose to bee 13 acrs at $12.75 per acer and ploud 
up my intire crop so you let me here from you at once so I will 
no what do do ... .
Another wrote :
first we will call you attan to crop year of 1933 Began of the 
Reduction By destroying of a said amount of cotton By which 
plain yplan/ would are was Rental acres to u.s. government its 
splended perpious was to aid the shear croper as well as the 
landlord.
... Mr. James Robb /¥he landlord . . . has never give we the 
agricultural workers of Widner Ars. not one di..;e of our Rightful 
Part, and now he is going around this week baging ̂ raggln^ 
and Perswading and making us sign a Blank Claiming for us to get 
our mony there are miny Bean forsted to sign some kind Blank is 
with his saying for us to be Paid for destroying crop of 1933*
Mr Wallas without a dout this is true
We. are a great number . . . .  We can Remember how Mr Robb did 
Beat and crikle ^ripple/ and knock and Put on the country 
/county/̂  farm his labor he run the great farm of Widner. Ark. 
Called Wheeler.
Still another :
^Robert Allen to H. C. Malcom, December 5, 1933, NA, RG 1̂ 5. 
^"Bladning" to Wallace, April 20, 1935, NA, RG ll5-
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Dear Sir: Is it lawful that Dr. Tailor should buy cotton that
hasn't been pledged or appraised, and plow said cotton up and 
not allow his croppers to plow up because they did not want to 
take $6 per acre when they were suppose to have one half of
said crop. There arejp croppers here have not been allowed
any part or our crop.b
One cropper told how his landlord had promised to pay him seven­
teen dollars per acre for the plow-up but was now willing to pay only 
twelve dollars. He said he had plowed under eight acres of cotton and 
produced six bales plus oGO pounds on his remaining seventeen acres,
which the landlord marketed for him. He claimed he had received nothing
for his crop and that the landlord refused to settle with him.
Other tenants complained that their settlement for the plow-up
had not been fair. A group of Alabama croppers stated:
In 1933 we plowed up our cotton--and on many plantations we re­
ceived no benefit whatever for this. When payments were allowed 
us--we were forced to allow it to be applied on our accounts
. . . .  In many cases we were given credit for one-third of the
payments /They were entitled to half/ . . . .  The plantation 
owners argued that since we did not have to pick the cotton 
plowed under we were not entitled to one half . . . .  We were 
cheated on that deal.̂
From Texas came a report from a man who identified himself only as a
home owner in a small town that landlords were requiring sharecroppers
"to make and gather the crop and set aside one fourth of the entire
crop to pay loans and taxes." The writer said this-practice was "forc-
y—  —— ^ing the white tennant /_sic/ out of homes on the farm." A leader of
J. Franks to H. C. Malcom, August l4, 1933, HA, RG l4$.
^Lem Peterson, affidavit taken by H. 0. Malcom, November 28, 
1933, HA, RG li+5.
^A. D. Gath, et al, to Wallace, December 12, 193^, HA, RG IU5.
°H. J. Turner to Wallace, December 26, 1933, HA, RG 1̂ 9-
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a tenants' organization -sent a list of sharecroppers who had received 
no payment and demanded to know,'"What is your department doing to try 
to stop such 'rackets' and give the man who tills the soil a break.
These planters are not such big devils that you need be afraid to crack
Y
down on them."
There is no accurate way to determine the extent of landlord 
chiseling in 1933- The Agricultural Adjustment Administration reviewed 
only 3;759 landlord-tenant complaints in three years,^ but this means 
little because the machinery for processing complaints in 1933 was 
inadequate and many tenants did not understand their rights or were 
afraid to assert them.
One proven case was the Twist Brothers Plantation of Cross 
County, Arkansas. The Twists failed to get the consent of their ten­
ants to plow up cotton and made no distribution of payments. After 
more than a year of Investigation, AAA stopped further payments to them 
until they made proper settlement.^ Another case was that of E. H. Polk 
of Phillips County, Arkansas. Before the plow-up, he told all of his 
sharecroppers that the government was going to pay him $11 per acre to 
plow up the cotton and agreed to split the money with them if they 
complied. In reality, Polk had chosen the cotton-option plan and the 
$11 per acre was his initial payment. He received an additional $6 
per acre from his option cotton which he did not split with his crop­
'll. R. Butler to W. B. Camp, August 13, 1935, HA, RG IU5.
Ĉobb, Memo to the Secretary, March 11, 1937, Landlord-Tenant 
File, NA, RG 1̂ +5•
^Margaret Bennett, Memo to Mr. Frank, December I9, 193^, NA, RG
1L5.
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pers.̂ *̂  It seems likely that many landlords followed the same practice.
Also, data gathered by the Arkansas Labor Bureau indicated a large
number of landlords took the plow-up money due tenants and applied it
11on old debts going oack as far as 19jO.
A tenant was lucky if he received any cash from the 1933 plow- 
up. The AAA's policy of paying all benefits to landlords allowed them 
to collect on old debts before settling with tenants. This practice 
did not violate the 1933 contract; moreover, AAA considered its respon­
sibility to extend no further than to guarantee that the payments were 
12applied to debts. A tenant who received his snare, either in cash or 
cancelled debts, was still worse off than one whose landlord had not 
signed a 1933 contract. The tenant on a contract farm received three 
cents a pound for cotton plowed under while the tenant of the non­
cooperating landlord got five cents if his cotton sold for the average 
price. Two additional cents a pound may not seem like much, but it
made a difference of kO percent in a large part of the annual income 
13of the tenant.
The Bankhead cotton control program in 193k was also open to 
abuse. The Bankhead Act instructed the Secretary to make provisions 
"protecting the interests of sharecroppers and tenants,indicating
^^Chester Davis, Memo to the Secretary, September 27, 193k, NA,
RG lk5.
D. Ezell to T. Roy Reid, December k, 193k, NA, RG lk5-
^^Calvin Hoover, "Hoover Report," NA, RG ik̂ .
1 1Raper, Preface to Peasantry, pp. 2k3-2k6.
S., Statutes at Large, XLVIII, Part I, pp. 989, 60d.
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that Congress aad become more aware of such problems. The Adjustment 
Administration complied by setting up regulations that cotton exemption 
certificates, the forms which allocated to each grower the number of 
bales he could market free of tax, would be issued to landlords and 
tenants in the proportion in which they were to share in the crop, and ■ 
that the tenant's share of exemptions would be computed without regard 
to current or past debts. However, it was not obligatory that cer­
tificates be Issued separately. A landlord could get his tenants to 
sign an agreement making him trustee for the certificates and thus 
receive all of them. Tliis arrangement was obviously put in the regula­
tions to be used on those plantations where the tenants were incapable 
of handling monetary matters, or where the landlord thought this was 
the case. Trustees were required to make a "final report and account­
ing" of their distribution of certificates.^^
By mid-193i, reports were appearing in newspapers and letters 
were pouring into AAA's offices in Washington to the effect that land­
lords were forcing their tenants to sign trustee agreements and then 
taking all the tax exemptions for themselves.^° Many tenants believed 
that since they had not signed cotton contracts in 193  ̂they were not
bound by the Bankhead Act and did not need tax exemptions. For this
17reason, and because of sheer ignorance, many tenants had not applied 
for tax exemptions Officers of a tenant organization wrote Cully Cobb
^^Chester Davis to Senator Joseph Robinson, August 29, 1935,
NA, RG 1̂ 5.
^°Chicago Daily News, October k, 1934j and H. L. Mitchell to 
W. B. Camp, August 13, 193̂ , NA, RG 1̂ 5*
Alvin Nunnally to Wallace, July 31, 193̂ , NA, RG 1̂ 5.
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that "very few if any" croppers had applied because the croppers had
not been informed it was necessary. Whetner this was "thru design or
ignorance on the part of [kkk'sj representatives" the tenant leaders
were not prepared to say. They asked Cobb to send someone to explain
the law,^^ but he sent only the pertinent regulations.^^
Under the Bankhead Act, farmers who did not produce their quota
of cotton could sell,'the tax exemptions at four cents a pound to other
producers. There were rumors throughout the Cotton Belt that kinship
and friendship played an important part when some county committees
made the allocations of certificates. To some observers it seemed that
those farmers with "connections" did not reach their quotas and sold
their exemptions to neighbors who went past theirs. Naturally, few
20tenants had "connections."
The tenant difficulties under the 193^-35 cotton contract were 
the most serious encountered by AAA. In the early spring of 193̂ ,
D. P. Trent, AAA's trouble-shooter in matters of tenancy, feared there 
would be difficulties under the 193  ̂contract and decided to take a 
field trip to make a first-hand check. He drove through eastern Arkan­
sas, where a large part of the trouble under the 1933 contract had 
originated. He talked with lawĵ ers, businessmen, landlords, and ten­
ants, and asked people at random what they thought of the government's 
cotton program, and whether they knew of any injustices to tenants or
l8Mitchell, Nunnally and Butler to Cobb, August 15, 193̂ , NA,
RG 145.
^^Cobb to Mitchell, August 23, 1934, NA, RG 145.
20Raper, Preface to Peasantry, pp. 243-246.
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had heard of a tenants' organization. Tiie answers were varied and con­
fusing, but Trent concluded that there must be some fire where there was 
so much smoke. He returned to Washington, conferred with Cobb and the 
two decided to seek the advice of the Directors of the Extension Service 
in Southern states. In writing the directors, Trent said: "I think we 
all agree that there are a considerable number of tenants who will not
receive the benefit payments intended for them unless some definite and
21prompt action is taken."
The advice from the directors was that the AAA should make its 
intent to protect the rights of tenants perfectly clear to all district 
and county agents and others who handled tenant matters. Accordingly, 
Chester Davis sent out a letter in May, 193̂ , calling on all "who are 
to assist with the landlord-tenant problem" to be patient and fair- 
minded and to use good Judgment. Davis quoted long passages from the 
Adjustment Act and pointed out that the Act was designed to benefit all 
farmers. He stated flatly that this included all classes of tenants. 
However, he added that the purpose of AAA was to deal with the acute 
agricultural emergency and not to solve a "deep-seated social problem." 
The AAA, Davis said, did not intend to interfere in the normal relation­
ship between landlord and tenant, but it was going to make sure that the 
benefits of the Adjustment Act were received by all farmers in fair and 
equitable proportion.
Davis instructed that cotton contracts be administered so that 
all types of tenants would receive the portion of "rental and parity 
payments specified in the contract," and that no one should be allowed
21Trent to Extension Directors of Southern States, April 12, 
1934, NA, RG 145.
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to withhold from tenants what was rigntfully theirs or secure for them­
selves a larger share of the oenefits than provided in the contract.
"Tne Agricultural Adjustment Administration," Davis explained, "is 
obligated to see to it that these programs do not operate to the dis­
advantage of tenant farmers." He noted that signs were already appear­
ing that landlords were violating the 193  ̂contract by evicting tenants, 
converting them from tenants to wage hands, withholding benefit pay­
ments from them by various devices, refusing to grant the status of
ppmanaging-share-tenant, and raising rents.
The Administrator decided also to take further precautions. He 
instructed Trent to set up special machinery to investigate and talie 
action concerning tenant complaints. Trent recruited seven men from 
the southern extension services and assigned each to investigate and
make adjustments in their states. This group was known as the Adjust-
23ment Committee.
Davis' precautions were well founded. Once the 193^ program 
was in motion, a veritable deluge of mail hit Washington from both 
tenants and landlords. One of the most frustrating problems was that 
of the managing-share-tenant. The 193^-35 contract defined such a 
tenant as "one who furnished work stock, equipment and labor and who 
manages the operation of the farm," but this definition only seemed to 
add to the confusion. Senator Joseph Robinson called the Cotton Section 
in Washington to ask what a managing-share-tenant was. Nobody in the 
cotton states, he said, had ever heard of it. George Bishop, a consult-
^^Davis to District Agents and Others, May ^, 193̂ , NA, RG 1̂ 5. 
^^Trent, Memo to Mr. Davis, December 28, 193̂ ; NA, RG 1̂ 5-
ant; explained that no one in the Cotton Section knew for sure either,
but as near as he could interpret it was "the old third and fourth
renter who furnishes /provides for/" himself and produces cotton and
pays a third of the feed or cash rent for feed and one fourth of the 
2kcotton for rent."
So much misunderstanding resulted from the original definition 
of a managing-share-tenant that Administrator Davis was forced to issue 
a new detailed definition. He said it was a share tenant who occupied 
a distinct tract of land wiiich had its own cropping system and was 
operated independently of any other tract, even if it was part of a 
larger land holding. Such a tenaiit directed his own labor "without 
direct supervision" by the owner. However, for an owner to visit the
farm occasionally to give instructions on planting and harvesting did
25not constitute "direct supervision."
It was a crucual matter whether tenants were managing-share- 
tenants or not. If they were, they could sign a 193^-35 contract and 
be eligible for rental as well as parity payments. If not, they got 
only parity payments. Final determination was left to the county com­
mittee or occasionally a field adjustor from AAA. Landlords were ex­
tremely reluctant to concede the status because it meant fewer benefits 
for themselves. They reasoned that no tenant was entitled to a rental 
payment— rent should go to the owner of the land. This opinion was also 
shared by the key men in the Cotton Section.The problem was one of
^^Bishop to Robinson, January 10, 193̂ ; HA, RG l4$.
^^Davis to District Agents and others. May 5, 193̂ , HA, RG 1̂ 5* 
^^Bishop to Robinson, January 10, 193̂ , NA, RG 1̂ 5*
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semantics. The term "rental" was misleading since the government was 
not renting the land to use it but to take it out of production. Had 
it been called a "non-production payment" or something like that, the 
landlords might have resisted paying part of it to their tenants less 
vigorously.
When Oscar Johnston went to Memphis in December, 1933, to ex­
plain the 193  ̂program to producers, he was questioned by landlords who 
feared they would have to share rental payments with their croppers. 
Johnston informed them that if a landlord signed a contract at a time 
when he had no agreements with his tenants, he would not have to share 
rentals. But if the landlord already had agreements with managing- 
share-tenant s, they would be entitled to half of the rental money. The 
meaning must have been clear to all landlords present that they should 
sign the 193^-35 contract before making arrangements with their ten­
ants
An example of other subterfuges used by landlords to avoid 
granting the status of managing-suEure-tenant was submitted to the Legal 
Division of AAA. A landlord gave leases which specifically denied a 
managing-share-tenant relationship and stated that the tenant was not
28entitled to any rental payments. This practice was not uncommon 
throughout the South.
Because of its importance to the people involved and the dif­
ficulty in interpreting the definitions, the determination of who was a
27Johnston, Address at Municipal Auditorium, Memphis, Tennessee, 
December 11, 1933, NA, RG l4$.
^®Frank to Gatlin, March 22, I93I+, NA, RG li+5-
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managing-share-tenajit often called for Solomon-like judgment. One 
field adjustor was so dismayed by a case that he reported: "This seems 
to be another of those cases where the landlord has not relinquished 
the authority to manage, but is not very active in his management. Land­
lord says he manages; tenants say they manage. Take it or leave it.
You may be wrong either way you decide." The adjustor finally decided 
in favor of the landlord on the basis that since he employed a riding 
boss, all of his tenants could not be managing.
Making rental and parity payments to one million contract sign­
ers in 193  ̂and trying to assure proper settlement with tenants was a 
big headache for AAA. Simply mailing out that many checks was a prob­
lem. Cully Cobb was instrumental in inducing the Treasury Department 
to allow the use of check writing m a c h i n e s , and fof^a time the Rental 
and Benefits Audit unit of the Cotton Section had to work in three 
shifts, twenty-four hours a day to make the payments without delay. 3̂
In the Comptroller's "factory," a room half a block long, fifteen
hundred employees with hundreds of business machines labored to turn
32out 80,000 checks per day.
Before any checks were mailed, Chester Davis, following through 
on his instructions for equitable distribution, called a conference in 
Washington of Extension Directors and other USDA officials from cotton
29Margaret Bennett, Memo to Mr. Frank, Exhibit "B," February !+, 
1935, NA, RG IÀ5.
^^Cobb to author, June 13, I96I.
^E. A. Miller to Rep. Marvin Jones, November 22, 193̂ , NA, RG
145.
"̂ Wallace, New Frontiers, pp. I87-I8 8.
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states to devise a method of assuring compliance with the cotton con- 
tracts.-’-̂ The conference decided to require landlords to sign a cer­
tificate of compliance with the cotton contract. In advising Secretary 
Wallace of this action, Chester Davis assured him a "fair distribution" 
would be made of 193^ benefits. ■ It was decided to mail a form to con­
tract signers which they would fill out and sign, indicating whether 
they had followed the regulations in distributing payments to tenants. 
The Legal Division drafted a form, but the Cotton Section objected to 
its length and wrote a shorter one. After seeing the form proposed by 
the Cotton Section, Jerome Frank said it would make it "next to impos­
sible" to determine if the landlord had complied with his obligation. 
Any unfairness by the landlord, said Frank, could be covered up easily 
because the form lumped together the cash settlement made by the land­
lord and the cancellation of tenants' "furnish" debts. If landlords 
used the "furnish" to pay government benefits to their tenants, Frank 
felt the government had a right to see that fair prices were charged 
therefore, he wanted them itemized. Frank ordered Francis Shea, Head 
of his Opinions Section, to prepare a memorandum stating the legal 
aspects of forcing compliance with the contract in the distribution of
payments to tenants. He told Shea to include a statement about how "we
boasted" in the literature put out to explain the cotton program that 
tenants and croppers would be treated fairly. He also wanted a state­
ment to the effect that action could be taken without going to court 
against a landlord who cancelled old "furnish" debts 'instead, of making
^%SDA, News Release, May 24-, 193̂ , NA, RG 1̂4-5.
^̂ Frank, Memo to Mr. Trent, November 9, 193̂ , NA, RG 1̂ 5*
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cash payments.
The Cotton Section saw things altogether differently. Cully Cobb 
had made plans to supply landlords with instructions on how to distrib­
ute parity payments and a standard receipt to be used. Also, the Section 
told landlords that within thirty days after the receipt of parity pay­
ments, they might oe required to give a complete accounting of their 
distribution. The purpose of this was to gain better compliance from 
landlords. Cobb did not intend to make a blanket demand for accounting 
and did not plan to have his section audit all accountings made. To do 
so, he said, would be a "colossal and expensive task." He and his sec­
tion saw the purpose of the certificate of compliance as providing a 
basis for investigation in case of disputes. Cobb rejected Frank's 
idea of having every landlord itemize his distribution. He felt this 
would result in a "negative reaction" among landlords.
The fight over the certificate of compliance had been simmering 
for months when Acting Administrator Victor Christgau, whose sentiments 
lay more with Frank, ordered Cobb to develop a form which would "assure 
the proper distribution" and yet not be any more complicated than nec­
e s s a r y . Accordingly, Cobb had his section draft a new form.38 When 
this was submitted to Chester Davis, he turned the matter over to D. P. 
Trent, Assistant Director of the Commodities Division, for a decision 
between the Legal Division's long form and the Cotton Section's new
^̂ Frank, Memo to Mr. Shea, November 2, 193̂ , NA, RG 1̂ 5-
^̂ Cobb, Memo to Chester Davis, October 26, 193̂ , NA, RG lk$.
Christgau, Memo to Mr. Cobb, November 13, 193̂ , NA, RG l4$.
^̂ Cobb, Memo to Chester Davis, October 26, 193̂ , NA, RG 1̂ 9.
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short form. Trent knew he held a hot potato, but he was a man with 
tender conscience concerning tenants. Although the final decision would 
be made by Davis and Wallace, he knew they would probably follow his 
recommendations. He also knew that AAA had received a "great many crit­
icisms" because the tenants' share of rental payments had been so small. 
The agency had answered the complaints by saying tenants would receive 
parity payments later. Trent felt that if AAA did not assure that ten­
ants received their parity payments, there would be "a new flood of 
criticisms." The cotton contract did not permit a tenant to pledge 
part of his parity payment to his landlord, but Trent was fully aware 
that most tenants would use their parity checks to pay what they owed 
their landlords, and he felt the debts should be paid. But because 
of the criticism it might bring, Trent believed AAA should not allow 
landlords to appropriate the tenants' share of parity payments to 
settle debts without the tenants' consent. Therefore, Trent recom­
mended that landlords be instructed that the purpose of the cotton 
program was to increase purchasing power to all farmers including ten­
ants, and that landlords were not to apply tenants' parity payments on 
old debts. Moreover, he argued that payments be applied on current 
debts only by agreement with the t en an ts.A statement to this effect 
appeared later in AAA's instructions to landlords for distribution of
, 4oparity payments.
In further recommendations, Trent acknowledged Jerome Frank's 
belief that landlords should be required to give a detailed accounting
30
Trent, Memo to Mr. Bower, November 8, 193̂ , NA, RG 1̂ 5-
koUSDA, Form No. Cotton 35A, November 26, 193̂ , NA, RG IU5.
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of their settlement. However, the Cotton Section had improved its
short form to the point that Trent thought it was adequate, so he
recommended its use. In line with Cully Cobb's reasoning, he agreed
that the Legal Division's long form would be difficult to administer
and distasteful to landlords.Davis and Wallace approved Trent's 
42recommendations. The Cotton Section won this battle, having surren­
dered only on the point that tenants would have to agree to applying 
their parity payments on current debts. And yet Trent had done all he 
could to help the tenant.
In the certificate of compliance as it was finally sent out, 
the landlords were required to certify that in keeping with paragraph 7 
of the contract they had reduced acreage ratably among tenants, that 
all tenants had been allowed to continue living in their houses rent 
free for the year, that each tenant had been given the use of an ade­
quate portion of the rented acres on which to grow food and feed, end 
that tenants were permitted reasonable use of work animals to farm the 
rented acres in exchange for labor. Any exceptions to these provisions 
were to be noted by the landlord. County committees and supervisors 
were required to check all phases of compliance and sign the certificate 
along with the landlord. Cully Cobb remarked with some justice that 
this was going "about as far as possible in protecting the rights of 
tenants.
Despite AAA's good intentions, the withholding of tenants' par-
^^Trent, Memo to C. C. Davis, November 12, 193̂ , NA, RG l4$.
^^avis. Memo to the Secretary, November 22, 193̂ , NA, RG l4$.
^̂ Cobb, Memo to Chester Davis, January 9, 1939, NA, RG 149.
110
ity payments by landlords, either in payment of debts or out-and-out 
cheating, was probably widespread. The unfavorable publicity about this 
wnich Trent had feared continued to appear in newspapers and liberal
kkmagazines, and AAA took careful note of it. However, reports from 
tenants that they had been cheated were not always reliable. Few ten­
ants adequately understood what was due them and they tended to be 
guided by what other tenants got. Some landlords in making their dis­
tribution of benefits "ratably" took into account the fertility of land 
and previous production. Thus one tenant with twenty acres might re­
ceive more than another with twenty, and the other tenant might feel 
cheated. In addition, the benefit checks of tenants who had signed 
trustee agreements, whether or not they knew what they were signing, 
were sent to the landlords and could quite properly be applied on current 
debts. Such tenants might receive no cash from the government and feel 
that they had been wronged. Often they had no legitimate complaint 
under AAA's regulations.^^
In cases where it was proven that a landlord refused to dis­
tribute benefit payments, his contract was suspended and no payments 
were made until he submitted proof of compliance. If the landlord re­
fused to comply, his contract was cancelled by the Secretary. However, 
this worked a hardship on the tenants of that landlord, since their pay­
ments were also stopped when the contract was cancelled. The Legal 
Division became concerned with this problem and began trying to get
Hit-Various clippings and extracts, Landlord-Tenant File, NA, RG-
I'Vb.
D . Ezell to T. Roy Reid, December p, 193l|', NA, RG 1̂ 5.
^^Reid to Wallace, January 10, 1935; NA, RG l4$.
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administrative approval for making separate payments to tenants who 
voluntarily reduced their acreage although they had no contract.
Approval for this policy was never obtained.
There were many landlords who fully compiled with the contract 
in distributing benefits to tenants. One such was Oscar Johnston, of 
the Delta and Pine Land Company. Perhaps he was forced to be "more 
Catholic than the Pope" by his high position in AAA, but Johnston wrote 
Cully Cobb in 1937 that he had been holding money for three years for 
some of his tenants who had left without collecting it. He had tried 
diligently to learn their present addresses but could not. They owed 
him money and he asked if ne could cancel the debts with the money ne 
was holding. Cobb, who was a stickler for rules once they were made,
48wrote Johnston that he could not.
Tne every-day routine of processing tenant complaints, and the 
possibility that some of them were unfounded, seems to have enured some 
people in AAA to the human tragedy with which they were dealing. But 
occasionally a letter got out of channels and into a place where it 
could cause an immediate reaction. Such a letter was received by Jerome 
Frank from a Negro in Ashdown, Arkansas, who was afraid to sign his 
name and had mailed it on a train because "they are hard on us about 
writing Washington, D. C." It said simply: "Please, Sir, fix it so 
farmers poor people can get the money that is put out, if you will 
please. Sir, help us. We need clothes. Some need bed clothes and we
^^Robert McConnoughey to T. B. Thibodeaux, August 31, 193̂ , NA, 
RG l45j and W. T. Watkins to Alger Hiss, April l8, 1934, NA, RG l4$.




The problem which proved the greatest thorn in AAA's side was 
evictions. Paragraph 7 of the 193^-35 contract required the landlord 
to maintain on his land the normal number of tenants and to permit all 
tenants to live rent-free in their houses during the two years.And 
yet it was inherent in cotton,acreage reduction that fewer tenants 
would be needed. During the debates in Congress over the Adjustment 
Act, Senate Majority Leader Joe Robinson had told nis colleagues that 
landlords could not rid themselves of the cost of production by "turn­
ing men out," and he doubted if they would even if they could.51 Appar­
ently, the senator did not understand Southern landlords as well as he 
thought. Even before the 193^ contracts were signed, there were numer­
ous evictions. During the season there were others, and after the 193U 
crop was in, a great wave of them developed.
The pressures on a landlord were great to discharge some of 
his tenants. About bO percent of his acreage lay fallow, and yet if 
he kept the same number of tenants his operating expenses for the year 
would be almost as great. If he evicted tenants he would not have to 
support them, he would not have to split government benefit money with 
them, and he could use the rented acres for his own purposes. AAA's 
rental checks, coming early in the season as they did, gave him money 
with which to hire day workers or wage hands to cultivate and harvest 
the crop. Such workers had no rights under the contract, so with them
^^Anonimous /sic/ to Jerome Frank, November 23, 193^, NA, RG ikg.
*̂̂ USDA, Form No.. Cotton la, 1934-39 Cotton Contract, NA, RG 1̂ 5 •
S., Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1939,
LXXIII, 1237.
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the landlord could return to the relation he wanted with his labor,
one in which the government did not interfere. Only those landlords
who sincerely wished to comply with their contract, who feared to
violate it, or who felt a paternalistic responsibility toward their
tenants, resisted the temptation to evict. Fortunately, they were in 
52the vast majority.
However, those landlords who made evictions caused great per­
sonal tragedy for the tenant families involved. Since fewer tenants 
were needed throughout the South, there was no place for dispossessed 
tenants to go but to the road or to the towns and cities to try to get 
on relief. Travelers in the South saw the homeless families on the 
rivers in flat boats, in the coves and swamps, on barren hillsides, and 
on the roads. They were without nomes, food or work, half-clothed and 
sick of body and soul--^^ the "grapes of wrath" of a government which 
had not intended to harm them.
In Alabama, 809 landlords were asked why they evicted their 
tenants who were currently on relief. Twenty-six percent said that 
acreage reduction reduced their need for tenants. Eighteen percent 
blamed the uncertainty of crop acreage due to the government programs, 
and over half said they could not afford to "furnish" all their ten-
sUants. In Texas, A. B. Cox, Director of the Texas Bureau of Business 
Research, charged that more than 450,000 people on relief rolls in
^ Ĥoover, "Hoover Report," M, RG 1̂ 5; and Hoffsommer, "AAA and 
the Cropper," Social Forces, XIII (June, 1935), 5OO-5OI.
53Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, p. 26.
Hoff sommer, "AAA and the Cropper," pp. 500-501.
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Texas were there because of the agricultural adjustment programs.
C. B. Baldwin, Assistant to the Secretary of Agriculture, challenged
him to prove it, and few officials in the USDA or AAA took the charges
T 55 - -seriously.
Evictions were worst in the Delta country of Arkansas, Tennessee, 
and the Missouri "bootheel." A great wave of evictions came after set­
tlement time in the winter of 193̂ -35- A reporter from the Southeast 
Missourian of Cape Giradeau made a tour of neighboring counties to 
check on conditions and found highways "filled with families trying to 
get somewhere" and with large numoers of women and children who were 
"most pathetic." He talked to one planter who had laid off three of 
nis five tenants because AAA trimmed his acreage more than ne expected, 
and to another who had to evict sixty-four persons. The reporter was 
not one to pass judgment on AAA. He said ne did not know who would 
take care of the homeless people, but he urged the citizens of Cape 
Giradeau "to lend a helping hand to the women and children stranded 
along the highway without thought of what caused their plight or who 
should by rights take care of them."^°
By late 193^ there were several cases in state and federal 
courts involving tenants who were suing for their rights under the 
57cotton contract. A request from a group of such plaintiffs that AAA 
enter the case on their side led to a serious crisis inside AAA within
55Baldwin to Cox, October 26, 193̂ , NA, EG l6 .
^^Southeast Missourian, Cape Giradeau, Missouri, undated, winter, 
193̂ - Clipping in Mary Connor Myers File, NA, EG l4$.
145.
I. Proffer to Mary Connor %ers, February 12, 1935, NA, EG
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a few months. In the meantime, the Cotton Section took the position 
that there were no more displaced tenants than usual and if there were 
it was not the fault of the cotton programs since every effort had been
58made to protect tenants. When a reporter from the Washington Post 
went to the Cotton Section to check on reports of wholesale evictions 
of tenants because of AAA's programs, Charles Alvord, new Assistant 
Chief of the section, denied everything. He later reported to Cully 
Cobb that he had said nothing "other then satisfactory to the Admin­
istration." The reporter asked Alvord if complaints from tenants were 
given any consideration and was told they were when there was evidence 
of "any injustice.
Another violation of the cotton contract which was common, 
although perhaps not so serious as evictions, was lowering the status 
of tenants from share-tenants to croppers or from croppers to day work­
ers. According the Chester Davis, this was "another out" which the land­
owners had, against which AAA tried to furnish protection. Davis knew 
that the lot of a day hand on a cotton farm was "far worse than that of
„6oa .snare cropper.
Tne motivations for landlords to downgrade their tenants were 
about the same as for evictions. They would not have to split rental 
payments or tax exemptions with share-tenants-raade-croppers nor would 
they have to provide "furnish" or divide parity payments with croppers
^̂ AAA, Cotton Section, "Resume of Tenant Problem," January 
1935; m, RG 1 4 5.
^ Âlvord, Memo to Mr. Cobb, April 7; 193̂ ; NA, RG 1̂ 5*
^^Davis to author, June 15; 1959-
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who had been forced to become day workers. To prevent this, AAA issued 
an administrative order early in 193^ providing that no contracts would 
be accepted if it appeared there was a "side agreement" between landlord 
and tenant which would cause the tenant to turn over his benefit pay­
ments to the landlord or would lower the status of the tenant for that
6lpurpose.
Despite the efforts of AAA to prevent it, there were m^y 
instances where the status of tenants was lowered.. The timing of bene­
fit payments had something to do with it. By the end of spring, 193̂ , 
every landlord had received half of his rental payment, and by the end 
of summer the other half. All that remained then was the parity pay­
ment which amounted to only about 22 percent of the total benefits.
Thus, before the crop was harvested the landlord had received 'jQ percent 
of what the government intended to pay him. He could violate the con­
tract any way he wanted to and still lose only the remaining 22 percent. 
Sometimes, landlords stood to gain more than they could lose by evict­
ing tenants or lowering their status, even if AAA cancelled their con­
tracts.^^ In many instances, often in the middle of the growing season, 
croppers were converted to wage hands merely by the planter sending 
word that no further credit would be allowed them at the commissary.
The tenants were then forced to accept work as day labor or leave the 
plantation.
The variety of administrative problems which arose under the
^^Administrative Rule No. 15, File 119, NA, RG 1̂ 5.
°^Richards, Cotton Under AAA, pp. 108-109*
63Raper, Preface to Peasantry, pp. 249-253•
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193^-35 contract were almost 'unimaginable. For instance, such a simple 
matter as renting acres to the government could get extremely compli­
cated . The contract provided that landlords were to allow tenants to 
use an ad.eq_uate portion to grow food and feed for their own use. But 
could the landlord charge share-rent on the food and feed grown? Or 
conversely, could a tenant grow feed on government acres which he nor­
mally grew on the landlord's land thus depriving the owner of the rental? 
The answer to both questions was no. Then the matter was raised of who
was to keep weeds out of the rented acres. Here the answer was the
6htenant who normally farmed it. Next came a suggestion to use the 
rented acres to grow food for relief purposes. Alger Hiss was given 
the unenviable task of writing a legal opinion on this, and he decided 
the acres could not be used for relief purposes since the cotton con­
tract did not specify it. However, he suggested ways aro'und his ruling
if the owner of the land was willing. The owner could shift feed crops 
from non-rented acres to rented acres thus freeing the non-rented acres 
for relief use, or he could name persons on relief as his tenants thus
entitling them to use the rented acres.
Even the most violent critics of AAA's cotton program were 
willing to admit that its problems were enormous in trying to enforce 
one million contracts. One such critic. Dr. William Amberson of the 
University of Tennessee, felt that the worst weakness of the program 
was the enforcement phase. He charged that the county agents, although
technically qualified, were not trained in landlord-tenant affairs and 
_
Jerome Frank, Memo to Mr. Campbell, May 1$, 193̂ , NA, RG 1̂ 5-
^̂ Hiss, Memo to Mr. Frank, and accompanying Legal Opinion,
April 18, 1934, NA, RG IÀ5.
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were closely bound to the landlords. He also said AAA could not expect
■ "harassed minor officials inspecting scattered cases on the run" to do
, . , 66 a good job.
The standard procedure for a tenant with a complaint was to
take it to the county agent or the county committee, depending on which
was functioning most effectively in the county. From there the tenant
could appeal his case to the State Adjustment Board. If his complaint
involved regulations, administrative rulings, or instructions issued
by the Secretary, the decision of the State Board was final. If it
concerned the provisions of the cotton contract, it could be appealed
to the Cotton Section and eventually to the Secretary.Complaints
received directly by AAA in Washington were usually referred back to
68county agents or committees.
However, county committees were notoriously pro-landlord. In 
fact, they generally consisted of landlords and planters. One group of 
eighteen tenants in Tennessee wrote the AAA that "the small landowner 
and renter has no chance for a fair deal before the community committee, 
the county agent, or the county committee. Gardner Jackson, an 
ousted AAA official touring the South in 1935j asked a county agent 
why no sharecroppers were put on county committees. The agent answered, 
"Hell! you wouldn't put a chicken on a poultry boaxd, would you?"?^
66William Amberson, "New Deal for the Sharecropper," Nation,
CXL (February 13, 1935), l&T-
^^Cobb to Sen. Joseph Robinson, April 29, 1935, NA, RG ih^.
^Cobb to Robinson, February 7, 193̂ , NA, RG 1̂ 5.
°^Bert Hodge, et al, to Mary Connor %ers, February 8, 1935,
NA, RG l4$.
^Ogardner Jackson, interview with author, July 28, 1959*
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Carroll Binder, a reporter for the Chicago Daily News, returned from 
the South to report that planters on county committees were "taking 
care" of themselves and their friends in a manner that would "smell 
to high heaven before the cotton reduction campaign is over."?! Indi­
cations were rife that M. L. Wilson's and Henry Wallace's dream of 
enlightened democratic administration of the Adjustment Act at the 
local level had turned sour in the plantation South.
Criticism of AAA's tenant policies mounted steadily toward the 
end of I93A. The Washington Post carried an editorial in November 
entitled, "Where Planning has Failed," which was read in AAA offices 
with great consternation. It pointed out that farm employaient was 
down in 193^ for the first time in twelve years and implied that AAA 
was to blame. "Officials must have realized," said the Post, "when 
they set out to curtail production that a large number of men would 
thereby be deprived of employment." The newspaper reported that the 
Administration had made no plans to provide jobs for the workers dis­
placed by the acreage reduction and commented rather sadly that agri­
cultural planning was evidently easier to discuss than achieve.?^
A study made by Harold Horrsommer in Alabama and reported in 
Social Forces concluded that AAA had failed miserably to help share­
croppers and low class tenants. For instance, of 1,022 tenant families 
on relief, only 28 percent had received AAA benefits in 1933- Among a 
group of sharecroppers questioned in one county, ^3 percent had received 
benefits; however, three-fourths of them had used the money to pay
71Chicago Daily News, October 193̂ -
^^ashington Post, November I8, 193̂ - Clipping in AAA files,
NA, RG IÀ5.
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debts, and 60 percent of these had been forced to do so by their land­
lord.^3
Perhaps the most vocal critics of AAA were the Socialists.
Norman Thomas carried on a personal crusade for southern tenant farmers
which lasted several years. He inspired the organization of a tenants'
union in Arkansas, and at the 193^ Convention of the Socialist Party
in Detroit, he reported to a special committee on tenancy and promised
‘71to raise money to study the problem. Dr. William B. Amberson, a 
University of Tennessee physiologist, nationally Imown for his work 
in attempting to synthesize human blood, was appointed to nead the 
study
Amberson and the Memphis Chapter of the League for Industrial 
Democracy together with the Tyronza, Arkansas, Socialist Party con­
ducted a study of 300 Delta tenant families. They found that incomes 
and living standards were below the subsistence level and that land­
lords had cheated the tenants in numerous ways under the 193^-35 cotton 
contract. Their report charged that 15 to 20 percent of the tenants 
studied had been driven from the land as a result of AAA's programs.
It said that most of them were whites because the planters preferred 
to keep the more docile Negro tenants. Those tenants who were allowed 
to stay, were being reduced to wage hands and the whole Southern share- 
cropping system was in danger of collapse. The Amberson Committee 
reported that relief administrators had been uniformly helpful to
70
Hoffsommer, "AAA and the Cropper," pp. 498-̂ 99-
^^Thomas, Plight of the Sharecroppers, p. 13*
75Time, March 4, 1935, P- 1̂ -
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evicted tenants but added that county agents, committeemen, and planters 
were all "hostile." In summary, it charged that the framers of AAA had 
been "exceedingly naive" in thinking they could prevent the displace­
ment of tenants when cotton acreage was reduced.7° Other criticism 
came from many quarters, and AAA was becoming more sensitive to it.
But in the meantime, additional trouble for AAA and the Administration 
was brewing in eastern Arkansas.
William B. Amberson, "Report of Survey Made by Memphis Chap­
ter, League for Industrial Democracy and the Tyronza Socialist Party," 
a part of Norman Thomas, Plight of the Sharecropper, pp. 19-25; 33-
CHAPTER V 
THE SOUTHERN TENANT FARMERS' UNION
The cotton plantations in the delta country of northeastern
Arkansas were relatively new. The area was formerly swamp-land, having
been drained only a few decades earlier, and the plantation owners there
were new and more Inclined to be profit-minded and less paternalistic
than planters in the Old South.^ Relations between the races were not
the same as in a state like Georgia; some of the whites had come from
the North or from mountain country in Tennessee or Kentucky, where the
attitudes toward Negroes were more liberal. In addition, there was a
relatively large and active group of Socialists in northeastern Arkansas.
All of these factors furnished a favorable background for the formation
2of a bi-racial tenant farmers' organization.
The people who worked in the cotton fields of northeastern 
Arkansas were mostly sharecroppers, usually assigned no more than twenty 
acresTheir work was closely supervised by the planters. Although
Rupert Vance, Human Factors in Cotton Culture (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1$29), pp. 21-22.
2H. L. Mitchell, Interview by Oral History Project of Columbia 
University during 1956 and 1957, P- 53» Hereinafter cited as Mitchell, 
Oral History Interview.
S., Bureau of Census, Fifteenth Census of the U. S.: 1930, 
Agriculture, Vol. II, Part 2, "The Southern States" (Washington, 1932),
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their living conditions vere appalling, they were probably no vorse off 
than thousands of croppers throughout the South. The thing which gal­
vanized them to action was the injustice of one planter, Hiram Worcross.
A St. Louis attorney, Norcross borrowed enough money from the bank at 
Tyronza, Arkansas, to buy Fairview Farms, a '+,500 acre plantation near 
Tyronza. He was determined to make it pay, which meant he had to exploit 
his tenants.
Ordinarily, the planters in Arkansas allowed their sharecroppers 
credit at the commissary on a basis of one dollar a month for each acre 
farmed. Norcross had his plantation surveyed and found that his com­
missary was allowing more credit than the plantation had acres. On 
other plantations it was the custom to grant additional credit to crop­
pers with large families, but Norcross decided to end that practice at 
Fairview. He issued eviction notices to about forty families who had 
exceeded their alloted credit.^ Even some of the other planters in
Poinsett County condemned this action as not only harsh but in violation
5of Section 7 of the cotton contract.
Later when the AAA began making parity payments to cotton farm­
ers, Norcross decided that since his sharecroppers were farming less 
acreage under the cotton contract, they should get less of the parity 
payment than their rightful one-half.^ This made his croppers extremely 
angry, and they began to hold meetings to discuss a means of relief.
pp. 115^-1159; 1168-1173- See statistics for Crittenden, St. Francis, 
Cross, Poinsett, and Mississippi Counties.
Ĉ. T. Carpenter to Paul Appleby, November 3, 193̂ , NA, RG l6.
M̂itchell, Oral History Interview, pp. 8, 9, and 12.
Ĉ. T. Carpenter to Paul Appleby, November 3, 193̂ , NA, RG l6.
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Other planters said Norcross was a fool to adopt this policy for he
could raise prices at the commissary to get the additional money without
7his sharecroppers knowing it.
Because of their resentment toward Norcross and what he repre­
sented, some of the sharecroppers turned for help to two Tyronza busi­
nessmen who had always treated them fairly. They were Clay East, who 
operated a service station, and H. L. Mitchell, owner of a dry-cleaning 
shop next door. Both were self-converted Socialists; they headed a 
Socialist-minded group in Tyronza and vicinity that numbered nearly a 
thousand and carried on extensive educational programs among the share­
croppers. East and Mitchell at one time organized local unemployed
people in a successful attempt to bring pressure on the Civil Works
8Administration to provide temporary jobs. In early 193^ they invited
Norman Thomas, oft-time candidate of the Socialist Party for President,
to come to Tyronza and speak in the high school auditorium. Thomas came
and talked with many sharecroppers in the county and later told a packed
crowd in the auditorium how conditions among the cotton workers shocked
him. He condemned the plantation system and the AAA for perpetuating
it. He charged that the AAA was not enforcing its cotton contracts and
had done nothing to aid tenants and sharecroppers. The audience, both
planters and croppers, was astounded to hear anyone speak so bluntly
9about the plantation system. Thomas later repeated his charges to 
reporters of the national press services, and the story appeared in news-
7Mitchell, Oral History Interview, p. 21.
^Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, pp. 5o-57*
9Mitchell, Oral History Interview, pp. 20-21.
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10papers throughout the country.
While Thomas was having dinner at Clay East's house, Mitchell 
and East told him of their single venture in politics. They had at­
tempted to run for local offices as Socialists only to be ruled off 
the ballot on a trumped-up technicality. Thomas advised them politics 
was not in the cards for Arkansas Socialists and, according to Mitchell, 
said they should direct their efforts toward organizing a sharecroppers' 
labor union.Later, Thomas denied being the sole originator of the 
idea. He wrote: "I was one of a group to wnom the idea occurred prac­
tically simultaneously, and the most important figure in the group was
IPthe resident of Arkansas, H. L. Mitchell . . . ."
In July, 1934, eighteen sharecroppers, eleven whites and seven 
Negroes, met at a dingy little school house called "Sunnyside" on Nor­
cross' Fairview Plantation. They invited East and Mitchell to attend, 
but before the two arrived they began discussing what should be done 
about Norcross and other planters. Tnere was wild talk of lynching, 
but Alvin Nunnally, who had been a member of the Farmers' Union, said 
if they committed any violence someone would go to the penitentiary or 
the electric chair. When East and Mitchell arrived, they suggested the 
group form a labor union. The eighteen approved the idea by a voice 
vote.
The next question was whether there would be two unions, one 
for blacks and one for whites, or one for both. An aged Negro was there
*̂̂ New York Times, March 11, 193̂ , II, 2.
^^Mitchell, Oral History Interview, pp. 20-21.
^^orman Thomas to author, June 6, 1960.
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vho once had been a member of the Colored Tenants Union which was
broken up by the Elaine Massacre in 1919• "Tnere ain't but one way for
us . • . and that's to get together and stay together," he observed.
Others agreed that the planters had often been able to play white and
Negro tenants against each other, and it was obvious that the Negroes
would be in great danger from the planters if they attempted to form a
union with no whites in it. It was decided to make the union for all 
ISraces.
The first chairman of the union was Alvin Nunnally. C. H. Siiiith, 
a Negro minister and sharecropper, was chosen vice-chairman. Tne secre­
tary was an expatriated Englishman named H. J. Panes, who worked as 
bookkeeper and sharecropper on the Norcross Plantation.No name was 
chosen for the organization at the first meeting. The one adopted 
later, "The Southern Tenant Farmers' Union," was the idea of Charles 
McCoy, an old-time Socialist who became a STFU organizer. He avoided 
the use of the word "sharecropper" because there was already a union by 
that name in Alabama.
"Uncle Charley" McCoy was typical of the leadership of the union, 
although he was about as atypical of Arkansas as a man could be. An 
Irish immigrant with no formal education, he became a skilled millwright 
in the Singer Sewing Machine plant at Truman, Arkansas. His wife taught 
him to read, because of his interest in the Socialist Appeal, a newspaper 
published in Girard, Kansas. Once he could read, McCoy became addicted 
to radical books, newspapers, and pamphlets.
^̂ Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, pp. 5Ô-57* 
lUMitchell, OraJL History Interview, pp. 22-23*
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During World War I, McCoy helped organize a union of Singer 
employees affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. He became 
leader of a long and bitter strike which the union lost. As a result̂  
he was blacklisted and could never work again at his trade. The town 
of Truman had no sewage system, so "Uncle Charley" made a living clean­
ing outhouses and using the "night soil" for fertilizer on his five 
acre farm, which became very productive. He organized a group of 
Socialists in Truman and helped many of his "comrades" through the lean
years of the depression. Any Socialist candidate on the ballot at Tru­
man was sure of at least 200 votes.
One prime reason for the formation of the Southern Tenant Farm­
ers ' Union was to give the sharecroppers and tenants some bargaining 
power with the planters. But of equal importance was the desire to
get AAA to stop evictions and guarantee tenants their rights under
Section 7 of the cotton contract.Howard Kester, who later became 
a key leader of the union, stated in 193o that the rising consciousness 
of the sharecroppers was due in large measure to tne "stupidity and
viciousness" of AAA policies toward tenants. He wrote : "This was too
much for even an humble sharecropper to understand and swallow without 
protest.
At the end of the 193^ season, Hiram Norcross evicted more share­
croppers. On December 21, the STFU brought suit against Norcross on 
behalf of twenty-four tenants. The case, known as West et al vs Norcross,
^^Ibid., p. 2 8.
^̂ H. L. Mitchell, Interview with author, July 28, 1959•
17Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, p. 53*
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was heard in the Poinsett County Court and finally in the Supreme Court
of Arkansas. The plaintiffs asked that Worcross be restrained from
evicting them and that they be given access to woods for fuel and rented
acres to grow food under the terms of Section 7 of the cotton contract.
In evicting the croppers, Norcross made the apparent mistake of
giving notice in writing. One communication read,
Having no use for your services next year, we do hereby notify 
you to vacate and deliver possession of the house you now occupy 
to us together with all our property, real, personal and mixed, at 
the expiration of your present contract, to wit— not later than 
December 31, 193̂ *
Tyronza, Arkansas FAIRVIEW FARMS
October 9, 193̂  H. Norcross, President
(signed)
In another written notice, Norcross told those evicted tnat their parity
payments would be given to them on the day they vacated. If they did
not leave by the appointed day, he warned tnat any expense incurred in
bringing eviction would be deducted from their parity payments.
In the trials, the evicted,croppers claimed they had applied to
the county committee and county agent for help, but to no avail. They
said they were evicted because they were members of the STFU and asked
that Norcross be restrained from discriminating against union members.
They also asked that the landlord be enjoined from compelling tenants
to sign any contract or stipulation whereby they waived their rights 
19under Section 7-
West vs. Norcross attracted considerable attention in the Delta 
country, and when he learned of it, AAA's Legal Counsel, Jerome Frank,
1 O
C. T. Carpenter to Paul Appleby, November 3, 193̂ , NA, RG l6. 
^^Menrphis Press-Scimitar, December 21, 193̂ *
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seriously considered entering the case on the side of the tenants.
This led to a series of important events in Washington which will be
discussed later. In late December, Henry Wallace received a letter
from Edward J. Meeman, Editor of the Memphis Press-Scimitar, which said
that the case of Norcross' tenants was "additional evidence of tne
tragedy which has been the unintended result of the acreage reduction
program." Meeman felt that planters who were willing to share the
risks of growing cotton with sharecroppers did not want to share guar-
20anteed income from the federal government.
The union lost the case against Norcross. The Arkansas Supreme 
Court ruled that sharecroppers, not being parties to the cotton con­
tract, had no rights to bring suit under its provisions.^1 This was 
a great disappointment to STFU leaders who had hoped for victory, 
especially if the federal government decided to intervene; however, 
the loss of the case tended to strengthen the union because the share­
croppers were forced to turn to it when they saw they could expect
22 ■ • ■■little from the courts.
At first. Clay East and H. L. Mitchell felt that the share­
croppers could assume leadership in building the union, but they soon 
found themselves organizing new locals. They would load their cars 
with members and drive to some plantation scnool or church where a 
meeting had been called. The mere announcement of a meeting was enough 
to bring hundreds of sharecroppers, and most of them joined the union, 
onMeeman to Wallace, December 2k, 193̂ , NA, RG l6.
2180 (2d) Southwestern Reporter, pp. 67-'fO.
22Mitchell, Oral History Interview, p. 30-
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The dues were only one dollar per year or ten cents a month, but those 
who could not pay were allowed to join also.^^
To help organize the union, East ran for township constable at 
Tyronza and was elected. As constable, he was entitled to wear a badge 
and a gun. The sharecroppers, particularly the Negroes, now felt less 
fearful about joining the union because "Mr. Clay" was "the law." As 
the union gained membership. East and Mitchell decided to incorporate 
it under a state law which authorized charters to benevolent organiza­
tions. They wrote a rough draft and took it to Dr. William Amberson, 
a leading Socialist and friend of the union in Memphis. Amberson 
looked over the draft and said, according to Mitchell: "Why, boys, 
you're trying to have the Socialist revolution incorporated, and that
can't be done." They toned down the document considerably, submitted
pkit to the proper state authorities, and received a charter.
East and Mitchell also wrote a constitution for the union, 
which provided that any farm worker over eighteen years of age could 
be a member, if he made his living from "rents, interests, or profits" 
derived from agriculture. The constitution required every local of 
the union to have a secretary, an executive committee, a defense com­
mittee, a president, and a vice-president. The entire union was to be 
governed by annual conventions and an executive committee elected by 
the annual conventions. The executive committee was to consist of 
seven to seventeen members and to meet every three months. The union 
officers were a president, a vice-president, and an executive secretary.
^^Ibid., p. 28.
2hMitchell, Oral History Interview, pp. 24-25.
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Conventions were to be held each January after the crops were in, with
locals sending delegations according to their size. The executive
committee was also to set up a defense committee to lead the fight
25against the planters.
The first annual convention was held in January, 1935, in front 
of "Uncle Charley" McCoy's house in Truman. At that time the constitu­
tion authored by East and Mitchell was adopted and officers were elected. 
East became president of the union, E. B. McKinney, a Negro sharecropper,
was chosen vice-president, and Mitchell got- the job of executive secre- 
26tary. Soon after. East resigned, saying the president of a share­
croppers ' union should be a sharecropper. He was in and out of the 
union for the next few years, but was usually available for the more 
dangerous missions into nearby counties. His successor as president 
was J. R. Butler, a white sharecropper who looked the part. He was 
tall, thin, with hair that stood straight up, and yet he could talk 
like a college professor. Butler had been a teacher during World Wa.r I 
and a conscientious objector, but he eventually entered the army rather 
than go to jail as a war resistor. He was also a doctrinaire Socialist 
and devoted to the union. E. B. McKinney, the Negro vice-president, 
was highly respected by union members and leaders, especially Mitchell, 
who backed him for the office.
The man who did more than any other to hold the STFU together
25Southern Tenant Farmers' Union, Proceedings, 3rd Annual Con­
vention (Muskogee, Oklahoma: n. p . ,  1937), PP* 82-84.
STFU, "Proceedings of 1st Annual Convention," mimeographed 
copy on file with the Headquarters of the National Agricultural Workers 
Union, Washington, D. C.
^̂ Mdtchell, Oral History Interview, p. 90.
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was H. L. Mitchell. As executive secretary, he ran the union from day 
to day. He was known around Tyronza as a radical and a "Red,a nd  
when he became secretary of the union the ladies of the Missionary
Society of the Tyronza Methodist Church organized a boycott of his dry
29cleaning shop and drove him out of business. He moved to Memphis, 
set up union headquarters, and lived for the next few years on his 
savings. For the first two years ne received no pay from the union 
other than a few dollars occasionally to operate his can. In 1937 the 
annual convention voted him a salary of twenty-five dollars per week, 
but there was seldom money in the treasury to pay it.^^ The Socialist 
Party once furnished him a new automobile because Norman Thomas feared 
for Mitchell's life if his old car broke down some night in Arkansas 
after a meeting.
Mitchell was a sandy-haired young man in his early thirties of 
Scotch-Irish descent. His father had been a snarecropper in Tennessee, 
and Mitchell tried his hand at making a crop before deciding to go into 
business. As a boy he saw a Negro burned alive on the courthouse lawn 
at Dyersburg, Tennessee, for insulting a white woman.32 in his capacity 
as executive secretary of the union, Mitchell provided a calm, deter­
mined courage which inspired some and restrained others.33 in 1936
M. Landers (County Agent) to Cully Cobb (Telegram), no date,
NA, RG 1 4 5.
29Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, p. 66.
3*̂STFU, Proceedings, Third Annual Convention, pp. 8O-8I. 
3̂ Mitchell, Oral History Interview, p. .
32Ibid., pp. 1-3; and Mitchell, Interview with author, July 28,
1959.
33xester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, p. 66.
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Mitchell broke with the Socialist Party because it was trying to run 
its own candidates in the South and he felt this was politically fool­
ish. After that, Mitchell considered nimself a Democrat.
A surprising number of those who came to help organize and work 
for the union were Protestant ministers, both black and white. One of 
these was Ward Rodgers, a young Methodist who was pastor of several 
rural churches in western Arkansas. He was a native of Oklahoma and a 
graduate of Vanderbilt University and a seminary in Boston. When he 
heard of the STFU, he left his churches to help in the organizational 
work. He lived with Mitchell, but when Mitchell's business failed he 
was forced to seek work elsewhere. He applied to the Workers Education 
Bureau of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration in Washington 
and got a job teaching farmers around Tyronza.
Another white preacher of great importance to the union was 
Howard Kester. A Southerner, Kester graduated from Princeton Univer­
sity and Vanderbilt Divinity School. He was an ordained Methodist 
minister, but worked for a number of organizations, including the Fel­
lowship of Reconciliation, a pacifist group which he served as Southern 
Secretary. He was once a special investigator of lynchings for the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Kester was 
a member of the Executive Council of the National Socialist Party, and 
was friendly with leading Socialists such as Norman Thomas and Powers 
Hapgood. He had helped in relief work among striking coal miners in 
Tennessee and had a deep understanding of Southern problems. He knew
3^Mdtchell, Oral History Interview, pp. 90-91•
^̂ Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, p. 66.
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many people in religious and liberal organizations throughout the 
country, and a committee of such people as Rheinhold Neibur of Union 
Theological Seminary and Roger Baldwin, Secretary of the American Civil 
Liberties Union, supported and financed his activities in the South.
Kester once offered to help the STFU if it got in trouble, and in an 
early crisis Mitchell sought his aid. Kester came and in the years 
that followed became one of the principal leaders of the union.3°
A third white preacher and another graduate of Vanderbilt was 
Claude Williams, Director of Commonwealth College at Mena, Arkansas.
He was an ordained Presbyterian minister and, according to H. L. Mitchell, 
a card-carrying Communist.-'' Williams had been active among the United 
Mine Workers in western Arkansas and with the unemployed there. In 1935 
he was given a ninety-day Jail sentence in Fort Smith, Arkansas, after 
addressing a meeting of striking relief workers. His trial lasted five 
minutes, and he was convicted of barratry (inciting litigation).-^ 
Williams started working with the STFU when the union first began to 
receive national publicity. He became a member of the executive council 
but was later tried by the council and expelled for taking part in a 
Communist plot to usurp control of the union.
Many of the Negro organizers and officers of the union were
Mitchell, Oral History Interview, pp. kO-hl.
37Mitchell, Interview with author, July 29, 1959- Mitchell 
claims he actually saw Williams' card in 1936 at a union convention.
New York Times, February 2k, 1935, p. 5*
39STFU, Complete Proceedings, Trial of Claude Williams, Records 
of the STFU, Headquarters, National Agricultural Workers Union, Washing­
ton, D. C. Hereinafter cited as STFU, Trial of Williams.
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preachers, but most of them were also sharecroppers. The Negro churches 
of the Cotton Belt could not afford full-time preachers, so usually one 
of the members who had "the call" served as pastor. Few had any formal 
training. Typical of these was A. B. Brookins, the union chaplain and 
official song leader. Although past seventy, Brookins was once severely 
beaten by riding bosses and sheriffs' deputies. He told the 1937 con­
vention :
They shot up my house with machine-guns, and they made me 
run away from where I lived at, but they couldn't make me run 
away from my Union . . . .  When I lived at Marked Tree, Arkan­
sas, the nightriders broke into my house, and they shot a bullet 
that just went through my daughter's hair. But I am not afraid 
to go on being a union man.
Because so many of the organizers were preachers and because of 
the nature of the people involved, union meetings took on heavy reli­
gious overtones. The songs of the union were much like those of the 
old camp meetings, and some were Negro spirituals with the words modi­
fied. The favorite was "We Shall Not Be Moved"; one refrain went,
"Like a tree by the river side. We shall not be moved." This had spe­
cial significance because of evictions by the planters. There was much 
praying at union meetings, and the speakers often quoted the Bible.
When members were persecuted for being in the union, they often devel­
oped a martyr-like feeling. It took courage to join the union and more 
to stay in it.̂ ^
In the early days, there was no desire to build anything more 
than a tenant farmers' union, and there was no idea of spreading any 
further than Arkansas. The leaders thought only in terms of dealing
^̂ STFU, Proceedings, Third Annual Convention, p. 43- 
klMitchell, Interview with author, July 26, 1959*
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with the large planters and helping the sharecroppers get justice from
AAA. Said H. L. Mitchell years later: "There were economic conditions
that needed solution, hut none of us were capable .of thinking them
k2through at the time."
Within a few months after It was organized the STFU had around 
1,400 members in four or five counties. It was impossible to get an 
accurate count because locals formed and operated for months before 
the union leaders learned of them. The Texas newspaper, Ferguson's 
Forum, took note of the formation of the union but held little hope 
for its success. An editorial expressed the belief that the union 
would either fall into the hands of labor racketeers or become a "cat's
paw" for Communist eind Socialist agitators. 3̂
The charge was made often, even by AAA and USDA officials, that
the STFU was dominated by Communists and Socialists, and there was no
attempt by union officers to deny that both types of radicals were 
prominent in the movement. Howard Kester, himself a Socialist, wrote 
that the union was proud of the achievements of Socialists and Commun­
ists on its behalf, but he denied the union was "an adjunct or organ 
of either the Socialist or the Communist Party." Almost anyone who 
professed sympathy for the working class and volunteered to help organ­
ize the union was accepted. As a result, many of the key organizers 
were Socialists or CommunistsMitchell has said: "For a long time 
I didn't know the difference between a Communist and a Socialist— just
k2Mitchell, Oral History Interview, pp. 27-28.
^^Ferguson's Forum (Temple, Texas), August 13, 193̂ - 
Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, pp. 5̂ -55-
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so they were on my side." In his years' of working with the union, 
Mitchell learned that the Communists were on no one's side but their
4$own.
The Socialist Party willingly admitted its support for move­
ments like the STFU. Powers Hapgood, member of tiie Executive Committee 
of the National Socialist Party, affirmed this while on a tour of east­
ern Arkansas addressing union meetings. He also said nis party had 
"declined united action with the Communist Party.Norman Thomas, in 
a letter to Henry Wallace in 1935; stated that the STFU was an "inde­
pendent, bona fide union, not controlled by the Socialist Party." Most 
of its members, said Thomas, were Democrats who could not vote because 
of the poll tax."''̂
Tne Communist tactics were to infiltrate the STFU with CP organ­
izers in an attempt to take over and use the union for their own sub­
versive purposes. At first, the legitimate leaders of the union did 
not realize this, and later they could not rid the union of the influ­
ence of Communists and were drawn into two big convention fights with 
hothem for control. On one occasion, Harold Ware, the alleged head of
]l Q
"Ware Cell" of Communists in AAA, and his famous mother, "Mother 
Boor," visited union headquarters and talked to H. L. Mitchell for
Us ^Mitchell, Oral History Interview, p. o2.
UÔMemphis Press-Scimitar, February 9; 1935-
"̂̂ Thomas to Wallace, April l6, 1935; NA, RG 1U5.
U8STFU, Trial of Williajos.
U9Later, before a Congressional committee, Whitaker Chambers 
accused Alger Hiss of being a member of this group. Hiss was sent to 
jail by a federal court for perjury when he denied it.
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several hours. According to Mitchell, "the old lady gave all sorts of 
advice," but there is no indication he took any of it.̂ ^
At first, the planters of Poinsett County paid little attention 
to the STFU. Naturally, they wondered way East and Mitchell were organ­
izing the sharecroppers. Some said the two "Reds" had political ambi­
tions, but others pointed out that the Negro sharecroppers could not 
vote because of state laws and the white croppers had no money to pay 
the poll tax. As the size of union meetings grew, the planters became 
more curious. One planter, H. F. Loan, entered a union meeting at 
Tyronza accompanied by four of his riding bosses witii pistols swinging 
from their belts. When he was asked to leave. Loan became enraged at
such unheard-of-treatment. He later attempted unsuccessfully to get
51tne union charter revoked.
Because of its racial policy, the union was completely unaccept­
able to the planters and townspeople. Where the union tried to organize, 
the planters fought it by saying to their white tenants, "You don't want 
to belong to an organization that takes in 'niggers,'" and by telling 
the Negroes that the union was made up of "poor white trash." In the 
South, prejudice works both ways, and this was an effective stratagem.
In some communities, the union found it necessary to set up two locals 
for the two races. But often the members of one local attended the 
meetings of the other, and the two locals eventually merged.
In some locals where the whites took the leadership, the Negroes 
dropped out. In others the opposite happened. H. L. Mitchell felt that
^ M̂itchell, Oral History Interview, p. 64.
Cl
Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, pp. 59-8o.
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if the union vould limit its membership to whites, it could spread 
quickly throughout the South, but he also knew it would be "a flash 
in the pan." An exclusively white union, he reasoned, could do nothing 
for the sharecroppers; the planters would simply replace its members 
with Negroes and they would lose the fight. Mitchell and other union 
leaders^^ firmly believed that the iiope of the STFU was based on its
inter-racial policy. Tliey knew that other organizations of white or
53'black Southern farmers had flourished for a time and died.
After the planters began to worry about the union, tne activ­
ities of the organizers were bound to lead to trouble. On one organ­
izing trip into Crittenden County, Ward Rodgers and C. H. Sjnith, a 
Negro minister, were arrested near tiie town of Marion. Smith was put 
in jail and Rodgers escorted out of the county and told not to come 
back. Union leaders knew they would need a lawyer to get Smith out 
of jail, but no local lawyer would accept the case. Mitchell sent a 
wire to the American Civil Liberties Union in New York requesting the 
names of lawyers who might serve. The ACLU wired back the names of 
three Memphis lawyers, and Mitchell and East drove there to contact 
them. One had moved and another was ill. The only one available was 
Abe Waldauer, an assistant city attorney. When asked to help, Waldauer 
gave this memorable reply as quoted from memory by Mitchell :
52Claude Williams told the 1937 annual convention, 'You must 
forget the lies that you were taught in school about five races in the 
world . . . .  There is one race, and that is the human race . . . .
You have been split in the past, but . . . [ n o ^  you must think about 
the great danger of drifting apart. Your union should be organized 
with all races." STFU, Proceedings of the 3rd Annual Convention, p. 
l6.
%̂litchell. Oral History Interview, pp. 80-8̂ .
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I greatly admire you fellows; you are real Americans. It 
takes a lot of intestinal fortitude to undertake what you are 
trying to accomplish. No one needs help more than those Arkan­
sas sharecroppers, but I served my country on the battlefields 
of France in the last war. I was with the Lôst Battalion in 
the Argonne Forest, and I left all my courage over there. I'm 
one Jew who isn't going over in Crittenden County to get a 
Nigra out of jail because he is charged with organizing a union.
Tne interview ended with Waldauer's explaining the single-tax theory to
East and Mitchell and giving them a copy of Progress and Poverty by
sUHenry George.
East and Mitchell eventually found a lawyer. He was C. T. Car­
penter, who practiced in Marked Tree, not far from Tyronza. Carpenter 
agreed to take the case without fee as ne had a strong conscience on 
civil rights. He was also a capable lawyer with a distinguished appear­
ance and more than normal courage. When he told East and Mitchell to 
have all of their sharecroppers gather at the Courthouse at Marion to 
back his attempt to free Smith, they gladly passed the word. Negro 
union members were told to stay at home to avoid trouble. At the ap­
pointed hour, hundreds of snarecroppers gathered on tiie courthouse 
lawn and moved silently behind Carpenter as he entered the building. 
They filled the halls and offices; and although they were orderly, it 
was obvious why they were there. Carpenter gained Smith's release, 
and that night a meeting was called at Sunnyside scnool to celebrate. 
Smith, who had been beaten while in jail, showed his battered body and 
said he was glad to bear this cross for the union.
After the freeing of Smith, the planters attempted to prevent 
further union meetings. They put padlocks on the doors of cnurches 
where croppers met and boarded over the windows. They packed school-
Ibid., pp. 29-30.
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houses with hay. Some union members received threatening letters and 
others were flogged or evicted from their homes.
When the rumor spread that the planters were buying machine 
guns, many ’onion members armed themselves with old shotguns. However, 
they found it difficult to buy shells at local stores. Wiien the crop­
pers began bringing their shotguns to union meetings, union leaders 
grew fearful that these people who had been oppressed all their lives 
might rise up in savage fury now that they were organized. The planters 
were already using brutality and terrorism to try to break the union, 
and they might go much further. Howard Kester, who attended many union 
meetings during this period, was convinced that the only reason the
planters did not break up the meetings with violence was the presence
5oof women and children.
In the face of these dangers, the union leaders decided to
adopt a policy of passive resistance. They asked members to leave
their shotguns at home. At every meeting they emphasized that the
57union must proceed legally and peaceably. Since the usual meeting 
places were closed, the leaders decided to gather in the open. At such 
meetings the riding bosses, planters, sheriffs, and deputies often 
gathered on the fringe of the crowd and amused themselves by shooting 
into the air. Union leaders had to learn to carry on while bullets 
whistled overhead and leaves and twigs fell down from above. The in­
truders usually accompanied their fireworks with raucous laughter and
^̂ Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, pp. 6l-o2.
56 .Ibid., p. 61.




In December of 1934, four organizers, two white and two colored, 
were working together in Cross County. One night near Parkin, the 
county sheriff and a large band of deputies, riding bosses, and planters 
broke into their meeting and arrested the four. Tney kicked A..B. 
Brookins in the face and stomach and kept him in jail until the next 
day without medical attention althougl: he was permanently injured.
Before Carpenter, the union attorney, could get to them, the four were 
tried and convicted of "receiving money under false pretenses and dis­
turbing labor." Carpenter appealed the cases, bail was set at $500 
each, but the union could not pay. It was forty days before the money 
could be raised; meantime, the four remained in jail.59
Meanwhile, the leaders of the STFU, working with the Amberson 
Committee, a group of Socialists in Memphis, compiled a list of land­
lords who had violated the cotton contract. While doing this, Amberson, 
Mitchell, and East kept up a steady barrage of letters and telegrams 
to AAA officials citing violations and warning of wnolesale evictions 
in eastern Arkansas.When Cully Cobb received these, he called the 
county agent in Memphis to find out who the writers were. The agent 
reported that Amberson was considered by the Memphis chief of police 
as a "full-fledged Coromunist" who had already made a number of efforts 
to start uprisings among the N e g r o e s _ From another county agent,
^̂ Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, pp. 62-63.
59Ibid., p. 65.
°̂ Amberson, Mitchell, East, and others. Letters and Telegrams, 
Landlord-Tenant File, NA, RG 145-
M. Landers to Cobb (Telegram), no date, NA, RG l45.
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Cobb learned that there was no indication of wholesale evictions in 
Poinsett County.Cobb's eventual reply to Amberson and union leaders 
was that the government was limited to the enforcement of the cotton 
contract and that he had no evidence of evictions in violation of the 
contract.In the meantime, the Washington Evening Star carried a 
story describing the letters and telegrams from the union warning of 
widespread evictions in eastern Arkansas and possible "open rebel­
lion .
Despite the reports from the county agents. Cully Cobb decided 
to send his assistant, E. A. Miller, to Arkansas to investigate the 
charges made by Amberson and his group. After his first day of inves­
tigation, Miller wired Cobb that every planter should be required to 
compile a list of his 1933 and 193  ̂tenants in order to protect the 
cotton program from "unfavorable criticism" and to remove the tempta­
tion to displace tenants.Miller toured the troubled area of eastern 
Arkansas accompanied always by county agents and committeemen, planters, 
and reporters. He told several planters the contract did not require 
them to retain undesirable tenants, just the usual number of tenants.
After concluding his investigations. Miller told a reporter of 
the Memphis Commercial Appeal that there was "absolutely no foundation" 
for the charges that the cotton program was causing wholesale evictions. 
The next day the newspaper carried a long story under the heading:
^̂ A. R. Sullivant (County Agent) to Cobb (Telegram), March 12, 
193\, NA, RG 1̂ 5.
°^Cobb to Amberson, March 193̂ , NA, RG 1̂ 5*
^ Washington Evening Star, March 11, 193̂ -
^^Miller to Cobb (Telegram), March l6, 193̂ , NA, RG l4$.
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"Wanton Evictions Charge Groundless; AAA Officials Say, Absolutely No 
Foundation for Attacks on Planters." The Poinsett County Committee 
and the Tyronza Community Committee were so pleased by Miller's inves­
tigation that they adopted a resolution in joint session tnanking AAA 
for sending him and commending the entire acreage reduction program.
The resolution was proposed by the chairman of the Tyronza Community 
Committee, Hiram Norcross.°°
The Commercial Appeal also carried an editorial which attri­
buted the trouble in eastern Arkansas to "outside uplifters" aid re­
marked that the South had never taken kindly to uplifters. The edito­
rial said that Normal Thomas, "a man of integrity . . . despite his 
peculiar political views," had come to Arkansas in searcn of evidence 
to support his preconceived notions about peonage in the South. He 
had talked to a few "imaginative Negroes" and some "white trash" and 
upon their statements framed his indictment of the South. However, 
the Assistant Chief of AAA's Cotton Section, after a thorough investi­
gation, had exonerated the planters, the AAA, and the South. The 
"complete vindication" by Miller, said the editorial, had made Thomas 
"somewhat ridiculous."
Immediately, the cry went up from Amberson and the STFU leaders 
that Miller's mission had been a "whitewash." H. L. Mitchell, who 
talked with Miller while he was in Arkansas, reported to Norman Tiiomas 
that Miller had shown no interest in a report concerning 100 evicted
^̂ Memphis Commercial Appeal, March 17, 1934.
'̂̂Memphis Commercial Appeal, March l8, 1934.
Mitchell to Editor of The Arkansas Gazette, March 20, 1934.
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sharecroppers and had asked Mitchell to make no more complaints because 
"the landlords are all your friends and these share-croppers are a 
shiftless lot and there is no use of being concerned about them as they 
really don't count, you knov--they are here today and gone tomorrow." 
Thomas was enraged by this and immediately wrote Paul Appleby, Assistant 
Secretary of Agriculture, who demanded a report from Cully Cobb. Appleby 
said that if Miller had such an attitude, there should be "very strong
69disciplinary measures."
When questioned by Cobb, Miller said he had instructions to
investigate only matters around Tyronza while in Arkansas and was not
authorized to receive other information offered. He emphatically denied
having told Mitchell not to be concerned about the sharecroppers, but
said he had told Mitchell and East that if they nad any complaints in
the future, it would be best to direct them to the county or community
70committee, of which Norcross was chairman.
In his formal report. Miller described nis mission to Arkansas.
He had checked the records of the Tyronza Supply Company, which was the 
commissary for many of the plantations around Tyronza, and learned that 
there were actually more tenants in 193̂  than in 1933-^^ Evidently, it 
never occurred to Miller to be suspicious of this information, even 
though the Secretary of the supply company was John Emerich, the presi­
dent of the bank from which Norcross made an excessively large loan to
69Appleby, Memo to Mr. Cobb (Confidential), March 24, 1934, NA,
RG 145.
70Miller, Memo to Mr. Cobb, March 26, 1934, NA, RG l45- 
"̂ M̂iller, Memo to Mr. Cobb, March 19, 1934, NA, RG l4$.
146
buy Fairviev Farms.
Miller found only three farms near Tyronza where there were' 
fewer tenants than in 1933  ̂and each owner agreed to increase his ten­
ants to make the number as large as in 1933-^^ In a confidential report. 
Miller dealt with personalities. He said Mitchell and East were con­
sidered locally to be "very erratic." For instance, several years ago 
they announced they no longer believed in a Supreme Being and said that 
if one did exist, he was unjust. They even held meetings with people 
who believed similarly. East, Miller learned, came from a locally 
prominent family, but his relatives deplored the bad publicity ne was 
causing the community. Miller felt that Norman Thomas, East, and 
Mitchell were trying to excite unrest in order to capitalize on it, but 
the "substantial people" in Tyronza saw them for what they were.7^
Cully Cobb accepted Miller's findings and defended his assistant 
to his superiors. Cobb's view was that the claraor being raised by 
Amberson, Mitchell, East, and Thomas served a useful purpose: now the 
matter was out in the open "where we can get at it." Cobb felt this 
was better tlian a whisper campaign. He looked upon the activities of 
the STFU and its supporters as part of a "well-defined and very wide­
spread political attack on our entire agricultural adjustment program 
and everybody connected with it." Events in Arkansas were only one 
phase of the attack, an attempt to create and capitalize on unrest. 
Trouble could be expected elsewhere, and the best way to meet it was to
72Mitchell, Interview with author, August 2, 1959*
73Miller, Memo to Mr. Cobb, March 19, 1934, NA, RG l4$.
RG 145.
'̂ M̂iller, Memo to Mr. Cobb (Confidential), March 24, 1934, NA,
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"keep our skirts clear and put our program over successfully." Cobb's
idea was to be "most respectful and most guarded" in relations with
75"these people in Arkansas."
Soon after the Miller mission, the Amberson Committee released
the findings of its investigation of the effects of AAA's programs on
7 ̂tenant farmers. Amberson took copies of the specific charges against
individual planters to Washington and talked with J. Phil Campbell,
Chief of the Agricultural Rehabilitation Section, who promised a full 
77investigation. Next, Amberson wrote a series of articles for Nation 
describing the activities of the STFU and charging that one-third of 
the rural unemployment in the South should be blamed on AAA. He said 
that AAA's programs aided owners and higher type tenants but harmed
78sharecroppers and day laborers.
Amberson also continued a steady stream of correspondence to
AAA and to Paul Appleby, his friend from college days. In one telegram
he plead with Appleby to act quickly: "We cannot control situation much
79longer," he warned. To this, Appleby wired back that the difficulties 
in Arkansas seemed to be matters for state and local government and not 
of the Department of Agriculture. He promised, however, to give a 
"vigorous and impartial investigation" to specific complaints of viola-
^ Ĉobb, Memo to Mr. Appleby, March 28, 1934, NA, RG l4$.
^̂ 8ee page 120 for a full treatment of the Amberson Report.
77Amberson to Eva Sams, Tennessee Transient Bureau, December 1, 
1934, NA, RG 145.
^^William Amberson, "New Deal for Sharecroppers," Nation, CXL 
(February 13, 1935), 186-I8 7•
79Amberson to Appleby (Telegram), November 27, 1934, NA, RG 14$.
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ôotions of the cotton contract. Amberson responded vith a list of 
plantations and the violations which Appleby turned over to Cully Cobb. 
The violations were investigated by W. J. Green, a member of the com­
mittee in AAA which was assigned the task of handling landlord-tenant 
problems. Green found that on the plantations named by Amberson, 
evictions were no more than normal and small compared to the number of 
tenants kept. One of the cases cited by Amberson was that of Hiram 
Norcross. Green reported that Norcross had not violated the contract 
and actually had more tenants than in 1933- True, many of Norcross' 
new tenants were "cotton pickers" but Green did not choose to apply 
the rule prohibiting the lowering of tenant status by landlords. In 
every case investigated by Green except one, the landlord was cleared 
of breach of c o n t r a c t . G r e e n  obtained all of his information from 
files in Washington, mostly from the reports of county committees.
Cully Cobb reviewed Green's report and forwarded it to Chester Davis as 
evidence of the "nature' of charges that have been made and facts devel-
82oped upon investigation."
And yet Amberson did not give up. He continued writing letters 
to Appleby, Jerome Frank, and Lawrence Westbrook of FERA. He felt that 
the sharecroppers were "burning with a sense of intolerable wrong," 
and he feared a serious uprising unless an administrative solution was 
found to their problem. One of his letters describing all of his
80 ,Appleby to Amberson (Telegram), November 28, 1934, NA, RG
145.
. J. Green to Amberson, December 12, 1934, NA, RG l4$.
82Cobb, Memo to Mr. Davis, January 9, 1933, NA,- RG 14$.
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efforts was sent to a relief official in M e m p h i s . filtered even­
tually through government channels to the desk of Henry Wallace, who 
read it with interest and scribbled a note to Chester Davis asking if 
Campbell had made an investigation as promised, and what Davis knew
about Hiram Norcross and "his compliance." He also wanted to know more 
84about Amberson. Evidently, it was the first Wallace had heard of 
these matters.
When it became evident to the leaders of the STFU that their 
letters and telegrams to Washington were accomplishing little, they 
decided to send a delegation to the Capitol to talk to Wallace and AAA 
officials. They chose H. L. Mitchell, C. A. Nunnally, Walter Mascop, 
and E. B. McKinney. The delegation arrived in Washington on January 10, 
1935, after driving there in Mitchell's car. Having no idea they would 
need an appointment, they went to the office of the Secretary of Agri­
culture and asked to see Wallace. The receptionist told them the Sec­
retary was busy, so they said they would sit in the outer office until 
he was free. Mitchell had a letter from Amberson to Paul Appleby, and 
he asked that it be delivered. When Appleby read the letter, he came 
out of his office immediately and talked to the four about conditions 
on the plantations. Appleby then went into the Secretary's office and 
brought out Wallace, who talked to the sharecropper delegation for half
an hour and promised to send an investigator to Arkansas. He told them
he would send Mary Connor Myers, who had just completed work with the
On
•̂ Amberson to Eva Sams, Tennessee Transient Bureau, December 1, 
1934, NA, RG 145.
Elizabeth Scheiblich to Nels Anderson, December 17, 1934, and 
accompanying note by Wallace, NA, RG 145.
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Department of Justice on the A1 Capone case in Chicago. According to 
Mitchell, Wallace advised the four to go back to Arkansas and tell their 
members that they had seen the Secretary of Agriculture, that he had 
said something was going to be done, and that he was "going to look 
into this matter and take action.
While the STFU delegates were in Washington, Wallace set up a 
conference for them with Cully Cobb and his assistants, Campbell,
Miller, and Green. Mitchell began the conference with a statement 
that the STFU delegation represented 4,500 to 5,000 sharecroppers, but 
the men of the Cotton Section tended to discount this because they had 
read the various unfavorable reports on Mitchell. Instead of accepting 
the four as representatives of a large group of sharecroppers, they 
tried to interview Mitchell and the others to find out what personal 
complaints each had against the cotton program. Naturally, Mitchell 
had no personal grievance since he was not a sharecropper, but he 
presented a list of 550 croppers and tenants who had been evicted at 
the end of the 1934 season in violation of section 7 of the cotton 
contract. When he mentioned the Tschudy Land Company, an Arkansas 
plantation where the tenants were getting no rental payments, W. J.
Green informed those'present that he had investigated the case and 
nothing could be done because the tenants on the Tschudy plantation 
were not managing share tenants. The general conclusion of the four 
AAA officials after the conference was that it accomplished nothing.
The four did not take the STFU representatives seriously because they
^̂ Mitchell, Oral History Interview, pp. 32-33•
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presented no grievances of their own against the cotton program.
Later, in an article in Nation, Mitchell claimed that Cobb had called 
them "Reds" and refused to listen to their case.^^ Mitchell could not 
rightfully deny.that they had been given a hearing, but perhaps he was 
right when he said Cobb had not listened.
86Report of Conference, STFU File, no date, NA, RG IL5 .
87H. L. Mitchell and J. R. Butler, "The Cropper Leams His 
Fate," Nation, CXLI (September I8, 1935), 328-329-
CHAPTER VI 
AGRARIANS VS. LIBERALS
The troubles in Arkansas had a catalytic effect on the troubles 
which were brewing inside the AAA. The two sides had been clearly 
drawn since the beginning. On one side were those who might be called
traditional agrarians, men who had worked their way up through the
ranks of the Department of Agriculture or the farm movements. They 
came from the triple alliance of Extension Service, Farm Bureau, and 
Land Grant Colleges.^ Capable, well trained, and dedicated, they were 
the ones who made AAA work, and yet they were reconciled to the agri­
cultural status quo and in general sympathetic with the larger and
2more successful farmers and landlords. Although not all of them com­
pletely fit the description, the leaders of this group were George Peek,
Charles Brand, Cully Cobb, and Oscar Johnston. Others included J. Phil
Campbell, E. A. Miller, and W. J. Green. The agrarians were in complete 
control of the various commodity sections, the Comptroller's Office, 
and most sections of AAA which dealt directly with farmers.
The connection between the Farm Bureau and the Extension Serv­
ice has been studied by William J. Block in The Separation of the Farm 
Bureau and the Extension Service; Political Issue in a Federal System 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, I960).
2Lord, The Wallaces of Iowa, pp. 38O-383.
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On the other extreme vere the liberals; "Boys vith their hair 
• 3ablaze," Peek called them. Led by Tugwell, their field commander in 
AAA was Jerome Frank because Tugwell's duties as Under-Secretary did 
not extend to AAA. Many of the liberals were young lawyers, brought 
into the Legal Division by Frank at high salaries. There were Adlai 
Stevenson, Francis Shea, Alger Hiss, Nathan Witt, John Abt, Lee Pressman, 
Margaret Bennett, and Robert McCoimaughey. In addition the Consumers 
Division contained two reformers, a generation apart, Frederick Howe as 
Consumers' Counsel and his assistant, Gardner Jackson.
The liberals ranged from moderate to ultra, but generally they 
looked upon AAA as an opportunity for social reform. Wlien Lee Pressman 
recruited Gardner Jackson for AAA, he told him, "Come on down to Wash­
ington with us; this is our chance to make the country o v e r . T h e  
ultras believed that capitalism was crumbling, that the profit motive 
was out-dated, and that the place of the government in the economy must 
continually increase. Nearly all the liberals had accepted in part the 
precepts of a planned economy.
The agrarians looked upon the liberals as interlopers--idealistic, 
impractical, and inexperienced men who had never plowed a furrow or met 
a payroll. Occasionally, they called the liberals the worst name they 
could think of— "urbanites." Their favorite story was probably the one 
about Lee Pressman, who, when working on a macaroni code, was supposed
^Russell Lord, The Agrarian Revival (New York: American Associa­
tion for Adult Education, 1939), P> 155»
kFrank, Memo to Mr. Brand, August 1, 1933, NA, RG lH-5.
Ĵackson, Interview with author, July 27, 1959-
15̂
to have asked: "Just tell me this; is this code fair to the macaroni 
growers?"^
For their part, the liberals saw the agrarians as representa­
tives of the vested interests in agriculture. For instance, Tugwell 
identified the State Extension Directors and their corps of County 
Agents with the ruling caste of farmers, the most conservative Farm 
Bureau leaders, the cotton barons of the South, and the banker-farmers 
of the Middle West. Russell Lord, who was in the Department of Agri­
culture at the time and who was not unsympathetic to the agrarian 
group, states flatly that they were "extraordinarily landlord-minded,
7in the main."
Outside of AAA, the liberals had some important allies in the 
Department. In addition to Tugwell, there was Paul Appleby, an assist­
ant to the Secretary, Mordecai Ezekiel, an economic advisor, Louis Bean, 
a master statistician, and part of the time, Wallace himself. The 
liberals often attempted to by-pass the Administrator of AAA in a dis­
agreement by going directly to Tugwell or Wallace.®
There are three excellent accounts of .the struggle in AAA 
between the liberals and the agrarians. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., tells 
the liberals' story largely through the eyes of Tugwell in Chapter I of 
his Coming of the New Deal. Gilbert C. Fite gives a balanced view with 
emphasis on the part played by Peek in Chapter XV of his George H. Peek 
and the Fight for Farm Parity. Much of the "inside" information and
6 -Fite, George N. Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity, p. 2ol.
7Lord, The Wallaces of Iowa, p. 359»
g
Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal, p. 51.
155
considerable insight are found in Russell Lord's The Wallaces of Iowa, 
which centers the story on Wallace. Yet none of these writers have 
given a full account of the conflict within the AAA.
The tenant farmer problem did not become an important part of 
the struggle within-AAA until 1934. By that time, Administrator Peek 
nad lost a show-down battle with the liberals and was eased out. Before
leaving he warned his successor, Chester Davis, to get rid of "Jerome
9
Frank and the rest of that bunch."
To understand better the tenant farmer question as a phase of 
the split in AAA, it is necessary to know the principal players of the 
drama and the organizational framework in which they worked. The Legal 
Division at one time reached a strength of 130 men, most of them young 
lawyers. George Peek complained that one of them had been hired fresh 
out of law school at a yearly salary of $4,222 when $2,400 would have 
been more in line with pay in other government agencies. The average 
salary of lawyers In the Legal Division was a thousand dollars higher 
than in the Solicitor's Office of the Department or in the Department 
of Justice.
Under Jerome Frank as General Counsel were three assistants: 
John P. Wenchel in charge of federal practice and procedure, Alger Hiss 
in cioarge of work on benefit contracts, processing and other taxes, 
appropriations and general matters requiring legal opinions, and Lee
266.
10,
F̂ite, George M. Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity, pp. 264-
George N. Peek and Samuel Crowther, Why Quit Our Own (New 
York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1936), pp. l4l-l4].
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Pressmen, who worked on agreements, codes and licenses.Under Hiss
were three sections : the Benefit Contract Section which he headed with
Robert McConnaughey as assistant, the Processing Tax Section directed
12by Prew Savoy, and the Opinion Section with Francis Shea as chief.
Arthur Bachrach served as Special Advisor to the General Counsel with
supervision over the Litigation Section headed by Jonn Abt and the
Administrative Enforcement Section with John Lewin as chief. Frank
had constant difficulty keeping his section chiefs in line and issued
several memoranda instructing them to make no important decisions
without his approval. Co-Administrator Charles Brand once complained
to Frank that his lawyers were expressing themselves too freely on 
ikpolicy matters.
In the hectic years after World War II, it developed in the 
hearings before the House Un-American Activities Committee in the famous 
Chambers-Hiss case that there was a cell of Communists in AAA organized 
by Harold Ware. According to Whitaker Chambers, all the following were 
"incipient or registered Communists" brought into the Ware apparatus:
Lee Pressman, Alger Hiss, John Abt, Charles Kramer of the Consumers' 
Counsel, and Nathan Witt.^^ During the Hiss hearings in 1948, Pressman,
^^Administrative Letter, October l8, 1934, Frank File, NA, RG
145.
12The purpose of this section was to prepare opinions on legal 
questions when requested by the administrator.
^^Adlai Stevenson was a Special Attorney under Pressman. He 
helped in negotiating several important marketing agreements. Frank, 
Memo to Mr. Brand, August 1, 1933, KA, RG l45.
^̂ Frank, Memo to Mr. Brand, August 1, 1933, NA, RG l45.
^^Whitaker Chambers, Witness (New York: Random House, 1952), 
pp. 334-335.
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Abt, Kramer, and Witt were called before the House Committee and asked 
if they knew Alger Hiss. Each took the Fifth Amendment and read a 
statement denying membership in any Coiniriunist-.groupIn 1950, the 
four were called again and repeated their refusal to answer questions, 
except Lee Pressman, who admitted he had joined a Communist group in 
193  ̂and left it the following year. He said that Witt, Kramer and Abt 
had also been members but not Hiss. The purpose of the group, said 
Pressman, was to receive Communist literature and to meet and discuss
17it. Later, Nathaniel Weyl, who was an economic advisor in the Depart­
ment of Agriculture, testified before the McCarran Committee that he had 
been a member of the Ware Cell along with Hiss.^^
Perhaps someday, the full extent of Communist infiltration and 
influence in AAA will be known, but to date, tne evidence is too scat­
tered and conflicting to allow a valid judgment. Henry Wallace felt 
in later years that "Communism was not an issue at that time."^^ Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr., writes off Communists in the AAA by saying they were 
there because there were so many jobs to fill, but they influenced no 
course of action which the liberals would not have taken without them.^O 
But this may not be the last word. The influence of Pressman and Hiss
^^The Earl Jowitt, The Strange Case of Alger Hiss (Garden City: 
Doubleday, 1953)> pp. 122-123.
17U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Un-American Activities, 
Hearings, Regarding Communism in the U. S. Government, Slst Cong., 2nd
Sess., I95O; pp. 2ok5, 2926.
18U. S. Congress, Senate, Judiciary Committee, Hearings, Insti­
tute of Pacific Relations, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, pp. 2799-2800.
19Wallace, Letter to author, June 13, 1959.
20Schlesinger, Coming of the New Deal, pp. 52-5̂ .
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was strong in the Legal Division. Although the official correspondence
of these two, plus that of Witt and Abt, seems to reflect no particular
PIpolitical viewpoints, nonetheless, they played an important part in 
the decision in early 1935 to make a rash and dangerous move on behalf 
of the Southern tenant farmers. It was an action well calculated to 
disrupt the entire cotton program, cause trouble in tne plantation 
areas, and tear AAA apart.
According to Russell Lord, Jerome Frank, leader of AAA's liber­
als, was "the most lovable and volatile of them all."^^ Brilliant, 
hard-working, and seemingly possessed of endless driving energy, Frank 
built a successful law practice in Chicago after graduation from the 
University of Chicago Law School and then moved to greater success in 
Hew York. He became a friend of Felix Frankfurter, the Harvard pro­
fessor suspected by some people of being the off-stage mastermind of 
the Hew Deal. When the AAA was being formed, Rexford Tugwell asked 
Frankfurter to recommend a capable and liberal lawyer for AAA, and he 
named Frank. This placed Frank among a select group in the New Deal 
known as "Frankfurter's Young Men," a group which included James Landis, 
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and David Lilien- 
thal. Director of the Tennessee Valley Authority.Frank recruited 
many of the lawyers for his staff from Frankfurter's students, including
21Representatives of the Republican National Committee have 
searched the records of AAA now in the National Archives for Communist 
implications but found nothing they could use. Interview with Dr. Harold 
T. Pinkett, Director of Agricultural Records Divisions, National Archives, 
August 1, 1959-
22,"Lord, The Wallaces of Iowa, p. 398
R̂aymond Clapper, "Felix Fran 
Reviews, XCIII (January, 1936), 27-29.
23 kfurter's Young Men," Review of
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2hHiss, Pressman, Abt and Witt.
Even George Peek was willing to admit Frank was a "good law­
yer, " although he later claimed Frank was "more concerned with social
25theory than with law." Part of Peek's objection to Frank may have 
gone back to the time in Chicago when Frank was a member of the law 
firm active in liquidating Peek's Moline Plow Company.Frank's back­
ground and manner were strictly urban, a severe handicap in the eyes 
of AAA's agrarians. And, like many ardent liberals operating in new 
waters, he was inclined to leap before he looked. When Frank first 
had the intricacies of the system for milk distribution in large cities 
explained to him, he was shocked by the inefficiency, especially the 
duplication of competing milk routes. For an entire day he laid plans 
for reforming the whole system, until some of the agrarians who had 
studied the problem for years showed him what abolishing duplicated 
milk routes would do to the unemployment problem. After that, he 
acknowledged that the milk industry could probably not be reformed 
abruptly.
The attitude of Frank and his lieutenants toward southern ten­
ant farmers was extremely sympathetic and protective, although it is 
doubtful that many of them had ever seen a sharecropper. Since the 
Legal Division made no policy, Frank and his lawyers had to fight for 
tenants' rights on a strictly legal basis. They did this through legal
2kSchlesinger, Coming of the Hew Deal, p. 50.
25Peek, Why Quit Our' Own, p. 21.
26Fite, George H. Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity, p. 260.
27Lord, The Wallaces of Iowa, p. 396.
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opinions on given questions, rulings made in individual cases, work on 
various landlord-tenant committees, opinions expressed at policy con­
ferences which they attended as legal advisors, and by "leaks" to the 
press. Most of their legal considerations revolved around the powers 
granted by the Adjustment Act and the provisions of the 193^-35 cotton 
contract, especially paragraph 7* Usually their opinions and rulings 
came out in favor of the tenants, but when the law or the provisions
of the contract could simply not be stretched to fit their purposes,
28they accepted it.
Perhaps in an effort to leave niraself free to defend his lieu­
tenants, Jerome Frank preferred not to express his views on policJ
29officially. Certainly the lawyers under Frank did not feel constrained
to hold their tongues, especially Margaret Bennett, who squabbled so
incessantly with members of the Cotton Section that they complained she
was "difficult to get along with" and delayed the handling of com- 
30plaints. Miss Bennett's boss, Alger Hiss, served for a time on the 
landlord-tenant committees, where ne fought for tenant's rights, but 
ordinarily he preferred, like Frank, to avoid policy matters in his 
official dealings. According to Hiss, the General Counsel's office 
considered it a lawyer's function to try to find lawful ways to carry 
out the Secretary's wishes. "We did not attempt," Hiss recalled years
28When Jerome Frank ordered his Opinion Section to look into the 
possibility of AAA entering the Norcross case on the side of the tenants, 
Francis Shea advised him that it would not be proper. Shea, Memo to Mr. 
Frank, NA, RG 1̂ 9•
29For example; see Frank; Memo to the Secretary; January 12;
1935, NA, RG IÀ5.
^̂ Bennett, Memo to Mr. Hiss, July 7, 193̂ , NA, RG 1̂ 5*
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later, "to set or modify policy in our opinions." However, he and the 
other lawyers felt free as "informed members of the staff" to suggest 
policy while it was in the process of formulation.3̂
The philosophical leader of the liberal group was Rexford G. 
Tugwell. Often in the evenings, the liberals gathered at the house he 
shared with Jerome Frank for a heady fare of liquor and Tugwellian 
economics. A former professor at Columbia and a member of Roosevelt's 
"Braintrust," Tugwell was highly intellectual and articulate. Early 
in his academic career, he decided to devote iiis study to the two 
classes of people who suffered most from industrial civilization-- 
farmers and industrial workers. He wrote books and speeches in which 
he predicted the coming of an economic revolution in the United States, 
either orderly or violent, which would be similar to what had happened 
in Russia. In The Industrial Discipline, published in 1933, he advo­
cated an enforced planned industrial economy, nationalization of certain 
industries, and abandonment of the laissez faire principle. It was
done with an oblique, pseudo-scholarly approach, but the message was 
32there. As Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, Tugwell had charge of-- 
the older agencies within the Department, leaving Wallace free to give 
direct supervision to AAA. In 193^ Roosevelt appointed him Under­
secretary of Agriculture, but there was resistance to his confirmation 
in the Senate because he was considered the most radical of the "Brain-
3^Hiss to author, September 17, 19̂ 0.
32Rexford G. Tugwell, The Industrial Discipline, and the Gov­
ernment Arts (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933), PP> 189-219-
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33trusters." Tugwell, who was once voted "the handsomest New Dealer"
by female readers of a Washington newspaper, appeared before the Senate
Agriculture Committee in an immaculate white linen suit and two-toned 
3̂shoes to tell the senators that he was a farm boy who had once raised
a prize-winning calf and that he was not the revolutionary they seemed
to think. When some of his most volatile past statements were read to
him by the senators, he said they were made before he had governmental
responsibilities. He denied he was a "Braintruster" or a "Planner."
One senator was led to remark, "Doctor, we are really shocked to learn
that you are leaning so strongly toward ultra-conservatism."35
Another liberal who played an important part in tenant affairs
was Gardner Jackson, Assistant Consumers' Counsel. Jackson took his
job of looking after the interest of the consumer seriously, but then
he had always taken worth-while causes seriously. While in AAA he was
not directly concerned with the tenant problem, but he was interested
in it,^^ and later entered the thick of the fight on the tenants' side.
Jackson's father was the builder of the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad
and one of the biggest landowners in New Mexico and Colorado, but by
the 1930's Jackson had spent most of his fortune fighting for lost 
37causes. It started with Sacco and Vanzetti, the two Italian radicals
S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 
Hearings, Confirmation of Rexford Tugwell, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 
1-20, 166-168. 
okGardner Jackson, Interview with author, July 20, 1959-
35Senate Agriculture Committee, Hearings, Confirmation of 
Tugwell, pp. 1-173-
^^Gardner Jackson, Memo to Mr. Alger Hiss, March 17, 193̂ , NA,
RG 145.
^^Drew Pearson, "Washington Merry-go-round," Florida Times- 
Union (Jacksonville), February 26, 1937-
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accused of murder and robbery in Massachusetts during the Red Scare of 
1919-2 0. Jackson was a student at Harvard, but when he learned the 
details of the case he dropped out of class to work with the Sacco and 
Vanzetti Defense Committee. It was Jackson who put up much of the money 
to carry on the fight for an appeal or retrial, neither of which was 
ever granted. In the years that followed, Jackson championed so many 
such causes--the bonus army, Tom Mooney, the Spanish Loyalists--that 
he became well known in political circles. A friend once told him, 
"You're the only man I know who the underdog has on a leash."3®
Jackson was a curious combination of charm, idealism, persist­
ence and brass. He once told Senator William E. Borah of Idaiio, "Borah, 
I don't like you. You're not sincere, Borah. You're not a go-through
39guy." But Jackson was a go-through guy: on one occasion when Wallace
and Davis had gone to Chicago to sign a meat-packing code, ne leaked a
story to the press that the code permitted meat prices which would gouge
the consumer. This caused so much unfavorable publicity that the code 
40was cancelled. When Davis returned to Washington, he tried to find 
out who had released the story. Jackson proudly confessed, but Davis 
did not fire him, probably out of sheer admiration for his nerve.
Right or wrong, most people could not help liking Jackson. Years later, 
Henry Wallace recalled, "What Chester Davis understood a Pat Jackson
38Jackson, Interview with author, July 20, 1959-
^̂ Pearson, "Washington Merry-go-round," February 26, 1937-
^^Jackson to Senator Burton K. Wheeler, March 11, 1935, File 
1737, NA, RG 145.
4lJackson, Interview with author, July 20, 1959-
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could never learn. And yet strangely enough Pat Jackson is much more
[ipfriendly with me today than Chester Davis:"
The leader of the agrarians in tenancy matters was Cully Cobb.
A land grant college graduate, Cobb iiad come up through the extension 
service, first as Director of Boys' Agricultural Club Work and then as 
Assistant State Director. During the 1920's he was Editor of the 
Southern Rural!st of Atlanta, Georgia. Cobb, who was born in a log 
cabin on a Tennessee farm, was intensely proud of having come "all the 
way up from the soil."^^
As Chief of the Cotton Section, Cobb had a big job, and he did 
not intend to let anyone stand in the way. Much, of the success of the 
cotton programs can be attributed to his administrative abilities. 
However, Cobb had a blind side: he tended to view anyone who threatened 
to interfere with the cotton programs as a personal enemy and definitely 
un-American. He was convinced there was a Communist and left-wing plot 
which "extended from one end of the Cotton Belt to the other" to dis­
credit .the Administration and thwart its efforts to save the cotton
economy. He spoke often of the "incredible interference" of Communists
Ukand fellow travelers.
Cobb looked upon the STFU as a pawn of the Socialist Party and 
Norman Thomas as a man whose opinions counted little because of his 
peculiar political beliefs. If a letter had to be written to STFU 
leaders or Thomas, Cobb delegated one of his assistants to write it;
h2Wallace to author, June 13, 1959- 
'̂ Ĉobb to author, June 13, I96I.
^^Cobb to author, October 2b, 1959-
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however, he usually gave correspondence with senators and farm leaders 
nis personal attention and often found time to answer the letters of 
individual farmers h i m s e l f C o b b  looked upon most criticism as 
Communist-inspired and part of a "deliberate and continuous effort" by 
left-wingers to stir up trouble.
Cobb felt that every effort had been made to make the cotton 
programs completely fair to all types of tenants and landowners. He 
believed that, although some complaints from tenants were valid, most 
were not. To be as fair as possible, he brought several Negro employees 
into the Cotton Section to give counsel and assistance. The decision 
requiring landlords to keep the same number of tenants in 1933-3^ as 
before, he said, was not based on "cold economics but upon humanitarian 
considerations." In 1933 and 193^ he used Negro ministers to explain 
AAA's programs to tenant farmers in their churches because "those of us 
in charge of the program understood their situation and felt they were 
entitled to every fact that would help them . . . .
As for the liberals in AAA, Cobb claimed later that he knew 
most of them were Communists but could not prove it. He felt they could 
have given him much more trouble if they had known anything about agri­
culture. Fortunately, they did not. Cobb believed that he and the 
other agrarians were able to prevent the "social planners and fellow- 
travelers" in AAA from completely taking over the administration of the 
cotton programs only because Southern congressmen and senators backed 
the agrarians and because the control of the programs were decentral-
^̂ Cobb, correspondence file, NA, RG 145» 
^^Cobb to author, October 26, 1999, PP- 1-5■
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ized.^7
Cobb and his assistants in the Cotton Section had a theory that 
the great increase in the tenant population of the South since the .begin­
ning of the depression was caused by the return to the country of "desti­
tute urbanites," farm families who had migrated to the cities in the 
1920's and who were stranded there by the depression. Cobb believed 
that benevolent landlords had permitted these people to occupy abandoned 
.shacks and cabins and to farm unused land, a condition which accounted 
for the swollen number of farmers in the South. Many of the "destitute 
urbanites" became tenants, and in order to protect them AAA required 
landlords to allow them to stay on the farm in 193^ and 1935- But 
many of them no longer wanted to stay. They wished to return to the 
cities so that they could get on relief. This created the "wholesale 
evictions" which certain left-wing groups charged were taking place.
The leaders of the Cotton Section knew there was a considerable amount 
of shifting among tenants each year, and they believed it was unfair 
to blame AAA for this or the accompanying back-to-the-city migration.
Cobb and his lieutenants believed fervently that there had been no 
great displacement of tenants due to AAA's acreage reduction; they 
reasoned that, although cotton acreage was less,^^ profits were higher 
and there was less land to cultivate. This situation, they hoped, 
would allow women and children to stop working in the fields and allow 
more time to tend cows and chickens. The standard of living throughout 
the South would thus be immeasurably improved.
'̂̂ Ibid., pp. 9-8.
liftCobb to J. J. Miller, March 26, 193̂ , NA, RG IU5 .
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Above all, Cobb and the leaders of the Cotton Section feared the 
attempt by the liberals to make the cotton program into one of social 
reform because it might ruin good relations between landlords and ten­
ants . They felt that they alone understood tenancy because most of 
them were from the South and had lived with the problem all their lives. 
They were not opposed to social reform, but they were convinced that 
the best way to achieve it was by the economic rehabilitation of the 
South through crop control. To try to do more than that, they were 
sure, would be a grave mistake. In one of its studies of the problem, 
the Cotton Section warned that "to trust the future to those who are 
more or less unfamiliar with the y^out^ and its problems" would lead 
only to new problems and no solution for the old ones.
Oscar Johnston shared most of the views held by members of the 
Cotton Section. In addition to being AAA's Comptroller, Director of 
its Cotton Pool, and Assistant Director of the Commodity Credit Cor­
poration, he was also President of the British-owned Delta and Pine 
Land Company of Scott, Mississippi. With 38,000 acres of cotton land. 
Delta and Pine was the biggest plantation in the South. It had 1,000 
Negro sharecropper families, 1,000 mules, and a net income in 193° of 
$153,800. Johnston was a native Mfssissippian who had taken legal 
training at Cumberland University. He ran for governor of Mississippi 
in 1919 representing the wealthier classes of the state.According 
to the Amberson Report, the Delta and Pine organization was the fairest
^^Cotton Section, "Resume of Tenant Problem," January 9, 1935, 
NA, RG 145.
^^"Best Cotton Plantation," Fortune, XV (March, 1937), 125-132.
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plantation studied in dealing with its tenants.5^ Like the Cotton 
Section, Johnston felt that the interest of tenants could best be looked 
after by their landlords and that AAA. had neither the authorization nor 
the capability to reform Southern tenancy.
Caught between warring factions in AAA were their two bosses, 
Chester Davis and Henry Wallace. George Peek once described Wallace 
as m}"stical, religious, dreamy, honest-minded and rather likeable.
Russell Lord added that he was shy and folksy and had "corn country" •
54still written all over him. Wallace characteristically spoke and 
wrote in terms of high idealism but his actions were strictly middle of 
the road. He detested extremes, either political or economic. As Sec­
retary he learned to resist wnat ne called "newspaper drives" and pres­
sure groups. He felt it was his duty to look after the interests of
tne nation as a whole and not give in to the powerful and well repre­
sssented minorities. These qualities, in many ways desirable in a 
cabinet member, also made it possible for him to turn a deaf ear to what 
he probably considered a very smsill minority--the tenants and croppers 
who had been wronged under AAA's cotton programs.
By 1938, Wallace came to the conclusion that although AAA had 
attempted to prevent the displacement of tenants in the South, it was
^Hfilliam R. Amberson, "Report of Survey Made by Memphis Chapter, 
League for Industrial Democracy and the Tyronza Socialist Party," in 
Thomas, Plight of the Sharecropper, p.
52Johnston, Memo to Chester Davis, January 26, 1935; HA, RG 1L9 . 
^^eek. Why Quit Our Own, pp. 59-60.
^̂ Lord, The Wallaces of Iowa, p. 3̂ 6.
^̂ Wallace, New Frontiers, pp. 65-66.
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"impossible to write iron-clad rules with respect to these matters."
He said the Department of Agriculture would continue its efforts to 
protect, the interests of tenants, but tnat trends in agricultural prac­
tice must be considered. One-third of all American farmers lived on 
cotton farms, and with the reduced world market, it was obvious to 
Wallace that all of them would not be able to make a living indefinitely
56from cotton.
Chester Davis was not unlike Wallace in many ways. He had a 
broad social outlook and avoided extremes, but ne was essentially a much 
more practical man. If anyone could have successfully refereed between 
the agrarians ,gnd the liberals, it was Davis. Like Wallace, he was an 
Iowan. Educated at Grinnell, he became editor of the Montana Farmer 
and later Commissioner of Agriculture in Montana. During the 1920's he 
was Director of Grain Marketing for the Illinois Agricultural Associa­
tion and Washington Representative of the American Council of Agricul­
ture, of which George Peek was President. He had been Peek's right- 
hand man in the McNary-Haugen fight.
Russell Lord remembered Davis as being "kind and intelligent, 
humorously self-deprecatory, cordially open-minded, and capable of con­
tinuing learning . . . ." Davis was a capable and patient administrator 
who had developed negotiation and conciliation to a fine art. According 
to Lord, it was Davis who kept AAA running while Wallace "plugged on 
anead at the top, keeping more and more to himself.
^^Wallace to Congressman George Mahon, December 30, 1938; 
Landlord-Tenant File, NA, RG IU5.
57Lord, The Wallaces of Iowa, pp. 400-402.
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In all of'AAA there was only one man in high-position who was 
equipped by experience and attitude to achieve a compromise between 
the agrarians and the liberals. D. P. Trent was a Southerner who under­
stood tenancy intimately, and yet he wanted to take positive action to 
help tenants. Thus, his background was agrarian, but his ideas were 
liberal. Trent, whose full name was Dover Parham Trent, was born in 
Arkansas and raised on an Oklahoma farm. For a time he operated nis own, 
farm, but at the age of twenty-two he entered Oklahoma Agricultural and 
Mechanical College, now Oklahoma State University. After receiving a 
degree in agriculture, he became a school teacher and eventually a 
school superintendent. In 1919 he entered the government service as a 
county agent in Eastern Oklahoma. Showing great administrative ability, 
he rose to district agent and finally state director in 1927-^^ Accord­
ing to one of his subordinates, Trent was ambitious, perhaps egocentric,
5'and did not make friends easily.
Trent was brought to Washington by Chester Davis as an expert 
on tenancy, and Davis consulted him often on such matters. As Assistant 
Director of the Commodities Division, Trent was Cully Cobb's immediate 
superior, and certainly the men of the Cotton Section could not accuse 
him of being an urbanite who had never seen a tenant farmer. Yet Trent 
had deep compassion for the sharecroppers. He was determined that their 
rights be protected, and he was full of new ideas about how to reform the
cO
Ed Lemons, Head of Oklahoma State University Agricultural 
Information Services, to author, July 20, I96I; and D. P. Trent, Appli­
cation for Position, Oklahoma A. and M. College Extension Division, 
December 2, 1$2̂ , on file in State Extension Service offices, Stillwater, 
Oklahoma.
^̂ Dan Diehl to author, August 9, I96I.
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system. He soon became- suspect among the agrarians, and the Cotton 
Section refused to cooperate with him.' On the other hand,.Trent did 
little better with the Legal Division. He feared the young lawyers 
were too radical and impractical, while they did not completely trust 
him because of his agrarian background.
Perhaps there was something in Trent's personality that pre­
vented him from finding a middle ground for AAA on tenancy. Maybe he 
was not given enough authority. Or it could well be that compromise 
was impossible. Whatever the reason, Trent was unable to accomplish 
his mission in Washington.
With the characters thus drawn and the issues set, it is now 
time to describe the great fight as it developed between the agrarians 
and the liberals in AAA.
60D. P. Trent, Correspondence File, NA, RG I4 5.
CHAPTER VII 
THE AAA'S LAHDLORD-TENANT COMMITTEES
Despite the Cotton Section's repeated denials that wholesale 
evictions of tenant farmers were taking place in the South, evidence 
to the contrary continued to mount during the winter of 193^-35- Tiie 
number of tenant families moving to towns to get on relief rolls grew 
so great that the Federal Emergency Relief Administration became con­
cerned. Colonel Lawrence Westbrook, Assistant Administrator of FERA, 
sent to AAA a proposal that his agency provide relief for evicted ten­
ants and loans on the 1935 crop for those who remained on the land. 
However, he wanted AAA to give assurance that it would force landlords 
to retain the normal number of tenants. The Cotton Section thought it 
wise to accept Westbrook's offer since the requested provision was 
already in the 1935 cotton contract.^
However, the position of the Cotton Section concerning evictions 
remained largely unchanged. Cully Cobb continued to believe that a 
certain number of tenant complaints were to be expected and to attri­
bute displacement to the nature of tenancy. He took comfort from the 
fact that in eastern Arkansas, where many complaints originated, the




vote of farmers, including tenants, had been overwhelmingly in favor 
of more controls in the Bankhead referendum. Cobb pointed out that 
the total value of the cotton crop in Arkansas had risen from $48,860,000 
in 1932 to $75,039,922 in 1933 and $79,669,435 in 1934, including gov­
ernment benefits. In addition, Arkansas producers received $1,220,99^
2through the sale of surplus tax exemptions.
Cobb was never impressed with the complaints of tenant leaders. 
When J. 0. Green of the STFU wrote AAA requesting that the contracts of 
several landlords be suspended while it was determined whether their 
tenants were managing snare tenants, Cobb had him investigated. Later, 
Cobb sent instructions to county agents and committeemen in two eastern 
Arkansas counties to ignore Green because he was "fanatic and possibly 
. . . slightly unbalanced."^
But in the Legal Division, several key figures were working on 
behalf of what they considered to be the tenants' interests. Alger 
Hiss continually urged Jerome Frank to get an expert on landlord-tenant
relations appointed to the staff of AAA.^ John Abt, obviously disap­
pointed when Frank made arrangements to have Department of Justice 
lawyers try AAA's cases, attempted to arrange with the Attorney Gen­
eral for AAA, lawyers to handle them. He was willing to let the Depart­
ment of Justice have veto power over cases and plan the strategy, but 
this was unacceptable to the Attorney General. Finally, they agreed 
that AAA lawyers would take part only in the preparation and briefing
2Cobb to Senator Joseph Robinson, August 26, 1935, NA, RG 145.
Ĉobb, Memo to Mr. Frank, July 24, 193̂ , NA, RG l45.
Ĥiss, Memo to Mr. Frank, January 4, 193̂ , NA, RG l45.
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of cases, which was a blow to the Litigations Section, which Abt 
headed.^ The cause of the tenants suffered by this agreement, because 
if the liberals in the Legal Division had been able to prepare and try 
cases in federal court against a planter like Norcross they might have 
obtained a conviction which would have changed the whole complexion of 
contract enforcement.
Francis Shea and others in the Legal Division corresponded fre­
quently with H. C. Malcom, Deputy Commissioner of Labor in Arkansas, 
who in his own words was "fighting the battle of the sharecropper."
Malcom gathered data on violations of the cotton contract by landlords
6and forwarded them to AAA. He claimed to have records of 3,000 viola- 
7tions, and his department was trying in a feeble way to right some of 
the wrongs of the cotton program. In one day, Malcom and his assistants
recovered $700 which landlords had wrongfully withheld from their ten-
g
ants. Eventually, Assistant Secretary Paul Appleby became interested 
in Malcom as a "means for getting a more representative view of the 
situation than we have yet had.
Even the top administrators of AAA became more concerned about 
tenancy as a result of events in Arkansas. But when Chester Davis in­
quired of the chiefs of all commodity sections if they had encountered
Âbt, Memo to Mr. Frank, July l4, 193̂ , NA, RG ik̂ .
^Malcom to Shea, August 21, 193k, and other letters in Malcom 
correspondence file, NA, RG lk$.
•j
Arkansas Gazette, November 15, 193̂ - 
^Malcom to W. J. Green, January 2, 1935, NA, RG lk5- 
Âppleby, Memo to Mr. Boyd, January 7, 1935, NA, RG lk5-
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any difficulties concerning tenants, most responded they had not. Claude
Wickard of the Corn-Hog Section, for instance, reported receiving only
a few complaints, mostly from landlords. These were handled by a letter
stating flatly that tenants should share in rental payments as well as 
10parity payments.
Assistant Administrator W. E. Byrd, whose sympathies were more 
with the liberals than the agrarians, received a letter from a Mississippi 
planter who styled himself "one of those vicious landlords." He asked 
if there was not some way to "get rid of that swarm of pests neaded by 
Socialist Thomas who seem/e^ to consider it their special duty to rescue 
the most fortunate class of people on earth, the plantation sharecrop­
per." Byrd passed the letter on to Paul Porter, Executive Assistant to 
the Administrator, with the suggestion that "because of this gent's 
reference to sharecroppers, I thought you might be able to hand him a 
bouquet with a bumble bee in it.
In December, 193̂  ̂Frank Tannenbaum of the Rosenwald Foundation 
and the Brookings Institution came to AAA with the preliminary findings
of a study conducted by the Committee on Minority Groups in the Economic 
12Recovery. The project, sponsored by the Rosenwald Foundation at a 
cost of $50,000, had taken one year to complete.The report concluded 
that tenancy, especially white tenancy, was growing rapidly and that 
only government relief had prevented wholesale starvation eind rioting
^^Wickard, Memo to Mr. Davis, May 4, 193̂ , NA, RG IU5.
^^John C. Stephens to Davis, March I3, 1935, and attached note 
from W. E. Byrd, NA, RG IÀ5 .
^^Tannenbaum to Appleby, December 29, 193̂ , NA, RG 1̂ 5.
^^Rew York Times, March 21, 1935*
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among tenant farmers. It strongly advocated adopting a system of 
"peasant proprietorship" vhereby the government would purchase land 
rather than rent it to keep it out of production. The land would be sold 
to landless farmers on easy terms. This would create a class of peasants 
in the South, which the authors of the report thought desirable.The 
Rosenwald report was read by Wallace, Davis, and other high officials, 
and, although they were probably sympathetic to tenants' becoming land­
owners, they could see nothing AAA or the Department of Agriculture could 
do to accomplish this goal
Also toward the end of 193̂  ̂AAA began considering making its 
own studies of the effects of its programs on tenancy. Such studies 
were strongly recommended by Professor John D. Black, a Harvard econo­
mist and trusted advisor to the Administration on agriculture. Black 
resented the "very false statements that are appearing in certain types 
of allegedly liberal journals" about AAA and felt that the South was 
furnishing the most fruitful field for criticism. Black understood the 
feeling of the Cotton Section that its problems were its own and should 
be handled without help of outsiders, yet he realized that this attitude 
could lead to "unfortunate circumstances." He therefore suggested that 
AAA begin studies of Southern problems, make the results public, and be
ikCommittee on Minority Groups in the Economic Recovery, "Fore­
word and Conclusion of a Study of Agricultural, Economic and Social 
Conditions in the South," NA, RG 1̂ +5• The full report of this committee 
was later published by Charles Joimson, Edwin Embree, and Will Alexander, 
The Collapse of Cotton Tenancy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1935)-
^^Tannenbaum to Appleby, December 29, 193̂ , and attached routing 
slip, NA, RG IU5 .
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guided in its policies by the conclusion.
As a result of Black's recommendations. Secretary Wallace and 
Administrator Davis asked Professor Calvin B. Hoover, an economic 
advisor to AAA on leave from the faculty of Duke University, to make a 
study of the effects of cotton acreage reduction on Southern tenant 
farmers. Hoover was an expert on tenancy, so rather than make extensive 
field studies he simply applied his knowledge to an analysis of the 
cotton program. In the internal politics of AAA. Hoover was more sympa­
thetic to the liberals than to the agrarians. His final report, which 
was released to the public, was surprisingly outspoken on some points, 
but it was guarded and noticeably vague on others. For instance, Hoover 
concluded that it was inevitable from the first that acreage reduction 
would lead to widespread tenant displacement and he confirmed that it 
had done so in 1933 and 193 ,̂ but he was careful not to blame this 
situation on AAA. The causes of displacement, he said, were normal 
movement, evictions by landlords before signing contracts, and tenants 
moving to town to get relief.
Having denied the validity of one charge against AAA, Hoover 
confirmed others. He said that tenants were not receiving the full 
amount specified in the cotton contract and that the acreage reduction 
program had created a motive for reducing the number of tenants. He 
recognized that paragrapn 7 of the cotton contract was designed to pre­
vent evictions, but he concluded that enforcement was "inadequate."
The professor found that the share of rental payments received by share­
croppers and non-managing tenants under the cotton contract was unfair
^^Black to Chester Davis, November 1$, 193̂ , NA, RG l4$.
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when compared to tobacco or corn-hog contracts. He further concluded 
that the wording of the 1934 contract produced confusion in the classi­
fication of types of tenants with the division of benefit payments 
hinging on the interpretation.
Hoover reviewed the reasoning which had gone into the decision 
to give cotton tenants less than other tenants. He recognized that 
favoring the landlords had been necessary in order to induce them to 
sign the contract; however, he could not escape the conclusion that it 
had been unjust to bargain for landlord support at the expense of ten­
ants. He added that the decision had been influenced by the fact that 
cotton tenants would be allowed to use the rented acres to grow food 
and feed, and he felt that if the tenants were to receive any real 
benefit from the existing cotton program, it would have to be through 
the "free use" of the rented acres.
Hoover concluded that the cotton programs had greatly improved 
economic conditions in the South and that these advantages "far out- 
weigh^e^ any unfortunate results and individual injustices.He 
went about as far as he could go in his public report in condemning the 
cotton program: he denied it caused evictions but said it created a 
motive to evict. He courageously pointed out the inequitable division 
of benefits between landlords and tenants but took the edge off his 
criticism by saying, with some justice, that the cotton program had been 
of general benefit to the South.
Hoover's report provided ammunition for both critics and sup-
17Calvin Hoover, "Human Problems in Acreage Reduction in the 
South, " NA, RG ll+5.
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porters of the cotton program. William Amberson charged in the Nation 
that many officials in the Department of Agriculture ignored the report 
although it said the cotton program created a motive for evictions and
■18that enforcement of the contract was inadequate. H. C. Malcom, the
pro-tenant labor commissioner in Arkansas, called the report "propaganda
pure and simple" and offered to make his records available to prove mass
19evictions caused by AAA. On the other hand, the Cotton Section took
comfort from Hoover's general conclusion about the improvement of
20economic conditions in the South.
In recommendations to Secretary Wallace, which were not made 
public. Hoover went much further. He reversed nis position on tenant 
displacement and said there was "strong and definite" evidence that the 
acreage reduction program was causing evictions, at least in the south­
eastern states. He recommended that landlords be required to sign a 
statement of the number of tenants on their land before receiving rental 
checks and also that they be forced to make an accounting of their dis­
tribution of rental and parity payments. However, Hoover despaired of 
ever forcing landlords to retain tenants which they did not need, and 
he foresaw continued evictions. He felt that this situation created a 
major problem of helping the thousands of farm families set adrift with 
no training other then farming and little hope of finding jobs. A pos­
sible solution would be to place evicted tenants on small subsistence
1 AAmberson, "The New Deal for Sharecroppers," Nation, CXL 
(February I3, 1935), I85-I8 6.
19Arkansas Gazette, November 15, 193̂ *
20Cotton Section, "Resume of Tenant Problem," January 9, 1935, 
NA, RG 1U5 ,
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farms where they could grow most of their own food and feed. Hoover 
reasoned that it would be best to use former cotton and tobacco land 
for this purpose. He pointed out that the government could have bought 
considerable amounts of such land in 1933 for what it paid in rentals.
He recognized that the former tenants on such land would not be ready 
to operate their own farms without a period of supervision and commented 
that experimentation with collective farming communities might be worth 
while. Hoover also recommended that the rented acres be used in 193̂  
and 1935 to provide land for a "very limited number" of displaced fam­
ilies, and that surplus dairy cows be "transferred" to the South to be
PIdistributed to tenants through local relief agencies.
Calvin Hoover's recommendations to Wallace represented sentiments 
which were becoming more widely accepted throughout the country. Even­
tually, the Resettlement Administration, headed by Eexford Tugwell,
attempted to place homeless tenants on small subsistence farms and even
22experimented with collective farms. However, such ideas gained little 
vogue in AAA or in the Department of Agriculture, and one can easily 
imagine the reaction to them in tne Cotton Division.
Secretary Wallace, Administrator Davis, and other key figures 
contended that AAA was not an agency of reform; therefore the liberals 
in AAA were forced to carry on their fight with very limited objectives 
and within the existing framework of AAA. A major battleground was the 
various landlord-tenant committees created by AAA. The history of these
^^Hoover, Memo to the Secretary, March 7, 193̂ , NA, RG 1 6.
22Resettlement Administration, What the Resettlement Administra­
tion Has Done, R. A. Misc. Pub. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing 
Office, 1936), passim.
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committees began in August, 1933, when the "Legal Advisory Committee"
was set up to handle tenant complaints. When this arrangement proved
inadequate in January, 193 ,̂ the Committee on Violations of Rental and
Benefit Contracts was created, consisting of representatives from the
Cotton Section, the Legal Division, and the Comptroller. E. A. Miller
usually represented the Cotton Section and Alger Hiss or Margaret Bennett
spoke for the Legal Division.
The Committee on Violations was to hear all complaints and adju- 
23dicate them, but it experienced considerable difficulty. In February,
193$, it had a back log of 1,699 cases under consideration, l,Ll9 of
which involved 1933 contracts and I98 from 193̂ - In a representative
week the committee received 12k cases, 99 of which involved cotton.
However, it was able to settle only 69 cases in a four-month period.
Cases came in much faster than they were adjudicated and the Committee
2kquickly found itself more than a year behind in its work. The prin­
cipal reason, according to the Committee, was "lack of adequate person-
29nel to handle the great mass of complaints received."
Despite its limitations the Committee on Violations made some 
important decisions. One was the case of the Tchula Plantation of 
Jefferson County, Arkansas, first reported by H. C. Malcom of the Arkan­
sas Labor Bureau and later included in the Amberson Report. An investi­
gation of the Tchula Plantation by Francis Shea revealed that the land-
23Margaret Bennett, Memo to Mr. Frank, February k, 1935, NA, RG
149.
2k ,Report of the Committee on Violations, February k, 1935, NA,
RG lk9.
25Committee on Violations, Memo to Administrator, Re: Contract 
of Twist Brothers, February I9, 1935, NA, RG lk9-
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lords had paid their tenants for the 1933 plow-up in the form of can­
celled debts including usurous interest. The Committee on Violations 
ruled that usury was a matter between landlord and tenant and had no 
bearing on the cotton contract. When it ordered payment on the Tchula 
contract, the Secretary approved the action.
In anotner case the circumstances were almost identical, except 
investigators established that the landlord had not distributed or 
credited his sharecroppers with the full amount due them. The Committee 
recommended that the landlord be requested to allow the Cotton Pool to 
pay his tenants directly out of money due the plantation. If he refused,
his pooled cotton would be sold by the government and the proceeds given 
27to the croppers. The Committee was also responsible for suspending
payments to the Twist brothers of Cross County, Arkansas. The Twists
were stubborn landlords who felt that the customary 50-50 arrangement
was more than sharecroppers deserved. They steadfastly refused to make
any division of payments to their tenants until forced to do so by the 
28Committee.
In the spring of 193̂ , after Chester Davis became alarmed about 
enforcement of the tenant provision of the 193  ̂contract, he ordered 
D. P. Trent to have extension directors in the Cotton Belt set up 
three-man committees at the district level. These committees would 
settle or make recommendations concerning landlord-tenant disputes
^^Memo of the Committee on Violations, December 4, 1935, NA, RG
145.
27Memo to the Secretary, Re: Contract of J. G. and Jesse %ar, 
October 11, 1935, NA, RG 1̂ 5*
28Memo to Administrator, Re: Contract of Twist Brothers, Feb­
ruary 15, 1935, NA, RG 145.
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appealed from county committees. The members of the committees were 
to travel from county to county, giving advance notice of their arrival 
to "all interested parties," and holding hearings similar to court 
trials. Each case handled would be reported to Washington. In his 
instructions to the committeemen, Trent told them not to interfere with 
the normal agreements between landlords and tenants but to insure "as 
far as possible" that those who grow and harvest cotton, particularly 
tenant farmers, received their just share of benefit payments.
A rumor was circulating through AAA about this time that a 
"Compliance Committee" would also be set up in Washington. This story, 
combined with the order to organize the three-man committee in the 
districts, caused the Committee on Violations to ask Chester Davis for 
a clearer definition of its jurisdiction. However, the memo from the 
Committee never reached Davis and the Legal Division suspected it had 
been side-tracked by the Cotton Section.Their suspicion seemed con­
firmed on May 9 when Chester Davis announced to the press that eight 
district agents from the Extension Service had been named as field men 
to investigate complaints arising from the cotton contracts. Trent had 
supervisory responsibility over tne new organization, and J. Phil Camp­
bell, Chief of the Agricultural Rehabilitation Section and Former Direc­
tor of Extension in Georgia, was to head the work. A committee in 
Washington consisting of Campbell, E. A. Miller, and W. J. Green would
"31review the reports from the field adjustors.
"Procedure for Conducting Hearings," no date, Landlord-Tenant 
File, NA, RG 1À$.
30Margaret Bennett, Memo to Mr. Frank, February k, 1935, NA, RG
149.
3%SDA, Press Release, May 9, 1934, NA, RG 145.
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The Legal Division first knew of this new Adjustment Committee 
when members read about it in the newspapers. The lawyers assumed it 
was the work of the Cotton Section because there were no more steadfast 
supporters of Cully Cobb in all of AAA than Campbell, Miller and G r e e n . 32
Chester Davis' instructions to the field adjustors were to 
familiarize themselves with case files in Washington for three days 
before going to their assigned districts. Then, they were to go to the 
counties where cases were pending, get the tenants and landlords together, 
review their cases, and try to settle differences by conciliation. Davis 
warned the adjustors to work closely with local and state AAA officials 
and be careful not to offend them. Where the adjustors found willful 
violations they were autnorized to cancel contracts or tell violators 
what must be done to keep the contract in force. Tliey could also recom­
mend substitute contracts if, for example, a managing share tenant nad 
been refused his proper status. Davis, recognizing that tenants might 
be reluctant to speak frankly before their landlords, suggested that 
adjustors interview tenants privately when the situation warranted. He 
told adjustors to make weekly reports to Campbell and to file full infor­
mation of their actions with the county committees c o n c e r n e d . 33
During the next four months, the field adjustors investigated 
2 ,098 complaints of tenants in 320 counties. They were able to adjust 
215 cases, they assisted county committees in settling 3̂ 7 more, and they 
found 1,512 cases in which the complaint was unjustified. The investi­
gators cancelled twenty-four contracts, including eleven in Arkansas, but
■̂ M̂argaret Bennett, Memo to Mr. Frank, February 4, 1935, NA, RG
145.
^^avis to District Agents and others. May 5, 193̂ , NA, RG l45-
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only after landlords refused to make the suggested adjustments. 3̂
Having reviewed the investigations of the adjustors, the Adjust­
ment Committee of Campbell, Miller, and Green made a general report to 
Davis. They concluded there had been no "wholesale displacement" of 
tenants and that in practically every case of eviction, the landlord 
iiad "some good reason for doing so." The Committee found landlords 
cooperative "as a class" and said the charges that landlords were shift­
ing from croppers to day labor were "overdrawn." The Committee felt 
that most tenants entitled to the status of managing snare tenant had 
received it, and, although there were probably some tenants who had been 
wrongfully denied the status, there were man} tenants who attempted to 
defraud their landlords. To the allegation that county committees were 
landlord-dominated, the Committee answered that on the whole county 
committee men were "very honest . . . and fair."
The Committee also answered charges in the Amberson Report 
which specified eleven cases of contract violation. They found the 
charges in seven of these cases to be unfounded, cancelled one contract, 
and adjusted the others. E. A. Miller personally investigated the 
Korcross Plantation, one of those mentioned, and spent "a good pant of 
one day talking to riders and tenants." He found that Norcross had more 
tenants in 193  ̂than in 1933, which exonerated him of not keeping the 
normal number.
The Adjustment Committee was not intended to be a permanent 
3̂ D. P. Trent, Memo to Mr. Davis, December 28, 193̂ , NA, RG IÀ5 .
"Report of the Adjustment Committee," September 1, 193̂ , NA,
RG IU5.
l86
fixture. Its purpose was to clear up accumulated tenant complaints 
while a new method was being found to handle them oh a 'continuing basis. 
This was part of what Chester Davis had In mind when he created the 
Compliance Section In AAA. at this time. The section was responsible for 
"development of compliance methods" and coordinating them with all com­
modity sections, but according to Margaret Bennett, no one ever quite 
understood this setup and It never functioned effectively with regard 
to cotton contracts.
In the meantime the Legal Division was unhappy with the Adjust­
ment Committee, and Margaret Bennett, still serving on the Committee on 
Violations, began building a case against It. She found some strong 
evidence of pro-landlord sentiment on the part of the adjustors. One 
example Involved hearings at Truman, Arkansas, at which J. 0. Green, 
the STFU leader, appeared on behalf of a tenant who claimed the status 
of managing share tenant. The landlord Involved had agreed to grant 
the status and all that was needed was action by the county committee; 
however, when a hearing was held a county committeeman produced a 
signed statement In which the tenant retracted all his claims. The 
adjustor ruled that the tenant was not a managing share tenant and recom­
mended that Green be prosecuted for using the malls for extortion. The 
Adjustment Committee upheld the decision, but Margaret Bennett was con­
vinced the action was pro-landlord because of the hasty withdrawal of 
the tenant's claim and the recommendation to prosecute Green when no 
evidence was given to show that he benefited personally from the case.37
°̂Bennett, Memo to Mr. Frank, February 4-, 1935, NA, RG l4$.
Bennett, Exhibit "D, " Memo to Mr. Frank, February 1935, NA,
RG 149•
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In a case in Poinsett County, Arkansas, Miss Bennett found, that 
fourteen tenants, who had complained to Secretary Wallace that they had 
not been allowed to use rented acres, were called in by the adjustor and 
told their claim was denied. In reporting this case, the adjustor 
wrote the word "none" in the space provided for evidence, and the Adjust- 
ment Committee accepted the decision. The same adjustor accepted a
list of tenants supplied by the manager of the Twist Plantation as con­
clusive evidence that there had been no wholesale evictions there.
Meanwhile, Miss Bennett feuded openly with the representatives 
of the Cotton Section in the Committee on Violations. R. H. Polk of
Helena, Arkansas, had withheld 1933 benefits from his tenants,and
wnen his case came before the committee, all but Miss Bennett were will­
ing to allow final payment on Polk's contract. Miss Bennett kept the 
case open until the other members of the Committee finally agreed that 
Polk had violated the contract and that half the money due him from the
Cotton Pool should be given to his tenants. Polk was also forced to
resign as chairman of his community committee.Later, both Senator 
Hattie Carraway and Senate Majority Leader Joe Robinson of Arkansas wrote
Secretary Wallace on behalf of Polk. Robinson charged that the committee
Uphad arbitrarily decided against Polk. Despite this pressure, Wallace
^̂ Bennett, Exhibit "E," Memo to Mr. Frank, February k, 1935, HA,
RG ll+5-
^^Report of Adjustment Committee, September 1, 193̂ , PP* 66-09, 
NA, RG 1̂ 5.
*̂̂ Dell, Memo to Mr. Frank, July 19, 193̂ , NA, RG 1̂ 5.
^^Bennett, Memo to Mr. Hiss, July 7, 193̂ , NA, RG iĥ ', and Davis, 
Memo to the Secretary, September 27, 193̂ , NA, RG IÀ9.
kpRobinson to Wallace, December I9, 193̂ , NA, RG 1̂ 5i and Tugwell 
to Carraway, November 21, 193̂ , NA, RG 1̂ 9.
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upheld the decision of the committee; however, he penciled a note on
the final report that Polk's tenants should not receive more than they
kkwere entitled to under the contract. Finally, in August, 1935̂  Oscar 
Johnston of the Cotton Pool was ordered to sell Polk's options and dis­
tribute payments to thirty-six of his sharecroppers. It had taken AAA 
a year and a half and a tremendous effort through hearings, correspond­
ence, special investigations, and consideration by high ranking offi­
cials to make fined, disposition of the Polk case.^^
Because of such delays, the Legal Division sought a clear state­
ment of policy regarding the handling of tenant complaints and creation 
of a landlord-tenant committee in AAA which could decide such disputes 
with finality. Meanwhile, Margaret Bennett reached the conclusion that 
"investigation will not be adequate if left to the local authorities."^^
Jerome Frank agreed, since he believed that local committees were "fre-
k?quently composed of landlords, and he applied enough pressure on 
Chester Davis to force him to call a conference in D. P. Trent's office 
on July 3j 193̂ - Davis put Trent in charge of considering Frank's pro- 
■ posai for a landlord-tenant committee. Present at the conference in 
Trent's office besides Trent were Commodities Division Chief Victor 
Christgau, Frank, Comptroller John B. Pa^me, E. A. Miller, W. J. Green,
^^Wallace to Robinson, January 15, 1935, NA, RG 1̂ 5; and Payne 
to Frank, January 7, 1935, NA, RG 1̂ 5-
kiiDavis, Memo to the Secretary, September 27, 193̂ , NA, RG 14$.
^^Tugwell, Memo to Oscar Johnston, August 30, 1935, NA, RG 1̂ 5• 
^^Bennett, Memo to Mr. Appleby, January l4, 1935, NA, RG l45- 
'̂̂ Frank, Memo to Mr. McConnoughey, January 25, 1935, NA, RG 14-5.
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Margaret Bennett, and Alger Hiss. They agreed that a definite landlord- 
tenant policy was needed and that a policy 'committee should be created 
to make recommendations. Trent, Calvin Hoover, Frank, Pa^me, and Cully 
Cobb would constitute the new committee. Alger Hiss suggested that once 
they determined a policy, a sub-committee should be created to make 
investigations and adjudicate cases. This idea was accepted. It was 
further agreed that the Violations Committee should be abolished and 
its records taken over by the new sub-committee
Plans progressed for the new committee until Cully Cobb changed 
his mind about it and addressed a memorandum to Christgau opposing its
llQcreation. He said his Division had primary responsibility for the 
cotton program and that the people in it understood cotton problems 
better than anyone else in AAA. He felt that if the cotton producers 
and local committees were made to feel they had lost responsibility for 
enforcement of the contracts to some agency in Washington, the results 
would be "disastrous to the program.The Legal Division pointed out 
in rebuttal that no clearly stated policy for settling tenant claims had 
been made, that there was no reason why such matters should be left 
solely to the Cotton Section since one policy could apply to all com­
modities, and that a landlord-tenant committee could make such a pol­
icy. But Cobb nevertheless remained adamant.
^̂ Hiss, Memo Of Conference, July 3, 193̂ , NA, RG ik'p.
Bennett, Memo to Mr. Frank, February k, 1935, NA, RG IÀ5.
^̂ Cobb, Memo to Mr. Christgau, September 8, 193̂ > NA, RG 1̂ 5.
^̂ R. K. McConnaughey, Memo to Mr. Frank, September 2k, 193̂ , NA,
RG lk5.
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Trent's stand on the proposed landlord-tenant committee was, as 
usual, eminently reasonable. Although he recognized that Cully Cobb and 
the Cotton Section were "entirely conscientious in their point of view," 
he knew that if the proposed committee were pushed through it would be 
over their objections. "I would like to say frankly," he wrote to 
Jerome Frank, "that there has been a rather systematic effort ^by the 
Cotton Section^ to delay or forestall most of the efforts which we have 
made to deal with this problem." Trent was genuinely concerned about 
the large numbers of complaints being received by AAA, and he observed 
that "we have been inclined to pussy-foot and dodge responsibility" 
by telling claimants to see their county agent or committee. Trent 
did not seek the job of handling the landlord-tenant committee, but he
would take it because of nis interest in protecting the rights of ten-
+ 52ants.
The Legal Division continued to press for the Landlord-Tenant 
Committee, but their efforts were fruitless as Cobb successfully blocked 
formation of the committee. Hopes for a compromise between the agrar­
ians and the liberals suffered a major setback when Trent became con­
vinced that the situation was hopeless and decided to return to his 
post as Director of Extension in Oklahoma. Acceptance of Trent's posi­
tion was probably the only chance that AAA had to avoid a great battle 
over tenancy.
Trent's recommendations, first expressed in the spring of 193̂ , 
contained the nucleus of almost everything accomplished by the New Deal 
for tenants as well as some things that were never done. He proposed
^̂ Trent to Frank, September l8, 193̂ , NA, RG IU5.
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a thorough government study of tenancy, better means for adjudication 
of landlord-tenant disputes outside the influence of county agents, 
the inclusion of all tenants in cotton contracts, the founding of farm­
ing colonies for stranded farm workers, efforts to get greater coopera­
tion from the states in solving tenant problems especially in Negro 
education, a careful study of the possibility of using the minimum wage 
set by NBA for farm labor, and help for capable tenants in securing 
their own land. Trent felt the goal of making tenant farmers an inde­
pendent and productive class should be "administratively recognized" 
and that the full force of tne federal government including all agencies 
concerned should be put behind the task.^^ If there is one man in the 
fight in AAA who stands out for his wisdom and compassion, it is D. P. 
Trent. His departure removed the middle ground of the battle in AAA.
Before Trent left, he made one last effort to solve immediate 
problems. Having just learned of FERA's plans to provide relief for 
evicted tenants, he expressed his misgivings to Chester Davis. Though 
he approved of the plan, he feared it implied that AAA did not intend 
to stand firm against landlords who took unfair advantage of their ten­
ants. He wondered if AAA was perhaps passing its own responsibility 
to FERA. Once they learned that FERA would take care of their tenants, 
Trent warned Davis, the landlords would cease their own efforts to do 
so.
Trent also told Davis that, although the Adjustment Committee 
had done a good job, there was a flood of new complaints concerning 
landlords converting from tenants to day labor. "Information which I
^̂ Trent to Extension Directors in Southern States, April 12, 
1934, NA, RG IÀ5.
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have," he wrote, indicates this parctlce is rather general throughout 
the cotton belt." He also indicated landlords were setting up new 
financial charges against their tenants and making side agreements to 
deprive them of government benefits. Trent warned Davis that great 
difficulties lay ahead for AAA in protecting tenant farmers, and he 
called for a "very definite and positive stand" on the problem of 
landlord-tenant relations.^
Meanwhile, the situation in which the Violations Committee found 
itself had become impossible. The Cotton Section refused to make sum­
maries of the cases so that the Committee co'old consider them expedi­
tiously. It prevented Margaret Bennett from seeing complaints until 
the day before they were presented to the Committee and occasionally 
delayed claims as much as eight months. Miss Bennett notified her im­
mediate superior, Alger Hiss, that matters had reached the basic issue 
of whether complaints were to be investigated to see that government 
money was distributed fairly or whether they were to be ignored and 
money paid just as if no complaints had been r e c e i v e d . 5̂
In early February, 1935, Miss Bennett grew so exasperated that 
she wrote a memorandum to Chester Davis and Jerome Frank declaring 
bluntly that there was "growing and justifiable public dissatisfaction" 
with the handling of landlord-tenant disputes and that if something 
were not done, the reduction program would be "seriously discredited." 
She complained that there were six different sections in AAA handling
^̂ Trent, Memo to Mr. Davis, December 28, 193̂ , NA, RG l4$.
^̂ Bennett, Memo to Mr. Hiss, July 7, 193̂ , NA, RG 1̂ 5.
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tenant complaints with no clear jurisdiction or policy to guide them.
The outspoken lady lawyer indicated four major tenancy questions 
which needed immediate policy decisions. They included whether judg­
ments withholding the status of managing share tenant could be appealed 
beyond county committees, the procedure to be used in handling claims 
in 1935; the extent to which paragraph 7 should be enforced, and the 
question of what section of AAA had final responsibility for enforce­
ment. The solution offered by Miss Bennett was a landlord-tenant com­
mittee. Her plan was to abolish all functions of local committees in 
tenant disputes and let the new committee handle them in Washington.
If necessary, field representatives could be sent out to investigate
r~ ̂
and make recommendations.^ The chiefs of AAA took no action on Miss 
Bennett's suggestions, and the problems continued.
^̂ Bennett, Memo to Mr. Frank, February 1935, NA, RG l4$.
CHAPTER VIII 
PURGE IN AAA
Tne situation in AAA had now reached the breaking point. All 
that was needed to goad the two sides into full combat was an issue 
which was clearly defined. With almost unbelievable irony, such an 
issue was provided by the case of Hiram Norcross, whose evictions led 
to the formation of the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union. Norcross' case 
was currently pending before the Committee on Violations.
The first complaints concerning Norcross reached the Cotton 
Section in the spring of 193̂ - As mentioned earlier, E. A. Miller gave 
Norcross a clean bill of health on his tour through eastern Arkansas.
J. Phil Campbell's survey came to the same conclusion, both men exon­
erating Norcross of any contract violation because he had more tenants 
in 193  ̂than in 1933- But the Amberson Report charged that Norcross 
had. not reduced acreage ratably and was replacing white tenants with 
black ones. When the Cotton Section investigated, it found these 
charges false. No further action was taken until Amberson wrote his 
friend Paul Appleby that Norcross was evicting tenants solely for mem­
bership in the tenants' union and had threatened to withhold their pay­
ments if they caused trouble. Appleby turned the matter over to Jerome 
Frank, who gave it to Margaret Bennett, his representative on the
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Committee on Violations. Miss Bennett; knowing E. A. Miller had pre­
viously investigated the case, asked him to prepare a memorandum to 
Appleby for the Committee.^
In his memorandum, Miller took the view that, since the contract 
required landlords to maintain only the normal number of tenants, and 
since his own investigations revealed that Norcross had done this, he 
had not violated the contract. Miller felt that if Norcross actually 
withheld parity payments from tenants, it would be a violation of the 
contract, but to threaten to do so was not a violation. Since there 
was no concrete evidence that Norcross had withneld payments. Miller 
recommended that parity payments be made on Norcross' contract. He 
also said that Norcross should be advised of the situation, and then,
if he failed to distribute the parity money, he should be forced to do
2so by legal action.
When Miller's memorandum reacned Appleby, he wrote a scorching 
message to Cully Cobb saying Miller's attitude was "clearly loaded on ' 
the side of the landlords," and it seemed to him an effort "to find out 
how not to do something for the tenants." He pointed out that it would 
be much simpler for AAA to withhold Norcross' parity check and pay his 
tenants separately than to take legal action to recover from Norcross 
if he did not distribute the money properly.
Appleby told Cobb that the Cotton Section seemed biased in favor 
of the landlords and that the complete file of the Norcross Case was 
being turned over to Secretary Wallace. Appleby wrote: . .no single
B̂ennett, Memo to Mr. Frank, January 10, 1935; NA, RG li+5*
2
Miller, Memo to Mr. Cobb, December 26, 193̂ ; NA, RG 1̂ 5.
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problem before the Department more difficult or more important to
the continuing success of our program than this one of landlord-tenant 
equities in the cotton belt." He told Cobb that solution of the prob­
lem would require extraordinary effort and positive plans by the Cotton 
Section, rather than attempts "to evade responsibility. Before sending 
the memorandum, Appleby asked Assistant Administrator Byrd if he thought 
it would help any "to jar Cobb a little bit with a statement of this 
kind from me." Byrd felt it would.^
About this time, Jerome Frank received an urgent plea from C. T. 
Carpenter, attorney for a group of tenants evicted by Norcross who were 
suing in an Arkansas court for their rights under paragraph 7- Carpen­
ter wanted AAA to enter the dispute on the side of the tenants to insure 
that the paragraph was enforced. Frank wired him for more details^ and 
ordered nis Litigations Section to look into the possibilities of inter- 
vening in order to remove the case to federal court. Cully Cobb 
learned of this action and assured Chester Davis that his section would 
not allow Norcross to withhold parity payments from his tenants for 
making trouble as he had threatened. He also said tnat the government 
could not intervene between Norcross and his tenants in court because 
the cotton contracts gave the government a concern only in matters 
between itself and landlords or tenants, not in landlord-tenant dis-
Âppleby, Memo to Mr. Cobb, December 27, 193̂ , NA, RG l4$.
h
Appleby, Mémo to Mr. Byrd, December 28, 193^J and accompanying 
endorsement, NA, RG 1̂ 3.
5Carpenter to Frank, January 11, 1935, NA, RG 1̂ 5.
6A. M. Wilding-White, Memo to Mr. Abt, January 17, 1935, NA, RG
145.
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7putes. Strangely enough, after some painful legal machinations, the
ÛLitigations Section reached much the same conclusion.
Also about this time, the delegation from the SIFU arrived in 
Washington. Members talked to Henry Wallace, who promised to investi­
gate conditions in Arkansas. A mass meeting of sharecroppers in Marked 
Tree gathered to hear the report of the delegation when it returned to
Arkansas, and after a near-riot, Ward Rodgers was arrested for anarciiy 
9and blasphemy.
Union members in eastern Arkansas were in an ugly mood over the 
arrest of Rodgers; H. L. Mitchell and William'Amberson wired collect to 
AAA that it was imperative for a government investigator to come to 
Arkansas immediately if bloodshed and class war were to be avoided.
Since sentiment was already growing in the AAA for an impartial investi­
gation of matters in Arkansas, Assistant Administrator Byrd recommended 
that an unbiased report be made immediately by someone "other than the 
Cotton Section." Byrd felt that if a lawyer from the Legal Division 
were sent it would do much to stop evictions by l a n d l o r d s . I n  addition, 
Harry Hopkins, Administrator of FERA, requested Jerome Frank to send a
lawyer to look into the arrest of Ward Rodgers since he was an FERA
12employee and the agency had no legal staff.
^A. M. Wilding-White, Memo to Mr. Abt, January 17, 1935; HA, RG
145.
9For a full account of these events, see Chapter IX.
RG 145.
11.
^*^Mitchell and Amberson to AAA (Telegram), January lo, 1935; NA,
Byrd, Memo to Paul Appleby, January 9; 1935; NA, RG 145. 
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When Wallace and Davis had approved sending an investigator to 
Arkansas, Byrd recommended red-haired Mary Connor Myers, a Boston lawyer 
who had just come to AAA at the request of Henry W a l l a c e . 3̂ Mrs. %ers 
had an excellent record as an attorney and was one of the few lawyers 
in the Legal Division with a truly conservative background. Perhaps 
both these factors played a part in Byrd's choice. Jerome Frank in­
structed Mrs. %ers to go to Arkansas "for the purpose of making an 
investigation concerning the eviction of sharecroppers from the Fairview 
Farms Company farms at Tyronza, and to determine whether suit should be 
brought in the Federal court under paragraph 7 • • • •" Frank also told 
her to look into the case being brouglit against Norcross by his former 
tenants in state court, and the case of Ward Rodgers. Frank said there
should be no publicity and Mrs. Myers was to make no statements to the 
ll+press.
Before leaving, Mrs. %ers called on Cully Cobb to see if he had 
any instructions. ' Cobb knew little about Mrs. %ers, only that "she 
knew nothing about agriculture." He suspected she was one of the radi­
cals of the Legal Division; so he told her that he was not sending her 
to Arkansas and therefore had no instructions
Chester Davis ordered Mrs. %ers to find out how many tenants 
Hiram Norcross had in 1933 and 193̂ , how much acreage in cotton there 
was each year, how many new houses there were, how many non-union mem­
bers had been evicted, how many members of the tenants' union were
^^Time, March 5; 1935-
^̂ Mary Connor Myers to author, October 6, 1959, P- 2.
^ Ĉobb to author, October 6, 1959, P* 8.
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When Mary Connor %ers arrived in Arkansas she found it impos­
sible to avoid publicity. The trial of Ward Rodgers had attracted
reporters from all over the country, and they found her presence in
Arkansas made good copy. She wired Frank that she was going to explain 
her mission because the reporters were talking to "union and Socialist" 
officers and she felt it better for her to explain what she was doing 
in Arkansas than for them to.^̂  Accordingly, the next day the Memphis 
Press-Scimitar announced that Mrs. Myers had come to Arkansas to inves­
tigate charges of violations of cotton contracts. It called her a 
"fearless and most thorough investigator" and said if she found any 
fire where there was so much smoke. Secretary Wallace would "put it 
out.
For several days Mrs. %ers talked to hundreds of sharecroppers, 
took eighty or ninety affidavits, and was constantly amazed that so 
many croppers came to see her despite the icy weather. It apparently 
never occurred to her that H. L. Mitchell, her guide on her tour of 
the plantation area, was responsible for the sharecroppers' gathering. 9̂
On January l8, Mrs. %ers wired Jerome Frank that she was hear­
ing "one long story [ o ^  human greed" and that paragraph 7 was only one 
part of the cotton contract which was being "openly and generally vio­
lated." She confided to Frank that the sharecroppers she talked to
^^%ers. Memo to Mr. Davis, February 13, 1935, NA., RG 1̂ 5.
^^^%ers to Frank (Telegram), January 20, 1935, NA, RG 1̂ 5.
1 AMemphis Press-Scimltar, January 21, 1935*
^^Mary Connor Myers to author, October 6, 1959, P- 2.
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were of a "much higher class" than she had expected and that all of ■
them were "pathetically pleased" that the government sent someone to 
20listen to them. Reports hinting at Mrs. Jfyers ' findings began to
appear in newspapers, and this caused great worry to Frank, Byrd, and
21Appleby, who did not want such matters publicized.
When she checked the Norcross plantation according to Chester
Davis' instructions, Mrs. Myers confirmed the earlier reports that
Norcross had more tenants in 193̂  than a year before, even though his
acreage was considerably less. She saw three new tenant houses but was
told there were ten. She asked Mitchell how many union members were
still on the plantation, and, although he said about forty, she could
find only five or six who would admit it. And they were reluctant to
22talk. Mrs. Ifyers found that no non-union members had.been evicted.
Mrs. Myers did not report her findings concerning Norcross 
until she returned to Washington. Before then, however, a letter 
arrived in the AAA offices from Norcross explaining his side of things. 
Norcross claimed that he told E. A. Miller during the investigation of 
his plantation that he would withdraw his contract if it infringed on 
his power to evict tenants. According to Norcross, Miller told him 
that paragraph 7 required a planter to keep only the same number of 
tenants, not the identical tenants. Norcross also claimed he expressed 
concern to Miller that the paragraph required landlords to allow tenants 
to live in their houses rent free. By Norcross' account, Miller ex-
20%ers to Frank (Telegram), January l8, 1935, NA, RG 14$.
^̂ Frank, Ifemo to Paul Porter, February 2, 1935, NA, RG l4$; and 
Frank, Memo to Alfred Stedman, January 30, 1935, NA, RG 145-
^̂ Myers, Memo to Mr. Davis, February 13, 1935, NA, RG 14$.
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plained this meant only those houses which the landlord could not fill 
with working tenants. Later, because of the agitation of his share­
croppers by the STFU, Norcross wrote to Poinsett County Agent R. L.
McGill to ask if he could evict certain undesirable tenants for union 
activities. McGill told him the government's only concern was that he 
keep the same number of tenants. In his letter to AAA, Norcross pointed 
out that every house on his plantation was occupied and he had built 
eleven new ones. He claimed he had paid all evicted croppers their part 
of the parity payment although he had not yet received his, and he said 
he was willing to abide by all AAA rulings and would welcome an investi-
23gation of his plantation.
When Norcross' letter reached the desk of Jerome Frank, it caused 
a major explosion, for it was from reading the letter that Frank first 
learned that the Cotton Section was telling landlords they did not have
piito maintain the same tenants, only the same number. Frank talked to 
E. A. Miller to determine if Miller nad. actually given Norcross that 
interpretation. Miller said he could not remember what he told Norcross, 
but it was entirely possible he had given the interpretation because it 
was the one being used by the Cotton Section.
Frank now went into high gear. Chester Davis was out of town, 
so he notified Assistant Administrator Byrd that the Cotton Section had 
apparently been making legal opinions and that his Opinions Section was 
preparing a new interpretation of paragraph 7* He also persuaded Byrd
^%orcross to Appleby, January 5, 1935̂  HA, RG IL5 .
2kFrank, Memo to Mr. Byrd, January 12, 1935, NA, RG IL5.
^̂ Frank, Memo to Mr. Byrd, January l4, 1935, NA, RG 1̂ 5.
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to send out a telegram to AAA officials in Arkansas saying that the 
Norcross case was now before the Secretary and instructing them to make 
no statements and take no action which might be considered an interpre­
tation of the paragraph.Then Freink drafted a memorandum to Cully Cobb 
for Acting Administrator Christgau's signature ordering Cobb in the
future to submit all legal questions to the Legal Division before send-
27ing out information on them to the public, or to county agents. ' Frank
next put his Opinions Section to work on the question of whether the
p RCotton Section's interpretation was legally binding. The Opinions 
Section ruled it was not. Meanwnile, Alger Hiss had worked up an opin­
ion, concurred in by Frank, that membership in the tenants' union did 
not make tenants a menace or nuisance within the meaning of paragraph 7- 
Consequently, the Legal Division prepared to take legal action against 
Norcross
At the same time, the Opinions Section was busy on the most
important opinion, the re-interprétâtion of paragraph 7* Telford Taylor,
a lawyer in the section, had charge of the research and drafting of the
opinion, with Francis Shea, the Chief of the section, and his immediate
superior, Alger Hiss, participating in the substance and even the lan-
30guage of the draft. The opinion, when it was finally finished in 
early February, was thirty-six pages long; it attempted by the use of
^̂ Frank, Memo to Mr. Byrd, and attached telegram, January l4, 
1935, NA, RG 1̂ 5.
^̂ christgau. Memo to Mr. Cobb, January lU, 1935, NA, RG l4$.
p8Frank, Memo to Mr. Shea, January li+, 1935, NA, RG 1̂4-5•
^̂ Frank, Memo to Mr. Byrd, January 12, 1935, NA, RG l4$.
30.Hiss to author, September 17, 19̂ 0.
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strictly legal devices to settle the outstanding questions concerning 
tenancy. The most important of these was, of course, evictions. The 
opinion came to the conclusion that a landlord was required to keep the 
identical tenants, provided they were willing to remain and did not 
become nuisances or menaces. If a tenant left or was rightfully re­
placed, the landlord was required to replace him with a person of equal 
status "if possible." The opinion declared that the Cotton Section's 
interpretation had not been a "sound construction of paragraph 7■" It 
readily admitted that the phrase in paragraph 7 requiring the landlord 
to maintain "the normal number of tenants and other employees" contained 
no express requirement of identity or continuity of personnel from year 
to year; however, these words should be read in context. Landlords 
were required elsewhere in the paragraph to permit all tenants to occupy 
their houses rent free and to carry out the acreage reduction with the 
"least possible amount of labor, economic, and social disturbance." 
Discharging tenants at the end of 193̂ , according to the opinion, vio­
lated both these requirements.
Another argument offered by the Opinions Section was that land­
lords needed to keep the same tenants in order to have a prior standard 
to use in making the acreage reduction among tenants "as nearly ratable 
as practicable" as the contract specified. Also, since landlords were 
forbidden to reduce the status of a tenant or deprive him of any right 
to which his status before the signing of the contract would entitle 
him, the opinion reasoned that the same tenant must be retained after 
the signing of the contract; otherwise, a landlord could reduce the 
status of a tenant, hire another to take his place, and not have to 
divide parity payments with either tenant. Nor would this procedure
20k
violate the req.uirement to keep the same number of ' tenants.
One feature of paragraph 7 posed a threat to re-interpfetation. 
Certain rights in the paragraph were granted to tenants "and other 
■workers"; other privileges were given only to tenants. Only tenants 
had the right to occupy houses rent free during the contract period. 
Obviously, it was imperative that sharecroppers be considered as ten­
ants, or else the strongest argument for their tenure on an individual 
basis would be destroyed.- The opinion went to great .lengths with legal 
arguments to establish that croppers were tenants. Finally, it stated 
flatly, "... the status of a share-tenant and a share-cropper is pre­
cisely the same, except that the tenant receives a larger percentage of 
the crop and must provide his o-wn work stock and equipment. "3̂
While all the feverish activity was taking place in the Legal 
Division concerning Norcross, Margaret Bennett called a special meeting 
of the Committee on Violations to consider a complaint received from
eleven of Norcross' tenants who, they said, had been evicted solely for 
32union membership. When Miss Bennett presented a proposal that land­
lords should be allowed to evict tenants only if they were nuisances 
or menaces. Miller and Hudson voted it down. The two then wrote a 
committee report to the Secretary saying that if the Legal Division 
attempted to re-interpret paragraph 7 to require landlords to keep the 
same tenants, it would constitute an "interference with the contractural 
relationship existing between landlords and tenants." They argued that
^^Shea to McConnaughey, February 4, 1935, NA., RG l4$.
^ P̂etition of Eleven Sharecroppers to H. A. Wallace, December 12, 
1934, NA, RG 145.
^̂ Bennett, Memo to Mr. Frank, January 10, 1935, NA, RG 145.
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the purpose of paragraph 7 was to require landlords to provide houses 
and fuel for tenants without charge as an offset to the fact that land­
lords got the lion's share of government benefits. They said the para­
graph was not intended to force landlords to take care of tenants for 
whom they had no use. Miller and Hudson recommended that the Secretary 
not attempt to enforce the Legal Division's re-interpretation of para­
graph 7 because it would-be "inadvisable administratively" and not in 
keeping with "public policy." Margaret Bennett did not sign the report, 
saying she would write a dissenting opinion. Cully Cobb and the Comp­
troller, John Payne, approved the report, but Jerome Frank would not sign
it.3"
In her separate report. Miss Bennett argued that if the majority 
position were sustained, AAA would have no legal power to prevent evic­
tions . She boiled the problem down to an administrative question of 
whether AAA should assert its legal rights or make no effort to obtain 
compliance with the contract. She said that Norcross' tenants had organ­
ized merely to protect their rights, pointing out that the National 
Industrial Recovery Act and other recent legislation guaranteed the 
right of workers to organize. She recommended that Norcross be forced 
to restore his tenants, saying no action would do more to stop the 
"rising tide of criticism" against AAA.^^
In explaining why he had not approved the majority report of 
the Violations Committee, Jerome Frank told Secretary Wallace that 
Miller and Hudson based their arguments on what was the intent of those
qIlCommittee on Violations, Memo to the Secretary, January 10, 
193$, NA, RG 14$.
^̂ Bennett, Memo to the Secretary, January 12, 1935; NA, RG l4$.
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who wrote paragraph 7- The established principle of law, he said, was 
to ignore the subjective intent of those writing a law or contract and ' 
judge it solely on the wording. He complained that the Cotton Section, 
through Miller, had made a legal opinion in the majority report of the 
Violations Committee and that legal opinions were the job of the Legal 
Division. Frank acknowledged Margaret Bennett's recommendations but 
said he preferred not to suggest a policy in this matter. Final deci­
sion, he felt, would have to come from Administrator Davis and Secretary 
Wallace.
When Chester Davis returned from his western field trip, he 
found his agency split down the middle over the Norcross Case and the 
fundamental issues involved. He was also greeted with hundreds of 
wires and letters from landlords. Chambers of Commerce, cotton growers 
associations, and county agents clamoring for him to stop the threatened 
re-interpretation of paragraph One such letter, from nineteen
county agents in northeastern Arkansas pointed out that all the commit­
teemen in their area had told the landlords that they need keep only 
the normal number of tenants and that to change now would cause "the 
greatest embarrassment," possible withdrawal of many contracts, and 
"endless litigation
On February 5, Frank forwarded the legal opinion re-interpreting 
paragraph 7 to Davis. It was signed by Francis Shea and approved by
3̂ Frank, Memo to the Secretary, January 12, 1935  ̂NA, RG l4$.
Calvin B. Hoover, Memo to the Secretary, February $, 1935,
NA, RG Ik^.
3^Nineteen County Agents to Chester Davis, January 26, 1935,
NA, RG 145.
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•5QFrank, and Alger Hiss. Along vith it, Frank sent a memorandum from 
Hiss which affirmed that paragraph 7 required landlords to keep the same 
tenants but suggested it would be "difficult in most instances" to 
enforce. He foresaw that the government would have trouble proving 
unwarranted evictions in court because landlords could claim the evicted
Uotenants had become menaces or nuisances.
Davis decided to go to Wallace with the matter. He asked the 
Secretary to secure from "whatever agencies you deem appropriate" a 
legal opinion on the question of whether paragraph 7 required landlords 
to keep the same tenants or the normal number in 1935- He asserted that 
this question had been discussed at length during the writing and ap­
proval of the 193^-35 contract and that all concerned agreed that the 
purpose of paragraph 7 was to prevent the acreage reduction from cutting 
loose large numbers of tenants in 193̂ - Also, if normal arrangements 
were not renewed in 1935, it was agreed that the paragraph would allow 
former tenants to remain in their houses rent free and to have the use 
of the rented acres for subsistence purposes. Davis stated that the 
Legal Division gave no "intimation" at the time of an interpretation 
contrary to this. He pointed out to Wallace that since that time both 
he and the Secretary had declared in official publications that landlords 
were required to keep only the normal number of tenants and that the 
same interpretation was found in the report of Calvin Hoover.
^̂ Frank, Memo to Chester Davis, February 1935, HA, RG 1̂ 5*
^̂ Hiss, Memo to Mr. Frank, January 26, 1935, HA, RG 14$.
^̂ Davis, Memo to the Secretary, February 7, 1935, HA, RG l4$. 
Davis was correct in citing these instances. However, Jerome Frank 
managed to convince Hoover that he had been wrong in the interpretation. 
Hoover, Memo to Secretary, January 9, 1935, HA, RG IU5.
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The chips were now down. Wallace knew that if he upheld the 
new interpretation of paragraph "J, Davis, Johnston, most of the Cotton 
Section including Cobb, and many other agrarians in AAA would probably 
resign thus leaving AAA with a void of experienced men to administer 
the cotton program. Nor were the urban liberals qualified to take 
their places. Also, Wallace realized the outcry from the powerful 
landlords of the South would be unparalleled. Oscar Johnston warned 
that if the Secretary attempted to intervene in "private labor disputes" 
between landlords and tenants, it would be "absolutely fatal to the 
success of the cotton program" and "a serious political blunder.
He was probably right.
On the other hand, if Wallace backed Davis and the agrarians, 
one of the major functions of the Legal Division, that of giving legal 
opinions, would be undercut and some of the liberals mi^t resign in 
order to make the matter public. If that happened, it might add weiglit 
to the charges that AAA was unfair to tenants.
Wallace's natural inclinations were probably to back Jerome 
Frank and the liberals but his fear of repercussions among the Southern­
ers in Congress was overriding. "Of course," he wrote years later,
"^the liberal^ presented a strong case for the tenants but the reforms 
they wanted would have blown the department out of the water at that 
time." Wallace felt that if he stood by Frank, he would have to resign 
as Secretary and "make way for someone else who could get along better 
with the men from the South in Congress." But he knew this would be no 
solution since the next Secretary would only have to face the same
Johnston, Memo to Chester Davis, January 26, 1935, NA, RG 1̂ 5-
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problem. Therefore, Wallace decided to side vith Chester Davis because 
he thought the re-interpretation of paragraph 7 vas "bad lav and vould 
endanger the vhole agricultural program.
Davis sav the efforts of the Legal Division to guarantee the
tenure of tenants as only part of "deep and long-continued" differences
vhich vent "far beyond the questions of cotton tenancy." The thing
that angered Davis most vas that the liberals, "vith some help from the
outside office of the Secretary /Appleby/, sought to put over, during
my absence from the office, a dishonest legal opinion radically changing
the interpretation ... of the 193^-35 cotton contract . . . midvay
during its tvo year term." He felt the opinion vas dishonest because
the same men vho prepared and approved the re-interpretation sat through
the tough veek-after-veek sessions of preparing the contract in 1933
and approved it then vith "full understanding of the agreed meaning of
kkthe tenancy clauses.
After Wallace disapproved the proposed interpretation of para­
graph 7, Davis dismissed Jerome Frank, Francis Shea, Lee Pressman, and 
Gardner Jackson on February $, 1935* He forced Frederick Hove to resign 
as Consumers' Counsel but let him accept a position of less responsibil­
ity in the section. Davis vould have fired Paul Appleby if Appleby had 
been vorking in AAA rather than in the Secretary's o f f i c e . Those 
fired vere the ones vho had a part in vriting the re-interpretation of 
paragraph 7, plus Gardner Jackson, vho had/erossed Davis and Wallace
^^allace to author, June 13, 1959 
44.
45
|t liDavis to author, June 15, 1959-
Lord, The Wallaces of lova, p. 405-
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before as Assistant Consumers' Counsel. Davis also wanted to purge
Hiss, but Wallace would not agree. The reasons for this refusal remain
something of a mystery. Perhaps Hiss's memorandum which accompanied the
fatal legal opinion saved him. He resigned several weeks later, along
with Victor Christgau, but it was not clear whether they resigned vol-
16untarily or were forced out. Years later Hiss stated that his resigna­
tion was neither "asked for or suggested" and was based solely on an 
inability to continue his duties with AAA because of nis work with the 
Senate Munitions Committee. Hiss had been on loan to the Committee for
several months and had been dividing his time between the Committee and 
iyAAA. Jerome Frank and Gardner Jackson thought Hiss should have resigned 
the day they were fired, and years later they refused to come to his aid 
for this reason when he was accused of espionage.According to Hiss, 
he offered his resignation orally to Davis shortly before the purge 
when Davis told him the re-interpretation of paragraph 7 was not intel­
lectually honest. When Davis apologized for this remark. Hiss withdrew 
l9his resignation. The only explanation for the absence of Margaret 
Bennett from the list of those purged is that, although she was probably 
the most outspoken champion of tenants' rights, she had no part in writ­
ing the re-interpretation of paragraph 7 and was not influential in 
policy matters.
16Hew York Times, February 7; 1935, P- 2, and February 21, 1935,
p. 1.
l7Hiss to author, December 28, 1961.
Gardner Jackson, Interview with author, July 28, 1959- 
^^Hiss to author, December 28, 1961.
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Late in the day of the dismissals, Wallace sent word that he 
would see two of the liberals. Frank and Hiss went to the Secretary's 
office. Wallace greeted them as "the best fighters in a good cause" 
with whom he had ever worked, but added that he would have to confirm 
the dismissals. Frank asked Wallace why he had not talked it over with 
the liberals beforehand, rather than letting Chester Davis swing the 
axe. Wallace replied that he just could not face them.^^
Within a few days, Wallace sent a telegram to the Memphis Chamber
of Commerce, one of the groups which had protested the re-interpretation 
of paragraph J. It said: "Section seven of cotton contract does not 
bind landowners to keep the same tenants. That is the official and 
final interpretation of the Solicitor of the Department of Agriculture 
and no other interpretation will be given." Wallace explained that 
landowners would be expected not to reduce the number of their tenants 
but individual tenants would be no more secure in their tenure than they 
would be without the cotton contract. No attempt would be made to 
supervise the customary arrangements between landowners and tenants, he 
said, but compliance with the spirit of paragraph 7 would be expected.
The contents of the telegram were released to the press.
On the day after the dismissals, Chester Davis and Henry Wallace 
stood shoulder-to-shoulder at a press conference before a hundred report­
ers, some of them openly hostile. The questions of the newsmen were 
barbed, a few of them planted. Was Hiss to go? No, said both Davis
^^Gardner Jackson, "Henry Wallace: A Divided Mind," Atlantic 
Monthly, CLXXXII (August, 19̂ 8), 28.
allace to Memphis Chamber of Commerce (Telegram), February 12, 
1935, NA, RG 145.
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and Wallace.' What about Tugwell? He would continue his duties.One 
reporter reminded Wallace that "right winger" George Peek had walked 
the plank last year and now the left wingers were being ousted. Which 
way was AAA. going, he asked. Wallace, indulging in his weakness for 
mixed metaphors, replied, "You can't have the ship listing right and 
then left. It must go straight along. Straight down the middle of the 
road. "■
Wallace said the liberals were being dismissed "for the greatest 
possible harmony" in AAA, and that he and Davis had first discussed the 
matter in December. He also expressed the view that it was important 
to have the key positions in AAA filled with men who had an agricultural 
background. For his part, Davis attributed the shake-up to "mounting 
difficulty in getting things done." The two executives also announced 
that Calvin Hoover would take over as Consumers' Counsel and that the 
agency would become chiefly a statistical service. 3̂
The re-interpretation of paragraph 7 was not mentioned at the 
press conference. Naturally, Wallace and Davis did not want the purge 
put in that light, since it would meike them look pro-landlord. And 
certainly, there was much more involved than this one issue. Some of 
the liberals, ho'wever, chose to raise it. Gardner Jackson, now fighting 
mad, arranged to have a March of Time film made of tenant union activ­
ities in Arkansas, and when he appeared in the film he stated in a 
booming voice that Jerome Frank and the others were purged because they
52Lord, The Wallaces of Iowa, p. 40?.
53New York Times, February 7, 1935, p. 2.
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tried to help the sharecroppers.^^
Jackson's friend, Marquis Childs, reported in the St. Louis 
Post Dispatch that the blow-up in AAA was the result of a dispute over 
paragraph 7 and quoted Jackson as saying, "I don't blame Chester Davis 
. . . for what he did. He was under great pressure from the planters.
During the weeks that followed the purge, rumors persisted that 
Tugwell would resign. On February 22 he announced he would stay, and 
reporters assumed it was out of loyalty to the President.Jerome 
Frank accepted a position as Assistant Railroad Counsel for the Recon­
struction Finance Corporation, and most of the other purgees moved 
into good jobs with other government agencies. This turn of events may
explain Tugwell's failure to resign. However, there were also rumors
that some of the purgees felt Tugwell had not given them the support
58they deserved or expected.^
The press reaction to the purge in AAA was mixed. The New York 
Times wondered why such a peaceful pursuit as agriculture was so plagued 
by discord. It saw the purge as the beginning of the end of the Brain 
Trust. "The millenium-rushers have been rushed," it commented. The 
Times felt that what had happened in AAA was a victory of the bureau­
crats over the idealists, and now all would go smoothly in the agency--
^̂ March of Time, "Trouble in the Cotton Country," 1938, National
Archives.
55St. Louis Post Dispatch, January 3I, 1938. 
^̂ New York Times, February 21, 1935; P- 1- 
^̂ Ibid., February 22, 1935; p.
^^Ibid., February 9, 1935; p. 2 9.
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59until the next reorganization.
Raymond Gram Swing in Nation viewed the dismissals as the defeat 
of the social outlook in agricultural policy. He said Chester Davis was 
a man dealing vith realities, feeling his way between the interests of 
the agricultural producers and distributors, making concessions here and 
there to get things done, and satisfied with half-measures because they 
seemed aimed in the right direction. But Davis had found the Consumers' 
Counsel and Legal Division telling him that he was giving away funda­
mental principle. They fought with him, delayed his actions, and went 
past him to the Secretary until he would tolerate it no longer. Wal­
lace, Swing said, sided with Davis because of the Administrator's power­
ful friends in agriculture. Swing saw the appointment of Calvin Hoover 
as Consumers' Counsel and the fact that Tugwell had been put on the AAA 
advisory board as evidence that "some of the damage of the purge" had 
been repaired, but generally he felt the cause of the small farmer and
consumer in AAA had been sacrificed for the sake of the special inter-
, 60 ests.
Newsweek thought the purge was an attempt by Davis and Wallace
to achieve a frictionless, smooth-running operation. The obstreperous
liberals in the AAA had balked at coordinated action, affronted powerful
middlemen, and agitated for strict Federal control of processors ' and
6lwholesalers' profits. Thus, they had to go. Time cited the firings 
^̂ Ibid., February 7, 1935; P* l8.
^Raymond Gram Swing, "The Purge at the AAA," Nation, CXL (Feb­
ruary 20, 1935); 216-217.
■̂'‘Newsweek, January 16, 1935; P- 7-
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in AAA as the most striking of several signs that the New Deal had taken 
a turn away from reform and toward recovery. The magazine remarked that 
"with Franklin Roosevelt's consent the biggest single bevy of Brain 
Trusters in the administration had been quietly but firmly turned out 
as trouble makers.
Years later, Henry Wallace, recalling the purge, remarked, "The 
fake liberals have always criticised me for what I did in February of 
1935. I have never regretted it although I had considerable personal 
affection for both Jerome Fraiik and Pat Jackson." Wallace felt that the 
liberals had been too much concerned with "social reform by publicity" 
when social reform through Congress had to be approached another way.
He admitted that he admired Rexford Tugwell and believed in his ideals, 
but Tugwell had "moved too far too fast." It was up to Wallace to be 
around to "pick up the pieces!' when Tugwell left the government later. 
"Every man has to fight for social justice in his own way," said Wallace. 
"I do not criticise either Chester or Frank but between them they surely 
loaded a gun which went off with a bang.
It is difficult to separate the heroes and the villains of the 
purge in AAA. It would be easy enough to side with the liberals, whose 
intentions were undeniably worthy, but this would mean disregarding the 
legitimate arguments of the agrarians. Cully Cobb and the men of the 
Cotton Section were primarily concerned with getting the job done. They 
had to deal directly with over a million cotton farmers, and they wanted 
no changes which would further complicate matters. Their attitude was
^̂ Tlme, February 18, 1935; P- 1̂ «
^̂ Wallace to author, June 13; 1959-
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that tenants should receive the rightful share of government benefits, 
but it was not worth endangering the entire cotton program to accomplish 
this goal. Cobb and the others were pro-landlord out not anti-tenant 
unless there was a conflict of interests between the two. Their position 
sustaining the right of landlords to evict tenants may have been cruel, 
but it was practical. Few Southern landlords were ready to let the 
government dictate to them about the firing of unwanted tenants.
In early 1935; after the cotton contract had been in force for 
a year, it would have been disastrous to AAA's program to reverse the 
existing policy and require landlords to keep the identical tenants, 
and yet to continue the existing policy meant more evictions and hard­
ships for thousands of sharecroppers. How had matters reached this 
unpleasant dilemma? The tenant policies of the cotton program had been 
ill conceived in the first place, but once they were in effect it was 
next to impossible to change them materially. The time for the Legal 
Division to protect tenant rights was in the writing of the cotton 
contract, but the liberals missed that opportunity because of their 
ignorance of tenant problems.
When the complaints of tenants first began to reach AAA, the 
agrarians of the Cotton Section took refuge in the cotton contract, 
saying all they could to was enforce it and thus placing great impor­
tance on the exact wording of the agreement. For nearly a year, the 
Legal Division attempted to obtain justice for tenants through the 
various tenant committees within AAA, by the creation of a new committee 
outside the control of the Cotton Section, and by getting a clear state­
ment of tenant policy. When all of these efforts were blocked by the
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Cotton Section, Frank and the others decided to fight on the ground 
chosen by their enemies— the actual wording of the contract. Frank 
ordered a legal re-interpretation of paragraph 'J, and the document 
prepared by the Opinions Section was no more than a brief designed to 
justify the General Counsel's previous decision to guarantee tenants' 
rights to stay on the land. But Frank's strategy was unwise and imprac­
tical in view of the fact that a different policy had been in effect 
for a year. If he had not known about it before, it was his own fault 
for not keeping up with what the Cotton Section, the Administrator, and 
the Secretary had been saying in official publications throughout 193̂ * 
Chester Davis and Henry Wallace cannot be blamed for their 
actions in the purge. No other course was open to them except their own 
resignations. They nad to achieve peace in AAA, and the only way to do 
it was to remove the disturbing element--the liberals. In the final 
analysis, there were no real heroes in the battle, not even D. P. Trent, 
who threw in the towel while there was still hope. However, it is much 
easier to excuse the liberals for their brashness, ignorance of agri­
culture, delay in acting, faulty strategy, and compassion for suffering 
tenant farmers than it is to forgive the agrarians for their close­
mindedness, refusal to tolerate interference with their programs, pro­
landlord bias, and hard-heartedness toward tenants.
CHAPTER IX 
THE REIGN OF TERROR
There is a reign of terror in the cotton country of eastern 
Arkansas. It will end either in tne establishment of complete 
and slavish submission to the vilest exploitation in America or 
in bloodshed, or in both. For the sake of peace, liberty and 
common human decency 1 appeal to you who listen to my voice to 
bring immediate pressure upon the Federal Government to act.
— Norman Thomas on the NBC Radio Network
The weeks of the upheaval and purge in AAA were also the weeks 
of a reign of terror in eastern Arkansas. It started when the delega­
tion of the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union returned from Washington in 
mid-January, 1935• The desperate sharecroppers had high hopes that 
the mission would cause the government to recognize their plight and do 
something about it. Many of the croppers had contributed their last 
few pennies to send the four delegates to the capitol, and they waited 
anxiously for their return. When the day came. Ward Rodgers called a 
meeting of the entire union at Marked Tree to hear their report. Share­
croppers began arriving soon after dawn. They came from all over north­
eastern Arkansas and crowded into the small town. They climbed on roof 
tops and perched in trees and on the tops of trucks, boxcars, and wagons. 
There were almost five thousand of them. They waited for hours, but 
the delegation did not arrive. Several times the people on the speakers 
stand asked the crowd if Mr. Mitchell or Mr. McKinney, Negro vice­
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president of the union, had arrived yet. For most of the people pres­
ent it vas.the first time they had ever heard a Negro addressed as 
"mister.
When the crowd grew restless, Ward Rodgers decided to make a 
speech to kill time. Rodgers was a forceful speaker, and now he was 
just plain angry. The night before he had been questioned by a group 
of planters who resented his teaching sharecroppers to read and "figure" 
in his capacity as an FERA instructor. Perhaps the planters also ob­
jected to Rodgers' explaining the advantages of the union and Marxism,
2since he was doing that also. The planters told Rodgers to report to 
the Marked Tree Superintendent of School the next day. Rodgers went, 
and the Superintendent advised him to go back to western Arkansas or he 
might be found dead some morning. When Rodgers asked if that was a Ku 
KLux Klan order, the Superintendent told him he could call it what he 
wanted to.
As Rodgers addressed the crowd of sharecroppers, his big voice 
boomed out through the sunny January air. He spoke at length of the 
many injustices to sharecroppers. The crowd moved in closer; this was 
the kind of talk they nad come to hear. Rodgers warmed to his subject,3 
and while he orated, the four delegates arrived from Washington. They 
mounted the platform, but the young preacher did not stop. He told of 
threats against the lives of union organizers. Then he roaxed, "Well, 
that is a game two can play. If necessary, I could lead the sharecrop-
K̂ester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, p. 69.
2
Time, March k, 1935, P- 1̂ -
K̂ester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, pp. 67-68.
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pers to lynch every planter in Poinsett County.'"̂  The audience, vhich 
had grown more and more excited as Rodgers spoke, became suddenly still. 
Then with a great shout they threw their hats into the air and began to 
dance around embracing each other.̂  Some of the men began to yell,
"Let's go get 'em!"
This was much too unruly to suit H. L. Mitchell, who told Rodgers 
to sit down while he tried to pacify the crowd. Mitchell attempted to 
explain why Rodgers was so agitated, but as he spoke the thought of what 
had happened to Rodgers rna.de him more and more angry. Finally, he said, 
"Now Ward Rodgers is staying at my house. If anybody wants to chase 
him out of the country, that's where he is. And the first man that 
comes around my house with a pillow case over his head is just going 
to get hell shot out of him.
The report of the delegation, made by McKinney, was something 
of an anti-climax. Fred Stafford, Poinsett County Attorney, witnessed 
the whole affair from the edge of the crowd. When the meeting broke 
up, he arrested Rodgers as he left the platform for "anarchy, attempt­
ing to overthrow and usurp the Government of Arkansas, and blasphemy."^ 
After a long interrogation, Rodgers was jailed in Marked Tree. It was 
a small, brick building, and soon hundreds of sharecroppers surrounded 
it. They were in an ugly mood, and they talked about tearing the jail 
apart, brick by brick. Through the barred windows, Rodgers assured
^Time, March 4, 1935; P- 1̂ -
K̂ester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, p. 6 9.
M̂itchell, Oral History Interview, pp. 36-37*
K̂ester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, p. 69.
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them he was safer in jail than outside where the aroused planters could 
8get to him. Next day, Rodgers was moved from Marked Tree to the Poin­
sett County jail at Harrisburg. Then, local officials shifted him again 
to Jonesboro because they feared the sharecroppers would attempt to free 
him. At Jonesboro, a new charge was brought against him— "interfering 
with labor," but he was freed on bail.
Rodgers received a preliminary hearing in justice of the peace 
court at Marked Tree. County Attorney Fred Stafford brought the charges. 
By this time, the case was attracting national attention. It was news 
that a Methodist minister was charged with anarchy, barratry, and even 
blasphemy. Rodgers' picture appeared in newspapers as far away as New
York. Soon, the justice of the peace court ruled that Rodgers should
9go to trial in circuit court.
Immediately after Rodgers' arrest, Mitchell and Amberson wired
collect to AAA telling of the case and stating it was imperative that a
government investigator come to Arkansas immediately if the situation
10was to be controlled. Mary Connor Myers was already on her way to 
Arkansas, in keeping with Wallace's promise to the STFU leaders. She 
attended the day-long trial of Ward Rodgers and, according to a planter 
named W. R. Frazier, seemed "very interested in Mr. Rodgers' welfare.
The trial of Rodgers at Marked Tree was little more than a 
farce, and reporters from the metropolitan newspapers and national maga-
^Ibid., pp. 70-71-
%ew York Times, January 27, 1935, P- 12.
^^Mitchell and Amberson to AAA (Telegram), January l6, 1935, NA,
RG 145.
R. Frazier to Chester Davis, February l6, 1935, NA, RG 14-5 •
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zines reported it as such. Fred Stafford, the prosecuting attorney,
said Rodgers was a "foreign agitator" who had attempted to form a lynch
mob and was teaching the "niggers" to read and write. He charged that
Rodgers called Negroes "mister" and was from a Yankee school, Vanderbilt
University. Evidently, he did not know that Vanderbilt was in the
12neighboring state of Tennessee. Rodgers denied that he had' offered 
to lead a lynch mob, but admitted that he called a Negro "mister."̂ 3 A 
jury, described by one planter as "twelve good citizens, including two 
Share-croppers, three renters, one Undertaker, four merchants, and only 
two landlords,convicted Rodgers of anarchy. The judge sentenced 
him to six months in jail and a $500 fine. C. T. Carpenter, STFU attor­
ney, got him freed on bond pending an appeal which Norman Thomas and 
the League for Industrial Democracy promised to finance.
After the trial, Mary Connor Myers told Tyronza planter W. R. 
Frazier that she was not surprised at any verdict rendered in Marked 
Tree with the feeling running like it was.^^ Nation magazine commented 
that the issue in the Rodgers case was not anarchy but his activities 
in organizing the STFU. The magazine blamed the "eruption" on "what 
the AAA has done— and left undone— in connection with its reduction
program." It suggested that newspapers "in search of good dramatic 
_ _
Mitchell, Oral History Interview, pp. 37-^1j Time, March h, 
1935, P- l̂ j and New York Times, January 22, 1935, P- 12.
^^Memphis Commercial Appeal, January IT, 1935*
R. Frazier to Chester Davis, February l6, 1935, NA, RG 1̂ 5.
15New York Times, January 22, 1935, P- 12.
R. Frazier to Chester Davis, February l6, 1935, NA, RG 1̂ 5.
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American copy" dispatch a few reporters to Marked Tree.^^ The New York 
Times said the case might well become "another Scopes affair." However, 
the newspaper attributed part of Rodgers' difficulties to his public 
utterances and the fact that he was "an admitted adherent of commun-
18ism." The editor later received a letter saying that Rodgers was a
19Socialist and not a "communist."
Ward Rodgers' appeal was held over for three terms of court 
and never tried. Meanwhile, he remaihed free on bond. He lost his job 
with FERA after conviction, but he was never forced to serve his term. 
The conviction of Rodgers marked a turning point in the history of the 
STFU. This court action, and the suppression of the Mary Connor Myers 
report, brought national publicity to the sharecroppers' plight which
was followed by a nationwide surge of indignation. As a result of the
publicity, new organizers and workers, including a group from Common­
wealth College at Mena, Arkansas, came to help the union. The League
for Industrial Democracy offered aid, and money and clothing began to
onarrive from sympathetic people throughout the nation.
With the conviction of Rodgers the planters began a reign of 
terror in northeastern Arkansas which became a national disgrace. Per­
haps they feared the union would benefit from the publicity the case 
received, and probably the planters were angered at the interference of 
"outside agitators," including Northern journalists and government
'̂̂Nation, CXL (February 6, 1935); 1̂ 3-
^%ew York Times, January 27, 1935, section IV, p. 6.
^^Ibid., February 5, 1935, P- I8 .
20Mitchell, Oral History Interview, pp. 37 and Ll; Sharecrop­
per 's Voice, May, 1935-
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investigators. In any event, they formed a KLan-like organization 
called the "nightriders," and began systematically terrorizing members 
of the STFU.^^
The threat was so great to union officers that Mitchell and
others fled across the Mississippi River to Memphis, where they set up
22union headquarters. Those who ventured into the delta counties of 
Arkansas ran great risks. Lucien Koch, Director of Commonwealth College, 
and Bob Reed, a young communist student at the college, while holding a 
meeting near Gilmore, were attacked by a band of planters and deputies. 
Koch later wrote, "They brandished their revolvers and dragged me from 
the seat, and kicked me from the room." Outside, the violence contin­
ued: "They poked guns into our faces and bellies, they kicked us, punched 
us ... . We were both bloody about the face and head . . . .  Drunken 
deputies stood around and allowed it to go on."̂ 3 The assailants took 
Koch and Reed away in cars, and the sharecroppers in the meeting formed 
a rescue party. On the road, they found a rope with a neatly tied hang­
man's knot; however, the mob released Koch and Reed later without hang-
pli.ing them.
The next day the indefatigable Koch, with three other organizers 
including Rodgers, went to Lepanto to meet with sharecroppers. Consta­
ble Jay May arrested them for "obstructing the public streets, disturb­
ing the peace, and barratry." The Constable later told a reporter,
^^"Terror in Arkansas," Nation, CXL (February 13, 1935)̂  17̂ - 
22John Herling, "Field Notes From Arkansas," Nation, CXL (April 
10, 1935), 419-420.
^Nation, CXL (March 13, 1935), 294.
24Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, pp. 75-77•
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"They are liable to from $10.00 to $50.00 and as much as six months in
jail. They'll probably get the jail sentence because we are going to
put all we can on 'em." For the next few days, eighteen men guarded the
jail and adjacent streets at Lepanto for fear the sharecroppers would 
25try to break in. After three days, the organizers were tried, fined 
fifty dollars each, and released. They reported later they were kept in 
cells without adequate food or heat and with floors flooded with sewage 
and refuse.
Howard Kester and H. L. Mitchell also found in difficult to 
travel in the planter-dominated counties. Kester wrote Alfred Baker 
Lewis, Secretary of the Socialist Party in Boston, asking for aid, and 
Lewis offered to furnish an armored car so that they could drive to 
meetings. Mitchell thought an armored car would be open invitation for 
the planters to use dynamite, so he vetoed the idea.^? Even the union 
lawyer, C. T. Carpenter, was terrorized. By his own description, ". . . 
the landowners and their agents in an armed body came to my house the 
other night and probably would have taken me out and killed me had it 
not been for my good gun." When Carpenter came out of his house ready 
to fight, the mob fled into the night. One of them shot out the porch 
light to avoid identification. The lawyer, having heard that Rexford 
Tugwell was "close" to the President, wrote Tugwell describing the reign 
of terror and saying FDR should be told of it.^® Two months later,
25Memphis Press-Scimitar, February U, 1935•
^̂ Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, pp. 77-78-
^^Mitchell, Oral History Interview, p. 45-
PflCarpenter to Tugwell, April 5, 1935, NA, RG 1̂ 5.
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Tugwell replied asking for specific suggestions as to what the Adminis­
tration could do. Before he sent the letter he deleted a paragraph
saying the federal government had no right to interfere in police mat-
29ters within a state.
The reign of terror lasted two and one-half months. There is 
no complete record of all the brutality, but during a ten-day period 
in late March the following incidents occurred. A mob of about forty 
planters and riding bosses, led by the manager of a big plantation, a 
constable, and a deputy sheriff, attempted to lynch Reverend A. B. 
Brookins and then shot into his home with machine guns. W. H. Stultz, 
President of the STFU, received a letter signed with ten X's giving him 
twenty-four hours to get out of his home county. Next day, the night- 
riders abducted him to provoke him to some action which would give them 
an excuse to kill him. They told him to leave the county or they would 
shoot his brains out. Later, after the nightriders attempted to blow 
up his home, Stultz moved to Memphis.T. A. Allen, a Negro preacher 
and organizer of the union, was found shot through the heart and weighted 
with chains in the Coldwater River near Hernando, Mississippi. Sheriff 
Sid Campbell of Hernando admitted that Allen was "probably killed by 
some plantation o w n e r . M a r y  Green, wife of an organizer of the STFU
in Mississippi County, died of heart failure when nightriders came to
29Tugwell to Carpenter, June 7, 1935, NA, RG l4$.
"̂ Herling, "Field Notes From Arkansas," Nation, CXL (April 10,
1935), 419-420.
^̂ allas Morning News, March 23, 1935, P* 1*
3̂ San Antonio Express (Texas), March 30, 1935, P- 2.
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33her home to lynch her husband. Anangry mob drove Clay East and Mary
Hillyer, a union worker from New York, into the office of C. T. Car­
penter in Marked Tree. The Mayor saved them and had them escorted out 
of the county by armed men. One of them told East if he ever returned 
he would be shot on sight. John Allen, a union member, escaped a 
mob of riding bosses and deputies who were trying to lynch him. During 
the search for him, the mob beat up several Negroes who would not tell 
where he was. One woman received a blow which cut off her e a r . 35 A 
band of nightriders mobbed a group of Negro families returning from 
church near Marked Tree. They beat the men and women with pistols and 
flashlights, trampling the children under foot as they attacked.At 
Holly Grove, the nightriders burned the Colored Baptist Church to the
ground. 'The church was being used as a meeting place for the Holly
37Grove local of the STFU.
The planters also used less violent but equally effective means 
of combatting the union. On many plantations, they cancelled the con­
tracts of their sharecroppers and offered them work by the hour at less 
than subsistence wages. To the planters this had the double advantage 
of punishing union members and avoiding the division of parity payments 
with sharecroppers. However, lowering the status of tenants was not 
confined to Arkansas; planters were doing it all over the S o u t h . 3̂
^^ew York Times, March 22, 1935- 
^̂ Ifeiig)his Press-Scimitar, March 22, 1935*
^̂ Ibid., March 27, 1935.
^̂ New York Times, April l6, 1935; P* l8.
-̂ Sharecroppers' Voice, May, 1935•
3 K̂ester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, p. 35*
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During the height of the Reign of Terror, H. L. Mitchell wrote
AAA, "We are on.the edge of bloodshed, and these people ^he croppers/̂
will defend themselves if attacked. When that blood flows it will drip
down over your Department, from the Secretary at the top to the Cotton
Section at the bottom." Mitchell said AAA would be responsible for the
"incredibly folly of the whole reduction program, . . . the absolutely
inequitable contract which has borne so heavily upon these people, . . .
and the evasion and weakness which has marked your administration . . . .
Mitchell claimed that for nearly a year he had been sending AAA cases of
contract violations, but the agency usually did not even acknowledge 
%receipt.^
In response to a demand that he take action to guarantee the
rights to assemble and organize in Arkansas, Henry Wallace stated flatly
that ne had no jurisdiction in matters of that sort.^^ When the union
asked if the rented acres could be used temporarily to house evicted
hitenants, Wallace said no. The Second Annual Convention of the STFU 
condemned the "insane policy of economic scarcity" and demanded the
] i Orepeal of the Adjustment Act, but AAA took little notice.
So much correspondence was received by the AAA from the STFU 
that Paul Porter was given the unenviable task of corresponding with 
union officials and making recommendations to the Secretary. When the 
STFU learned of this, Mitchell wrote Porter to warn him that the Cotton
^^Mitchell to Paul Porter, March 27, 1935, NA, RG 14̂ .
*̂̂ Wallace to Prof. Paul Brissenden (Telegram), March 29, 1935,
NA, RG lk5.
^^Wallace to Mitchell (Telegram), February 7, 1935, NA, RG l4$.
12___STFU, Proceedings, Second Annual Convention, Resolution 19.
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Division, especially Cully Cobb, was prejudiced against the union, that 
Chester Davis vas wesik and vould not back him, and that county agents 
in the plantation areas could not be trusted because they were "abso­
lutely controlled by the planters.Porter was puzzled by this com­
pletely negative attitude, and he wrote asking what the union hoped to 
accomplish if they were sure the government would to nothing for them 
and the local administration was dominated by the landlords.When 
Mitchell sent a list of $00 evicted tenants, Porter wired back asking 
if the evicted tenants' houses had been filled by other tenants. Pro­
fessor Amberson wrote him angrily that this was a matter for AAA to
. 1+5 determine.
When Mitchell wired Mary Connor Myers asking for information on
what she had learned in Arkansas,*̂  Porter advised her not to answer.
A suggestion by Mrs. Myers that she turn over some information to Senator
Edward Costigan of Colorado so alarmed Assistant Solicitor J. P. Wenchel
1+7that he quashed the whole matter. '
To the sharecropper, the most feared action by tne planter, 
outside of violence, was eviction. Once he was cast off the plantation 
and his credit stopped at the commissary, the cropper had no means of 
support except federal relief, or the STFU. Very few sharecroppers 
could find a new landlord or any other sort of work. Howard Kester had
^^Mitchell to Porter, March 27, 1935, NA, RG l4$.
+5,
^^Porter to Amberson, April 2, 1935, NA, RG ll+5
Amberson to Porter, April 1+, 1935, NA, RG ll+$. 
47?
^^Mitchell to îfyers (Telegram), February 10, 1935, NA, RG l4$.
Porter, Memo to Mr. Wenchel, February 11, 1935, NA, RG l4$.
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charge of the union's relief work. He and his helpers distributed med­
ical supplies and services, clothing, and food to union members whç had 
been evicted or were in dire need. Sympathetic donors sent the union 
tons of used clothing and considerable amounts of money for the needy.
When a union family was evicted, the union staged demonstrations 
which were in keeping with the policy of passive resistance. When the 
sheriff and his deputies came to carry the family's possessions out of 
their shack, dozens of union members would stand watching and singing.
"We Shall Not Be Moved." When the sheriff left, they would carry the 
possessions back into the shack.
In a move to stop union meetings, many towns in nortneastern 
Arkansas passed ordinances prohibiting public gatherings. The one in 
Marked Tree was typical: . .it has been declared unlawful for any
person to make or deliver a public speech, on any street, alley, park 
or other public place within the corporate limits of Marked Tree. "5*̂
In most towns, the ordinances gave mayors the right to waive the ban.
The Mayor of Marked Tree told a New York Times reporter, "Anyone can 
speak except the radicals. I'd give permission to 'most anybody to 
hold a meeting so long as they haven't been mixed up with the union and 
have not been listed in the Red Net-Work Book."^^
^^Mitchell, Oral History Interview, p. k'ÿ, and Kester, Revolt 
Among the Sharecroppers, p. 35•
^̂ Mitchell, Oral History Interview, pp. 39-̂ 0-
^̂ New York Times, April 21, 1935, sec. II, p. 5-
^^Ibid. The "Red Net-Work Book" referred to by the Mayor was 
Red Network: A Who's Who and Handbook of Radicalism for Patriots, by Mrs. 
Elizabeth Billing (Milwaukee, 193̂ )* ÏT"ôôntaïnëd"lînZsT"ôF%SÔ organi­
zations and 1,300 people who were suspected by Mrs. Billing. Along with 
a few real radicals, it listed some extremely prominent people who had
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While terror reigned in the eastern part of the state, the
Arkansas Legislature passed a bill which was obviously aimed at the
STFU. The law made it a felony to possess five or more copies of any
labor union literature which was "seditious," or which "attacked" a
state official. The penalty was five to twenty years imprisonment.
The Memphis Commercial Appeal commented that this would make it a worse
crime to expose a grafter than to be one.
In March, 1935̂  the planters decided on a new strategy--they
would form a union of their own and lure away STFU members with promises
of jobs. Reverend Abner Sage, the Methodist minister at Marked Tree,
was the spokesman and executive secretary of the organization which
was called the "Marked Tree Cooperative Association." Sage once told a
New York Times reporter, ". . .it would have been better to have a
few no-account, shiftless people killed at the start than to have all
this fuss raised up. We have had a pretty serious situation here, what
with the mistering of the niggers and stirring tnem up to think the
53Government is going to give them forty acres."
Even at the height of the troubles in Arkansas, two intrepid 
British ladies came to speak to the sharecroppers. They were sponsored
worked at one time or another with any humanitarian group. New Republic 
recommended it to readers as a good guide to worthwhile organizations. 
New Republic, LXXIX (July 4, 193̂ ), 2l8. It was not unusual for South­
erners to think that any person who favored fair treatment for Negroes 
was a communist or Red agent. The Georgia Womans' World once told its 
readers that President and Mrs. Roosevelt were communists because they 
were courteous to Negroes. Arthur Raper, "The South Strains Toward 
Decency," North American Review, CCXLIII (Spring, 1937), 112.
^̂ Memphis Commercial Appeal, February 20, 1935- 
^%ew York Times, April l6, 1935, P- l8 .
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by the Socialist-dominated League for Industrial Democracy. One vas 
Jennie Lee, a former member of Parliament and later the wife of Aneurin 
Sevan, leader of tne British Labour Party. When the Mayor of Marked 
Tree forbade the union to assemble in town to hean Miss Lee, a crowd of 
more than 2,000 gathered two miles away on property owned by a member. 
After she spoke. Miss Lee and Howard Kester led the entire crowd march­
ing to town singing "We Shall Not Be Moved." They paraded past the 
Mayor’s office and into the union hall to continue their meeting. 5̂
The Association headed by Sage soon collapsed because the STFU was able 
to keep its members from J o i n i n g .  5 5  '
Naomi Mitchison, a well-known British writer and globe-trotter, 
also addressed a meeting in Marked Tree. She wrote in a British maga­
zine that about 300 people were there in the "drafty, dimly lit hall." 
She was struck by the beauty of the union singing, especially by the 
Negroes. The chairman, a man with a "terribly bashed face" and "most 
of his teeth missing," led earnestly in the Lord's Prayer. When she 
spoke. Miss Mitchison noted that if she used the word "slavery, " the 
audience "shivered and shifted."5° Later, after seeing some of the 
shacks of the sharecroppers, she told a Memphis reporter, "We in England 
wouldn't let animals live like these people are forced to live."5?
Perhaps the peak of the reign of terror was the famous "Birdsong
^̂ Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, pp. 78-79-
55Mitchell, Oral History Interview, p. 44.
^̂ Naomi Mitchison, "White House and Marked Tree," New Statesman 
and Nation, IX (April 27, 1935), 585-586.
57Memphis Press-Scimitar, February 19, 1935-
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Incident•" Norman Thomas' return to northeastern Arkansas was certain 
to bring trouble. The planters knew of his role in founding the STFU 
and were aware of his more recent activities. For instance, in February, 
1935, he had sent telegrams to President Roosevelt and Governor,J. Marion 
Futrell of Arkansas, the texts of which he released to the news services. 
The telegrams told of violations of civil rights in Arkansas and asked 
for remedial action. The wire to Roosevelt requested the President to 
provide tents and food for evicted tenants, and hold up further AAA pay­
ments until the situation was adjusted.Early in March, in an address 
over the NBC Radio Network, he said the exploitation of sharecroppers 
in the cotton country was leading to "the most wretched conditions" in 
America. He charged, "These sharecroppers and casual day laborers . . .
are the Forgotten Men of the New Deal. AAA has practically washed its
59hands of their problems."
In mid-March, Thomas came to Arkansas. After a long and fruit­
less interview with Governor Futrell, he began a tour of the cotton 
counties. He saw much suffering and many displaced tenants on the 
roads. STFU officials had invited him to speak at the small town of 
Birdsong, near Tyronza in Mississippi County. Thomas must have known 
of the personal dangers involved in speaking at a union meeting in the 
toughest of all the planter-dominated counties, but he accepted.^
In a Memphis hotel the day before he was scheduled to speak at 
Birdsong, Thomas was asked by a reporter if he was not dramatizing the
^̂ New York Herald Tribune, February 11, 1935•
59Time, March h, 1935, P- 1̂ *
^̂ Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, p. 8 0.
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situation in Arkansas. The Socialist leader jumped angrily to his feet 
and said, "Emphatically not! In the cotton fields are to be found the 
most stark lack of decent culture . . . anywhere." In answer to a 
charge by the pro-planter Memphis Commercial Appeal that he was an 
outsider, Thomas said some of the worst plantations were owned by "out­
side" corporations, and he added, "Whenever there is an evil so gross 
that it poisons and pollutes the body politic, nobody is an outside 
agitator.
On March 15, about 500 union members assembled to hear Thomas 
at Birdsong. Howard Kester was to introduce nim, but as he began,
"Ladies and Gentlemen, ---" he was interrupted by a rough voice which
said, "There ain't no ladies in the audience and tnere ain't no gentle­
men on the platform." About forty armed planters and riding bosses 
came forward and dragged Kester away. Thomas held up a copy of the 
Arkansas Constitution, which had an excellent bill of rights, and asked 
by whose authority the meeting was being broken up. One of the planters 
told him, 'We are the citizens of this county, and we run it to suit 
ourselves. We don't need no Gawd-damn Yankee bastard to tell us what 
to do with our niggers . . . .
Thomas spoke only a few words before being attacked from behind 
and dragged from the platform. During the scuffle, a riding boss clubbed 
a union official over the head. The county sheriff intervened and told 
Thomas to leave immediately or he could not be responsible for his
6lMemphis Commercial Appeal, March 15, 1935-
^̂ Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, pp. 8O-8I.
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safety. Thomas and his party allowed themselves to be shoved into 
their cars and then drove away. Several carloads of men followed them 
to make sure they left the county.
No small factor in the reign of terror was the national pub­
licity concerning it which called attention to tenant problems not only 
in Arkansas but throughout the South. Magazines such as Nation, New 
Republic, and Survey Graphic carried running accounts of the events in 
Arkansas and other parts of the South. Almost every issue of Nation 
mentioned some new incident, and the magazine openly solicited financial 
aid for the STFU. Probably more significant was the coverage given by 
the New York Times, Time magazine, the Scripps-Howrad newspaper chain, 
and the national press services. When such diverse media took notice of 
tenant troubles, the general public began to learn something of the 
situation and the matter became an embarrassment to the Administrator.
Time magazine reported in March, 1935  ̂that the plight of the 
sharecroppers "weighed heaviest" on the minds of Department of Agricul­
ture and AAA officials. The AAA, said Time, had received some T,000 
painfully scrawled letters from sharecroppers protesting the policies, 
and even as impartial an observer as the Federal Drought Relief Director
in Arkansas reported "wholesale unloading" of tenants by landlords onto 
6kthe relief rolls.
Hugh Russell Fraser, a feature writer for the Scripps-Howard 
chain, did a lengthy series on the sharecropper problem after a tour 
through the South. Having seen'thousands" of displaced croppers, he
Ibid.; and Norman Thomas to author, June 6, 1960.
6kTime, March 5, 1935, P- ik.
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wrote, "Along the highways and byways of Dixie they straggle--lonely „ 
figures without money, without homes, and without hope." He called 
the problem "one of the greatest and most far-reaching challenges to 
the whole New Deal program.
When three members of the STFU visited Norman Thomas in New 
York City in February, 1935, it caused quite a stir in the metropolitan 
newspapers. One of the three was Walter Maskop, who provided some 
dramatic copy for reporters with his stories of privation and injustice 
among sharecroppers. One reporter suggested that New Yorkers paying 
good money to see tenant farmers like Jeeter Lester in the Caldwell- 
Kirkland play Tobacco Road on Broadway, should see Walter Maskop if 
they wanted a look at the real thing.
AAA officials were sensitive to such publicity, and clippings 
of these stories circulated from desk to desk within the huge agency—  
not always with favorable reactions. When the clippings about Walter 
Maskop in New York reached W. J. Green of the Adjustment Committee of 
the Cotton Division, he wrote a long memorandum to Cully Cobb. Green 
pointed out that Maskop was one of the men who once represented the 
STFU in a conference in Cobb's office, and that, although the newspapers 
quoted Maskop as saying he was an evicted sharecropper, he was not one. 
"He owned a farm," wrote Green, "but lost it in 1932 before the Agri­
cultural Adjustment program got started. Since that time he has been 
living in a small town and working as a day laborer when he could get
^̂ Memphis Press-Scimitar, February 26, 1935•
^̂ ew York Sun, February 28, 1935; and New York World Telegram, 
February 2Ô, 1935*
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vork." Apparently, this information discredited Maskop as a repre­
sentative of the sharecroppers. In the memorandum, Green admitted that 
"many of the conditions mentioned Maskop/ are no doubt true," but 
he was positive the AAA reduction program was not responsible. Cully 
Cobb was so pleased with Green's comments that he forwarded them to 
Chester Davis.
The thousands of complaints about evictions and lowering of
status reaching Cobb also fell on deaf ears. In 1937 he wrote, "Every
year at this season since 193 ,̂ a few letters of this nature have been
received by /the Cotton/ Division." Cobb issued orders that year for
county committees to look into such cases with the idea of withholding
the landlords' parity payments if they were guilty. This had been his
policy since the beginning. Stopping the parity check was the maximum
penalty the Cotton Division felt it could assess against a landlord,
and. obviously this provided little comfort to tenants evicted long
before. It might even be a hardship, since their checks would be de- 
68layed also. Cobb felt also that events in Arkansas should not influence
Administration policies. He wrote a Massachusetts clergyman:
. . . some persons, instead of availing themselves of the 
State and Federal Courts, have been disposed to relate their 
stories to well-meaning people in other parts of the United 
States with the hope of arousing bitterness and adverse feeling 
toward the present National Administration.
Cobb reasoned that the very fact that "isolated cases" were given so much
publicity was evidence of the infrequency with which they occurred.
'̂̂ Memorandum to C. A. Cobb, March $, 1935.» STFU File, NA, RG 1̂ 5* 
Cobb to Scholl, January 19, 1937, NA, RG l4$.
69Cobb to James Hiller, November lU, 193̂ , Landlord-Tenant File, 
NA, RG lk5. National Archives.
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The official attitude in AAA toward tenant conçlaints was that 
nothing could be done about them unless there was some definite viola­
tion of the cotton contract. An example of this was the reaction to a 
wire in March, 1935, from STFU leaders who claimed that at mass meetings 
in Gilmore, Marked Tree, and Lepanto, 409 out of 1,766 people raised 
their hands when asked it they had no work or crop to make Paul A. 
Porter, Executive Assistant to Davis, wired back that if the union could
provide the names of sharecroppers who had been evicted and not replaced,
71AAA would begin immediate action against the landlords.
H. L. Mitchell sent Porter a list of evicted croppers and de­
scribed two plantations that warranted investigation. One was the Delta 
and Pine Land Company of Mississippi, managed by Oscar Johnston, AAA's 
Director of Finance. Mitchell charged that Johnston had failed to 
replace tenants who left voluntarily and that there were more than 127 
vacant cabins on the plantation. Mitchell added that the STFU had 
nothing against Johnston personally, since he was one of the more en­
lightened planters, but still he had violated the contract which he 
helped write.
A worse case was that of the Twist Brothers of Twist, Arkansas. 
Mitchell charged the brothers had kept all parity payments due their 
tenants, denied tenants access to rented acres, and reduced almost every 
sharecropper on their plantation to the status of a wage hand. In addi­
tion, he said the Twists allowed such cruelty to their workers that even
"̂ *̂ Stultz, Mitchell and Thomas to Wallace (Telegram), March 21, 
1935, NA, RG 145.
^^Porter to Stultz (Telegram), March 21, 1935, NA, RG 145.
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one of their riding bosses could no longer stand it and was willing to
testify against them. Mitchell told Porter, "Your failure to take
proper action has strengthened the farm owners in the continuance of
72the most brutal regime in this territory."
As long as the complaints concerning AAA's cotton programs came 
from tenants and tenant union organizers, AAA was able to keep the prob­
lem confined within its own house, but the Birdsong incident gave Norman 
Thomas an excellent opportunity to go all the way to Roosevelt with a 
dramatic complaint. As soon as he reached the safety of Memphis, after 
being driven out of Arkansas, Thomas sent a wire to the President de­
scribing the Birdsong incident and called it the "most arrogant tyranny" 
in the country. He told the President, "Nothing less than action by 
you . . . will avail to save tragedy from arising out of potentially 
the most dangerous situation I have seen in America."'^
The President was much too wise a politician to become person­
ally involved in the sticky Arkansas troubles. He referred Norman 
Thomas' telegram to Chester Davis for an answer. Davis' letter to 
Thomas was conciliatory. It referred to "definite steps" being taken 
by AAA to prevent aggravation of the conditions Thomas described. Davis 
declared that once these steps wore explained to him, Thomas would be 
convinced of the "genuine concern" of AAA for the sharecropper problem.
Davis pointed out that the denial of free speech and assembly in Arkan-
ihsas was obviously a state matter.'
7^Mitchell to Porter, March 28, 1935, STFU File, NA, RG 14̂ . 
T̂homas to Roosevelt (Telegram), March 15, 1935, NA, RG 1̂ 5.
Tlv
Davis to Thomas, March 19, 1935, NA, RG 1̂ 5.
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There was some legal basis for Davis' position,but in reality 
he was attempting to pass the buck. The Constitution of the United 
States means nothing if it can be violated with impunity as it was at 
Birdsong. Davis' stand was the easy way out, but of course he may have 
had no support from Wallace or Roosevelt for any other action.
Norman Thomas answered Davis' soothing letter with a blistering 
reply which must have raised the Administrator's blood pressure consid­
erably. He stated that the "wholesale evictions" were the most impor­
tant facts in the cotton country, and he had sweeping criticisms to 
make of AAA's policies toward tenants.Davis did not answer.
A few weeks later, Thomas wrote Henry Wallace. The Socialist 
leader had learned that Wallace suspected him of championing the share­
croppers for political reasons. Thomas denied this; he said that as a 
Socialist, he found enough wrong with AAA that he did not have to "re­
joice" at the reign of terror in Arkansas. He asked: "Does not the 
situation demand at least open investigation with power to protect 
witnesses? Does it not demand legislative protection of the right of 
workers to organize?"
^^The Bill of Rights in Article I forbids Congress (not the 
states) from abridging free speech and assembly; however, the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U. S. Constitution prohibits the states to deny citi­
zens the "privileges and immunities of citizenship." Since the Supreme 
Court in the Slaughter House cases of I873 defined the right to assemble 
as one of the "privileges and immunities," and since county and local 
governments were defined as "creatures" of the state in Atkin vs. Kansas 
in 1903 and in Hunter vs. City of Pittsburg in I907, it is clear that 
county and local officials cannot allow denial of the right of assembly 
without violating the Constitution. U. S. Senate, The Constitution of 
the United Staues, Analysis and Interpretation, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
Doc. No. 170 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953); P-
9 6 7.
76Thomas to Davis, March 22, 1935; NA, RG 145.
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Taen Thomas spoke with a frankness foreign to most politicians. 
He granted that Wallace and the Administration held "most of the cards" 
and they had more to fear from the "Republican reactionaries" and the 
courts than from himself and the Socialist party--"at the present junc­
ture." But Thomas felt that Wallace and the President had a sense of 
history. He told Wallace that history would acquit the New Deal of 
inventing the "damnable" plantation system, but it would not acquit 
Wallace and FDR of their "failure to act adequately and promptly in 
this Arkansas matter." "This," wrote Thomas, "I have sou^t to bring 
to your attention for the sake of humanity rather than for any sort of 
political advantage." He argued that it was not too late to act.??
Henry Wallace was a man of deep conscience, and Thomas' letter 
angered him, perhaps most because he felt unable to do anything about 
the conditions described. He dictated a reply to Thomas which must have 
been close to his real thoughts, but after consulting with Rexford Tug­
well, he decided not to send it. Wallace first wrote: "The effort on 
the part of some of your socialistic brethren to make it appear that
the situation has resulted from the Agricultural Adjustment Act appears
to me to be totally unwarranted." If there was to be bloodshed in 
eastern Arkansas, in Wallace's opinion, "the socialists and others who 
have come in from the North will be largely responsible." Wallace noted 
that it was very interesting how "right wing northeners and left wing 
northeners" cooperated in going to a "sore spot of long standing" to 
gain the maximum publicity for their respective dogmas.?®
??Thomas to Wallace, April l6, 193$, NA, RG l4$.
?®Wa11 ace to Thomas (not sent), date not known, NA, RG l4$.
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Twenty-five years later, when he read the contents of Wallace's 
unsent letter for the first time, Norman Thomas commented, "I rather 
think Wallace today is glad he never sent the letter . . . ." Thomas 
recalled that Wallace had not tried to defend his handling of the share­
cropper situation when he ran for President in 1948. He felt that 
Wallace had "behaved very badly" over the issue and probably was a
"little ashamed." Thomas remembered that Roosevelt would at least talk
79to him about the sharecroppers; Wallace would not.
By mid-April, 1935, the fury of the planters was spent and the 
reign of terror had ended. Certainly, without the policy of passive
resistance enforced on the croppers by the leaders of the STFU, there
would have been much more bloodshed.The major achievement of the 
union in the reign of terror was to survive. The planters were the real 
victors. They were able to get rid of their surplus tenants and continue 
receiving rental and parity payments. Moreover, the efforts of the 
STFU to bring the AAA into the struggle were largely unsuccessful.
True, the national publicity made the AAA, the Administration, Congress, 
and the entire nation more aware of the sharecropper problem, but this 
had no immediate effect on the plight of the sharecropper.
The steadfast refusal of the AAA to side with the embattled
sharecroppers in the reign of terror and the purge of the liberals in
AAA caused a growing resentment toward the agency by the leaders and 
members of the STFU. Therefore, they decided to send another delegation 
to Washington. The idea, and probably the money, came from the recently
79Norman Thomas to author, June 6, I96O.
fioNew York Times, April 21, 1935, pp. 1 and 8.
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purgçd Gardner Jackson, who was now the union's official but unpaid ' 
representative in Washington.
Nine members of the STFU, including Mitchell, Brookings, and 
McKinney, began to picket the main building of the Department of Agri­
culture on May l8, 1935• Their pickets stood directly outside the
offices of Henry Wallace and carried printed signs demanding fair treat-
82ment for sharecroppers. Gardner Jackson was present but did not, take 
part in the demonstration except to talk a policeman out of trying to
O g
break it up. Secretary Wallace watched the picketers from his window, 
consulted with Cully Cobb, and then summoned Gardner Jackson to his 
office. He told Jackson that Cobb was "frothing at the mouth" and per­
sonally he felt "awfully uncomfortable," but he confessed he was glad 
the sharecroppers were picketing because it would help him do what he
84had to do.
The Washington Post carried pictures and an article about the 
pickets. It happened that the picketing occurred on the same day that 
3,000 county agents arrived in Washington to review the accomplishments 
of the agricultural programs. The Post published an editorial called 
"The Nine Versus the 3;000," which emphasized the difference between 
what the county agents were told AAA was accomplishing and what the 
sharecroppers thought about the program.
81Mitchell, Oral History Interview, pp. 48-49.
82Washington Post, May 19, 1935-
^̂ Mitchell, Oral History Interview, pp. 48-49- 
84Gardner Jackson, Interview with author, July 20, 1959-
Oc
Washington Post, May 19, 1935-
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Throughout the remaining months of 1935, the STFÜ carried on 
its fight with the planters in northeastern Arkansas. In late Septem­
ber the union organized a strike of cotton pickers which led to much 
violence but was eventually successful in raising the pay of pickers to 
better than seventy-five cents per hundred pounds--still inadequate 
wages but à considerable improvement.®^
After the success of the cotton pickers' strike, union member­
ship shot skyward. By the end of 1935 it had reached 30,000, and spread 
into several states. The executive secretary had difficulty keeping 
track of new locals, several of which were organized and in operation 
for months before he learned of their existence. In Oklahoma a Cherokee 
Indian named Odis Sweeden had great success in organizing. He volun­
teered his services to the STFU after reading of the strike in Arkansas, 
and within a year he had more than eighty locals in Oklahoma. Later,
the migration of the "Okies" to California virtually wiped out the mem-
87bership in that state.
But as the union grew, so did planter opposition. During the 
last week of 1935 the powerful eastern Arkansas plantations began an 
all-out campaign against the STFU. They evicted nearly two hundred 
families for union activities. With no place to go, the evicted crop­
pers camped along the roadsides, huddled around open fires in the bitter
®®STFU, "The Voice of the Disinherited, A Brief History of the 
Agricultural Workers Union, 193^-1959," Files of the Agricultural Work­
ers Union, Washington, D. C.; and John Herling, "The Sharecroppers 
Fight for Life," New Republic, LXXXV (January 29, I936), 336.
Or?
Mitchell, Oral History Interview, pp. 5̂ -55; and STFU, Pro­
ceedings, Third Annual Convention, p. k.
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cold and wondered where their next meal would come from.®^ The planters
openly circulated blacklists Of 'union members who were not to be hired.
When union leaders wired relief agencies in Washington for aid for the
dispossessed, officials were sympathetic and ordered help, but local
functionaries in Arkansas refused to act.^^
The plight of the evicted was publicized throughout the country,
and the result was a deluge of wires and letters on the Administration
in Washington. Even the White House was swamped with messages. Drew
Pearson and Robert S. Allen reported in their "Washington-Merry-Go-
Round" column that the matter came up in cabinet meeting. Secretary of
Labor Frances Perkins, they said, proposed sending an arbitrator to
Arkansas to settle the differences between the planters and the union,
and members of the cabinet agreed, as did the President. But Vice-
President Garner objected, saying, "It would embarrass Joe Robinson,
we ought not do anything without taking it up with him. He's up
for re-election this fall, and that's a very delicate situation in
Arkansas." Robinson had been so cooperative with the Administration
that this argument evidently carried great weight. Tlie cabinet and FDR,
according to Pearson eind Allen, yielded to Garner and decided to do 
gonothing.^
Throughout 1935; the sharecropper problem was one of the sore 
spots of the Hew Deal. And the man who kept it sore was the STFU's
88John Herling, "The Sharecropper Fights for His Life," Hew 
Republic, LXXXV (January 29, 1936), 336.
89STFU, Proceedings, Third Annual Convention, Speech by Gardner 
Jackson, pp. 56-58*
90.Florida Times-Union (Jacksonville), March 17, 1936.
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official but unpaid representative in Washington, Gardner Jackson. When 
FDR sent a message to Congress in February, 1937, calling for tenancy 
legislation, Washington correspondent Drew Pearson reported it was the 
climax of one of the most important behind-the-scenes controversies of 
the New Deal., and the center of the controversy was Gardner Jackson. 
Pearson wrote that Jackson "probably more than any other man . . . /ya-sf 
the indefatigable and belligerent instigator of the President's message."
According to Pearson, Jackson caused the AAA officials who ousted 
him far more trouble outside of AAA than when he was under their roof. 
Also,
Jackson made life miserable for Miss Perkins and Secretary Wallace.
He raised unmitigated hell with Attorney General Cummings. He had 
the ear of Mrs. Roosevelt. He got a newsreel to film the strikers.
He raised thousands of dollars to finance them. He got Harry Hop­
kins to feed them.
Pearson identified Jackson as the "godfather, the chief financial 
angel" of the STFU, a union which, he said, was not large, but which 
made up for its size by its vociferousness. Pearson said Jackson sup­
plied the megaphone. He referred to Jackson's handling of events in 
•Arkansas as "stage-managing" and said: "When striking Negroes were jailed 
in Arkansas, when a preacher and a woman were horse-whipped, when union 
organizers were run out of the strike area, he made the most of it every 
time
It was Gardner Jackson who made arrangements for H. S. Mitchell 
to appear before the Resolutions Committee of the Democratic National 
Convention in Philadelphia in 1936. He also set up a meeting with the
9^Ibid., February 26, 1937.
92Ibid.
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committee chairman, Senator Joe Robinson. The way Jackson accomplished 
this was typical. A rumor, perhaps started by Jackson, circulated at 
the convention that the sharecroppers union might picket the convention. 
Ed McGrady, Undersecretary of Labor, apparently had the job of prevent­
ing such unfavorable publicity, so Jackson contacted him. He promised 
there would be no picketing if McGrady would arrange for Mitchell to 
see Robinson and appear before the Resolutions Committee. This was done 
and at the meeting with Robinson, both Mitchell and Jackson told the 
senator they wanted the convention to adopt a resolution saying the Dem­
ocrats would protect the civil rights of sharecroppers in Arkansas and 
insure their right to organize. Robinson agreed, but McGrady suggested 
the wording of the resolution be changed to apply to all workers in the 
country. He pointed out this would be more acceptable to the Southern­
ers in the convention.The resolution passed the convention,9^ but it 
was so general in application that it did the STFU little good
Jackson was once invited to a dinner in Washington at which 
several important senators were to be present. Howard Kester was visit­
ing him and Jackson wangled an invitation for Kester. At the dinner 
Kester became the center of attraction with descriptions of his experi­
ences in Arkansas including a beating he recently received while hold­
ing a union meeting. Senator Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., listened
^̂ Mitchell, Oral History Interview, pp. 69-73*
13*
^ D̂emocratic Platform, 1936, New York Times, June 26, 1936, p.
95During the conference, Robinson turned to Mitchell and said, 
"They tell me you are a foreign agitator." Mitchell became angry and 
said he had lived in Tennessee and Arkansas all of his life and had as 
much right to go any place in Arkansas as Robinson did. The Senator 
apologized. Mitchell, Oral History Interview, p. 72.
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carefully, and within a few days he introduced a motion in the Senate 
to create a committee on civil liberties. The LaFollette committee 
investigated violations of civil liberties all over the country and 
received wide publicity; however, it never looked into the sharecropper 
situation in Arkansas. Years later, Mitchell asked LaFollette about 
this, and the Senator indicated he had found too much opposition from
96Southern senators to tackle the problem.
During a cotton choppers' strike in 1936, Jackson went to offi­
cials of the Resettlement Administration to ask for aid for evicted 
families. According to him, they said, "This is awful; we will cer­
tainly help you." But when they ordered aid to displaced families, RA
97administrators in Arkansas refused to act. Drew Pearson reported the 
reason for the refusal was fear of reprisal by Senator Joe Robinson if
98they interfered in the strike. When Jackson demanded that RA offi­
cials in Washington enforce their own orders, they refused because they 
feared the wrath of the Southern Bloc in Congress. Robinson later 
relented and allowed the families to receive aid.^̂
Jackson was a power in Washington, and he had a well-earned 
reputation as a champion of the underdog. He sought no personal gain 
and few doubted his sincerity. His personal friends included several
^^Mitchell, Oral History Interview, pp. 64-65•
97STFU, Proceedings, Third Annual Convention, Speech of Gardner 
Jackson, p. 40.
98 "Starvation in Arkansas," New Republic, XXXVI (April 1, 1936),
209.
99STFU, Proceedings, Third Annual Convention, Speech of Gardner 
Jackson, p. 40.
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cabinet members and Supreme Court justices. Franklin Roosevelt was 
aware of his work. In fact, Jackson's incessant campaign on behalf of 
the sharecroppers had an important bearing on the President's decision 
in 1936 to appoint a special committee on farm tenancy.
The clamor raised by the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union and the 
constant agitation of Norman Thomas and Gardner Jackson eventually had 
some effect on AAA. Tlie troubles in Arkansas had served the purpose of 
dramatizing the plight of sharecroppers throughout the South, and AAA 
could not ignore them. The attention which the agency gave to tenant 
problems during the last year of its existence will be the subject of 
the next chapter.
100.Florida Times-Union (Jacksonville), February 26, 1937-
CHAPTER X 
THE LAST YEAR OF THE FIRST AAA
When Mary Connor Myers returned to Washington on February 7, 
1935, she found AAA in a turmoil. Most of those who had sent her to 
Arkansas had been fired, and no one in AAA was interested in hearing 
her report or recommendations. One day a reporter from the United 
Press was in her office and saw on her desk some pictures which she 
had taken of poverty-stricken sharecroppers in Arkansas. Using the 
snapshots and his own deductions,^ he wrote a story stating that Mrs. 
Ifyers had uncovered contract violations which caused "cruel hardships 
to part of the farm population," and that she had seen sharecroppers
pstraggling along the highways, homeless and unable to obtain relief.
Chester Davis was greatly annoyed by the appearance of this 
story in the nation's newspapers, and when Mrs. %ers tried to explain, 
even the Acting General Counsel, Seth Thomas, refused to discuss the 
matter. Disturbed that her superiors seemed to think her expedition to 
Arkansas was her own idea and that she had behaved dishonorably, Mrs. 
Myers wrote a long memorandum to Chester Davis, demanded an appointment, 
handed him the memo, and insisted he read it. Davis received her icily,
"Mary Connor Myers to author, October 6, 1959-
^Time, March 5, 1935, P- 12.
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but being a fair-minded man, he read the memo and then talked with her 
for several hours.
The %ers memorandum, entitled "Tenants on Cotton Plantations in 
Northeastern Arkansas," contained information on living conditions, the 
absentee ownership of many Arkansas plantations, the organization and 
development of the STFU, the Ward Rodgers case, and specific reports on 
the cases she was instructed to investigate, especially that of Hiram 
Norcross. It also described dozens of affidavits she had taken from 
tenants in Arkansas. Mrs. Myers' conclusions were that she had found 
enough evidence of contract violation and evasion with hardship to ten­
ants to warrant a full-scale investigation.
Davis called in several advisors to consider what to do about 
Mrs. Myers' findings. They decided to order an investigation, but when 
the question was raised of making the %ers memorandum public they 
balked because it was in many ways unfavorable to AAA. Mrs. Myers sug­
gested that her memorandum, like a FBI report, should be kept secret 
because it contained names of possible witnesses and defendants, and 
some particulars of prospective court cases. In addition, it quoted 
the controversial private views of several well-known people. Davis 
and his advisors agreed not to publish the report, and they instructed 
Mrs. %ers not to give copies of her memorandum to anyone and to dis- 
cuss the matter with no one.
Mrs. f^ers left the original copy of her memorandum with Davis, 
and after hearing "some weird reports of desks being rifled" in an 
attempt to find the other copies she took them all home. When Chester
^%ers to author, October 6, 1959 •
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Davis learned of this, he sent word that she had no right to take the 
copies from AAA. Mrs. %ers then sent Davis all copies but one, vhich 
she kept for self-protection, saying the whole "sharecropper situation"
had been the "most humiliating professional experience" of her career
kand that she was delighted to see the last of the memorandum.
In the weeks that followed, a great clamor was raised through­
out the country for publication of the "Mary Connor Myers Report."
The AAA received literally thousands of requests and demands, some of 
them evidently inspired by Socialist groups in large northern cities.  ̂
Letters came from the American Civil Liberties Union, the Methodist 
Federation for Social Service in New York, the Women's International 
League for Peace and Freedom in Minneapolis, the Business and Pro­
fessional Women's Department of the YWCA in New Orleans, the Cleveland 
Junior Division of the NAACP, and others. There was evidence that
fictitious names were used on some of the letters.^
Most of the letters urging publication of the %ers Report were 
similar, but the ones from the STFU contained a desperate note since 
the union had counted so heavily on Mrs. Myers' investigation to help 
its cause. Professor Amberson charged that "by supporting the %ers 
report you have given [the planters/ aid and comfort. They consider 
that the Union has failed in its efforts to get federal intervention, 
and that they may now, with impunity, adopt any illegal methods which
S-tyers to Davis, March 8, 1935, File kÔJ, NA, RG 1̂ 5. No copy
of the original Myers memorandum is in the records of the AAA now in the
National Archives.
Ĉ. B. Baldwin to Darwin Meserole, April 10, 1935, NA, RG 1̂ 5.
ÂAA, "Study on Myers Report Correspondence," no date, NA, RG
lJ+5.
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7they -wish to employ.'" H. L. Mitchell wrote that the suppression of 
the report encouraged the planters to begin the reign of terror.^
On the other hand, planters wrote that Mrs. Myers spent most
of her time in Arkansas in the company of Mitchell and other Social- 
gists and that she ̂ aid practically no attention to anyone except the 
disgruntled tenant." When Hiram Norcross offered to furnish her with 
a sharecropper to show her around, she refused saying she had employed 
H. L. Mitchell to drive her. J. A. Emrich, a relative of Norcross' 
banker and store manager, charged that Mrs. Myers was "already preju­
diced against the landlords and macLe no effort to understand their 
side of the situation.
Officials of AAA answered all the letters and telegrams. The 
tone of these replies was set by Chester Davis in his response to Roger 
Baldwin of the American Civil Liberties Union. Davis stated that there 
was a "general misapprehension" about the %ers Report, and that it 
was no more than an investigation of specific complaints against cer­
tain landlords. He compared it to a record of a criminal case, which 
of course could not be made public.Davis told Baldwin it was regret­
table that the public had drawn the conclusion that the report was a
7
Amberson to Porter, April 1935̂  STFU File, NA, RG 1̂+5 •
D
Mitchell to Porter, March 27, 1935, STFU File, NA, RG IÀ5.
Ŵ. W. Barton to Davis, February I3, 193̂ , MCM File, NA, RG IU5.
^^Emrich to W. J. Driver, February 26, 1935, NA, RG l4$.
^̂ The 193^-35 cotton contract required all signers to expressly 
waive the right to have records pertaining to the production and sale 
of cotton on the farm kept confidential. Thus, there were no legal 
barriers to making Mrs. Myers' findings public. USDA Form No. Cotton 
la, 193^-35 Cotton Contract, NA, RG 1̂ 5•
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survey of general conditions and that AAA had been put in the position 
of seeming to suppress a document of general public interest when such 
was not the case. Davis assured Baldwin that a general analysis of ten­
ancy conditions in counties "where relief has shown an increase" was
being made and that the results would be made public "just as promptly
12as the facts can be filed."
Norman Thomas' Plight of the Sharecropper was published during 
the furor over the Mary Connor Myers report, and in it Thomas challenged 
Chester Davis to make the report public. When the book circulated 
through AAA, Paul Porter, AAA Information Chief, forwarded it to Alfred 
Stedman, his counterpart in the USDA, with instructions to 'bote the 
challenge." Stedman replied that "sometime I hope the AAA gets around 
to my idea that this is a spot to move off."^^ ~
In late February, 1935> Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen re­
ported in their "Washington îferry-Go-Round" that in the Mary Connor 
Myers report Henry Wallace and AAA offocials had hold of a bear's tail. 
They described a press interview in which Wallace commented that ten­
ancy conditions had been "greatly exaggerated." Reporters then asked 
Wallace if that were true, why did he refuse to make the report public. 
Pearson and Allen said that what was secretly worrying the agricultural 
"generalissimos" was the knowledge that nationally known liberals had 
become interested in the plight of the sharecroppers and had launched 
a drive on Capitol Hill for a Congressional investigation.^^ Eventually,
^^Davis to Baldwin, March 2, 1935; Myers File, NA. RG 14$.
^^Routing slip attached to Plight of the Sharecropper, Thomas 
File, NA, RG 145-
^^Washington News, February 20, 1935•
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the Senate Committee on Agriculture demanded to see the report, and 
Seth Thomas took a copy to a closed meeting of the committee.What 
happened at this meeting has never been made public.
The steadfast refusal of AAA to release the Myers report served 
only to convince many people that it was a general report on tenancy 
conditions and that it was being suppressed because it was damning to 
AAA.. Years later, Chester Davis admitted that "it might have been 
better tactics to release it for what it w a s , b u t  this is a moot 
question since the report contained much that could have been used by 
AAA's critics. In the context of the purge of the liberals in AAA, the 
tactical soundness of publishing the report seems questionable.
Despite the solid front now presented by AAA to the public, the 
fight concerning tenancy still went on behind the scenes. USDA economist 
Mordecai Ezekiel, although definitely one of the liberals, had survived 
the purge because of Wallace's high regard for him. Even before the 
purge Wallace had instructed Ezekiel to look into tenancy matters, and 
one of Ezekiel's approaches was to have a county agent in a typical 
county conduct a minute survey of the effects of the acreage reduction 
program on tenant displacement. He chose a county in eastern Texas in 
which there were 6lU cotton contracts. The agent's investigations 
showed a slight increase in the number of sharecroppers and a small 
decrease in share-tenants in the county between 1933 and 1935• He ex­
plained the increase in croppers by saying they had probably moved from 
the cities and had no farming equipment. The decrease in share-tenants
^^Myers to author, October 6, 1959* 
l6Davis to author, August 21, 1959-
2)6
he attributed to increased land ownership by this group. From these 
facts, the agent concluded that there had been no great effort by the 
landlords "to sidestep or cheat" their tenants.
The agent found that 65 percent of the landlords had recognized 
their "three-fourths" tenants as managing share-tenants; however, he 
admitted many of them held the view that no tenants were entitled to 
share in rental benefits. The agent reported that because some tenants 
had received rental payments, they were boasting that there was more 
profit in renting land than owning it. He warned that some landlords, 
who had been coerced into granting the status of managing share ten­
ant in 193  ̂by threats from their tenants to bum improvements on the
17farm, would not allow themselves to be so influenced in 193 .̂
Evidently, Ezekiel was not wholly pleased with the agent's
report. He wrote that the purpqse of rental payments was to yield all
1 fiproducers parity prices and that tenants should share in them. How­
ever, he incorporated some of the information gained from the agent 
into a set of far-reaching recommendations made to Chester Davis. Ezek­
iel felt it was too late to do anything about the 1935 contract except 
through interpretation of the existing provision. He wrote Davis, "We 
will probably have to stand by the contract, as signed." However, he 
strongly recommended careful scrutiny of the 1936 contract in order "to 
provide more liberal treatment to tenants than had been afforded them 
. . . thus far." Specifically, he recommended that the qualifying 
phrases in paragraph 7 of the contract be deleted and that the definition
C. Morris to Ezekiel, January 9, 1935, HA, RG 1̂ 9- 
^^Ezekiel to Morris, January lU, 1935, HA, RG 14$.
2?7
of managing share tenant be broadened to include all two-thirds and 
three-fourths tenants. He also suggested that the administrative rul­
ings be changed so that landlords could not require their standing- 
19renters to pay their rent in cotton exempt from the Bankhead tax as 
20was the. practice.
Davis sent Ezekiel's suggestions to Cully Cobb for review, and 
Cobb took them apart one by one. He said they had been presented many 
times before, especially by the Legal Division, and discarded as "ad­
ministratively impractical and utterly . . . unreasonable." Cobb felt 
that it would be impossible to require landlords to keep even the 
normal number of tenants without qualification because of the financial 
reverses suffered by landlords and the difficulty in determining what 
the normal number was. Moreover, Cobb said., such a policy would prevent 
landlords from replacing "shiftless" tenants with better ones. This 
last argument by Cobb was particularly specious since a landlord could 
replace bad tenants with good ones under the interpretation put on para­
graph 7 by Wallace's Memphis Telegram without lowering the number of 
his tenants.
Cobb maintained that managing share tenants should not be de­
fined as two-thirds or three-fourths tenants because there were many 
other types of arrangements commonly made which this definition would 
exclude. He also pointed out that use of this definition would result 
in a "Belt-wide demand" that all contracts be re-written, which would 
be an intolerable situation. In answer to Ezekiel's suggestion that
^^Tenants who paid their rent in a fixed amount of cotton.
20Ezekiel, Memo to Mr. Davis, January 31; NA, RG l4$.
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landlords be prevented from requiring rent in tax-free cotton, Cobb 
said there vas already a rule calling for punishment of a landlord vho 
attempted to collect an "undue" amount of tax-free cotton.
But Cobb's vord was not final, and Ezekiel continued to look 
into tenancy matters on behalf of the Secretary. After investigating 
the distribution of benefits from the cotton program, the economist 
reported to Wallace that the gross income from lint cotton of farmers 
in general increased 50 percent from 1932 to 193̂ - On tracts of land 
where the farming was done by managing share tenants, the landlord's 
income increased 62 percent and tenants' kk percent. On land where 
there were non-managing share tenants, the landlord's income increased 
7  ̂percent and the tenants' 27 percent. Farms using sharecroppers had 
an increase of 97 percent for the landlords and 27 for the tenants.
These figures showed the unfairness of the program to the lower classes 
of tenants and probably had some effect on the tenant provisions of 
the 1936-39 cotton contract.
In the months that followed the purge, the news of the reign 
of terror in Arkansas was so unfavorable to AAA that the agency and the 
Secretary were forced many times to defend their position. Chester 
Davis on a tour of Southern agricultural areas, told reporters that the 
real problem among the sharecroppers was not abuse of the cotton con­
tracts by landlords but the general decline of the cotton industry. He 
explained that sharecroppers were inclined not to understand the terms 
of the cotton contract, especially when they got the idea that landlords
2̂ Cobb, Memo to Mr. Davis, February 6, 1935, NA, RG 145.
^̂ Ezekiel, Memo for the Secretary, March 5, 1935, NA, RG 1̂ 5.
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were required to keep the same tenants.
Later, after the Birdsong incident, Davis found it necessary to 
write President Roosevelt explaining the tenant situation. He said 
that a detailed study was being made of the effects of the cotton prog­
ram on the displacement of tenants, and that these efforts were being 
accelerated in view of the events in Arkansas. Davis assured the 
President that the landlords had been told repeatedly that they must 
live up to their obligations under the cotton contract. He outlined 
the procedure whereby a landlord was required to sign a certificate of 
compliance before receiving final payment of benefits and how a land­
lord's payment was withheld if there was any evidence of a "net dis­
placement" of tenants since 1932. Davis said the mechanism for investi­
gating tenant disputes had been strengthened and that AAA was taking 
positive action to hold to a minimun the labor displacement caused by 
the cotton program. However, the Administrator wanted the President 
to understand that AAA was not responsible for the tenancy problem and 
could hope to do little about it. He wrote, "... these conditions 
... as you know, are of long standing and are not the result of the
pl|AAA cotton programs."
A flood of mail arrived at AAA in the spring of 1935 complaining 
of injustices to tenants. These letters were usually answered by the 
Cotton Section, but on one occasion, Paul Porter, USDA Information 
Chief, found W. J. Green's replies so unresponsive that he wrote a reply 
himself and mailed it without sending it first to the Cotton Section
^%ew Orleans Sunday Item-Tribune, March 31, 1935*
okDavis, )kmorandum to the President, March 19, 1935, RA., RG 145-
2Ô0
25"for further scrutiny." Even Rexford Tugwell found it difficult to 
answer his correspondence concerning the tenancy problem. He received 
a letter from an old friend and colleague, Literature Professor Mark 
Van Doren of Columbia University, who had talked to a Negro sharecrop­
per brought to New York by the STFU. Van Doren enclosed a letter from 
the cropper's wife in Arkansas which demonstrated "how desperate and 
dangerous" the situation was, and he suggested that an investigation 
of affairs in Arkansas might "work wonders. Tugwell thanked him for 
his concern and admitted that the trouble in Arkansas was "bothering us 
greatly and we are very puzzled to know what to do about it.
In March, 1935  ̂Secretary Wallace appeared before the Senate 
Agriculture Committee during hearings on the Bankhead Farm Tenancy Bill 
and wholeheartedly endorsed the measure. He traced the development of 
the tenancy problem in the United States and acknowledged that AAA 
might have made the problem temporarily more severe. He declared that 
neither AAA nor FERA could hope to cure the tenancy evil but said the 
Bankhead Bill was a big step toward that goal.
As usual, Wallace's utterances were much more liberal than his 
actions; however, his politically wise endorsement of the Bankhead Bill 
drew fire from certain areas. One outraged Michigan businessman demanded 
to know how the Secretary had become committed to reforming farm tenancy, 
a condition which had existed "since the Indians were kicked out of
^̂ Porter, Memo to Mr. C. B. Baldwin, April 15, 1935; NA, RG IÀ5.
^̂ Van Doren to Tugwell, March 26, 1935; NA, RG I6.
27Tugwell to Van Doren, March 30, 1935; NA, RG II+5 .
28USDA, Press Release, March 5, 1935; NA, RG 1^5.
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place." He asked if farmers were to become and remain the "special 
pets of political America," and if the city man and taxpayer were to 
be forever the "victims of class legislation." What the farmer really 
needed, he claimed, was "rest from political interfering--and lots of 
It."^
The AAA found after the purge that it had a few loose ends to 
tie up. One of them was the matter of official records. In March, 
Gardner Jackson charged in a letter to Senator Burton K. Wheeler that 
the files of AAA had been stripped of the more revealing materials con­
cerning the purge.How Jackson learned of this is anyone's guess, but 
he was probably right. The records of AAA turned over to the National 
Archives are notably sparse for the period immediately before and after 
the purge. Correspondence mentioned elsewhere does not appear where it 
should. The Mary Connor Myers report, for instance, is not present.
The letters of dismissal sent to all the purgees are not in their cor­
respondence files. Evidently, the bosses of AAA wanted no reminders of 
the unpleasant experience.
As soon as possible after the purge, AAA was re-organized along 
lines more acceptable to Chester Davis.̂  The offensive Legal Division 
was uprooted and placed under the Solicitor of the Department of Agri­
culture. The Commodities Division disappeared and the various commodity 
sections were elevated to the rank of divisions. In general, it was a 
more streamlined and efficient organization and one less likely to have
29John H. Schouten to Wallace, March J, 1935, NA, RG 1̂ 5.
Jackson to Wheeler, March 11, 1935, File 1737, NA, RG ik^.
^̂ See Table U on p. 262.
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The new Solicitor was Seth Thomas, brought in by Wallace because
33he "understood both law and agriculture and political practicalities' 
and perhaps because he was a fellow Iowan. Thomas was a sharp contrast 
to Jerome Frank. When Robert McConnoughey of the Benefit Contract 
Section of the old Legal Division ruled that the government could give 
legal advice to tenants in suits against landlords, Thomas reversed 
the ruling. .McConnoughey, one of the few remaining liberal lawyers, 
argued that the government was under compulsion to see that the con­
tract was fulfilled, and if a dispute arose out of failure of one party 
to do so, the government might give legal advice or even assistance to 
the other party.Thomas denied this and said it was not the duty of 
his department to advise individuals of their rights against other indi­
viduals although these rights were based on government contracts. Even 
if county agents or county committeemen were accused by a tenant of 
fraud or misrepresentation in connection with AAA programs, Thomas said, 
it was a matter of legal action between individuals. The new Solicitor 
also made it clear that a managing share tenant could not use as grounds 
for suing the government the fact that he had not been allowed to sign
a contract.35
Thomas' seemingly harsh ruling became an issue in the presiden­
tial campaign of 193̂ , when former Democratic candidate for President,
3^ourse, Davis and Black, Three Years of AAA, p. $8.
^^allace to author, June 13, 1959- 
fcC(
35.
3̂ M onnoughey, Memo to Mr. Seth Thomas, May 1, 1935, NA, RG l6.
Thomas, Memo to C. C. Davis, May 8, 1935, NA, RG l4$.
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John W. Davis, charged that the federal courts, aided by the legal 
opinions from the Solicitor of Agriculture, had declared that tenants 
had no ri^t to take legal action against the government to require 
enforcement of the cotton contracts. Shortly thereafter, a repre­
sentative of the Republican National Committee called on the Solicitor 
and asked to see the pertinent legal opinions. He vas told that the 
Solicitor mad.e opinions for the Secretary of Agriculture and other 
bureaus and they were not ordinarily made public.37
Another charge made by John W. Davis was that the government 
had refused consistently to take legal action to prevent illegal evic­
tions, which left the tenants with no rights which the landlords were 
bound to respect. Davis referred especially to the case of West vs. 
Norcross in Arkansas courts, and this case seems to confirm his 
allegations. Jerome Frank considered entering the case on the side of 
West, who represented a group of STFU union members evicted by Norcross, 
but after the purge AAA steadfastly refused to have anything to do with 
the case. The tenants lost because the Arkansas Supreme Court held
that tenants were nor a party to the cotton contract and had no right
%to bring suit to enforce it.
Final disposition of the Norcross case in AAA, which revolved 
around much the same issues as West vs. Norcross, was made largely by
^̂ John W. Davis, ."Let Us Build a National Congress," Campaign 
pamphlet quoted by Mastin White, Memo for the Files, July 23, 1936,
NA, RG 145.
"̂̂ Mastin White, Memo for the Files, July 23, 1936, NA, RG 145. 
^̂ Ibid.
3980 (2d) Southwestern Reporter, 67-70 (1935)-
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default. The recommendations of Margaret Bennett and Jerome Frank 
that Norcross be prosecuted for violating the contract were ignored, 
and Norcross' final parity payment was made. Chester Davis consented 
to this procedure because both Mary Connor îfyers and the Cotton Division 
reported that Norcross had more tenants in 193  ̂than in 1933-^^ Secre­
tary Wallace's policy of "the-same-number-but-not-the-same-tenants" 
declared in the Memphis telegram made it clear that Norcross nad not 
violated the contract if he had more ratner than fewer tenants. In 
exonerating Norcross, AAA also disregarded the fact that he had evicted 
only, union members and that before the purge the Legal Division had
ruled that union membership, in itself, was not sufficient cause for
. . .  hi eviction.
The victory of the Cotton Division in the Norcross case, and 
the purge, had a salutory effect on the Division's attitude toward the 
tenant problem. With most of the urban liberals now gone and the Legal 
Division shoved completely out of AAA, members of the Cotton Division 
could advocate reform measures without seeming to give in to the enemy. 
J. Phil Campbell was the first to do so. On February 13 he recommended 
that because FERA had agreed to provide crop loans to tenants whose 
landlords could not support them during the next winter, it would now 
be feasible for AAA to announce that it actually expected all landlords 
to retain the normal number of tenants in 1935• But Campbell wanted it 
made clear that AAA was not responsible for current displacements of
^^Myers to Davis, February 12, 1935, NA, RG l4$; and Green to 
Davis, February l4, 1935, NA, RG 1̂ 5.
^^LaFayette Patterson, Memo to Mr. Christgau, January 22, 1935, 
NA, RG 1̂ 5.
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tenants in the South. This he blamed on "forces let loose by the depres- 
k2sion."
The Cotton Division next made a move that would have come as a 
great surprise in AAA a month earlier: the Division recommended the 
creation of a landlord-tenant relations unit. However, this was not 
the landlord-tenant committee which Alger Hiss and Jerome Frank had 
advocated. It was to be attached to the Cotton Division and headed by 
W. J. Green. There would be a staff in Washington to handle cases for­
warded to AAA and a unit in each cotton state to adjust cases on the 
spot. The state units were to work under the control of the state 
directors of extension and in close coordination with county agents 
and committees. Heads of state units would be chosen from "distin­
guished county agents or . . . district agents." In Washington, an 
advisory committee of three men from the South "who command^^ the 
respect of all groups" and who understood conditions in the South, would 
provide counsel.
The Cotton Division further recommended that a legal unit be set 
up within the Office of the Solicitor of Agriculture to handle cases 
arising out of cotton contracts. Specifically, the legal unit would 
take care of cases involving cancellation of contracts, civil action to 
recover payments made before breaches of contract were discovered, and 
criminal action for fraudulent statements made to obtain benefits under 
the contract.
UpCampbell, Memo to Mr. Tolley, February 13; 1935; HA, RG IU5 .
^^Cotton Division, "Recommendations for Organizing to Deal with 
Landlord-Tenant Complaints," Landlord-Tenant File, NA, RG 1̂ 5; and Cobb, 
Memo to Mr. Davis, February l4, 1935; HA; RG IU5.
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An idea for a survey by county agents and county relief direc­
tors to determine Lhe extent of tenant displacement due to acreage 
reduction also received xhs endorsement of the Cotton Division. In 
fact, the leaders of the Division felt it would prove them r i g h t . I n  
addition, Cully Cobb recommended to Cnester Davis that AAA "proceed 
more vigorously" in prosecuting the violators of the contract and AAA 
regulations. He said that, although some convictions for criminal 
violation of the contract had. been obtained, more were possible. He 
pointed out, however, that most prosecutions to date had been for abuses 
by landlords and that violations by tenants should also be looked into. 
Said Cobb, referring to non-criminal infractions of the contract, "Sus­
pending payments on contracts and actually cancelling contracts is the 
only way to get prompt action.
Another idea sponsored by the Cotton Division was to have a 
conference in Washington of extension directors and district agents 
from cotton states to formulate plans for dealing with tenant problems. 
Subsequent conferences would be held in the states with county agents 
and committeemen attending. The Division desired no publicity for 
these conferences, but it wanted to publish the results of the survey 
of the effects of acreage reduction on tenant displacement in order to 
"answer the unfavorable statements that are being made.
Naturally, Chester Davis was amenable to the suggestions of the
llilCobb, Cajnpbell, and Green, Memo to the Administrator, Feb- 
ruary Ik, 1935̂  NA, RG lk$.
^̂ Cobb, Memo to Mr. Davis, February ik, 1935; NA, RG lk5-
k6Cobb, Campbell, and Green, Memo to the Administrator, Feb­
ruary ik, 1935; NA, RG lk$.
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Cotton Division, since to accept them would make the purge of the lib­
erals look less sinister. He ordered.the reforms to be carried out, 
and the Cotton Division set them in motion. However, it should be 
noted that,the changes, if anything, strengthened the control of the 
Cotton Division over tenant affairs. Moreover, the cotton men might 
have changed their attitude toward the handling of tenant problems, but 
their views on tenant rights remained the same. For example, W. J.
Green as head of the Landlord-Tenant Relations Unit, could be expected 
to favor landlords over tenants in the interest of expediting the 
cotton program, and the conference of extension directors was not likely 
to produce any general condemnation of tenancy policies.
One action recommended by the Cotton Division proved to be a
real administrative headache. It was the survey of the effects of
acreage reduction on tenant displacement. The Division had high hopes
for this survey, and their optimism seemed confirmed when W. J. Green
was chosen to head the work. In each of eleven Southern states, the
Directors of Extension and the Federal Relief Administration selected
a man with no previous experience with AAA or FERA to supervise the
survey. They usually chose someone from the faculty of a land-grant
/college in the state. These supervisors became temporary federal 
employees and were given clerical staffs to assist in the work. Tlieir 
first job was to pick three to six counties in their state to be inves­
tigated. In a letter to all supervisors, Chester Davis cautioned them 
to work with open minds and not to champion the cause of either the
"Letters to Relief Administrators, AAA-FERA Survey," File 
119, NA, RG 1À5.
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tenant or the landlord.
The survey was limited to tenants who were on farms and covered 
by cotton contracts in 1933 or I93I+ and who were currently on relief, 
plus landlords against whom complaints had been made. Working closely 
with county relief officials, the surveyors made a list of contract- 
farm tenants on relief, and then set out to interview them and their 
landlords. They used a schedule for tenants which required the number 
in the family, the color, the race, and the county, state, and township 
of all residences for the past four years. It also listed the type of 
tenure, whether or not the tenants were replaced when they left, and 
whether the tenants who replaced them were lower in status. The form 
asked if the tenant had been allowed to use the rented acres for pro­
ducing food and feed and the number of acres used. Another schedule 
for the landlords who showed a net displacement in tenants asked them 
the number of families on their land for the last four years and the 
reasons for eviction.
The data collected from the landlord and tenant schedules were 
summarized into a state report and forwarded to Washington, where a 
committee headed by W. J. Green synthesized all state reports into a 
general one. When completed, the Green Report found that "little, if 
any" relationship existed between cotton acreage reduction and the 
number of tenants and former tenants on emergency relief. The statis­
tics of the report revealed that only 8 .2 percent of those on relief 
in the fifty-two counties canvassed were tenants from cotton contract
farms. In order to determine if the survey was valid. Green ordered an 
_
AAA-FERA Survey, File II9, NA, RG 145.
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additional study of all contract signers and their tenants in twenty- 
three townships throughout the South. According to Green, the results
of this study were "practically the same" as those of the survey of
kSrelief-roll tenants.
The total of cotton contracts in the counties surveyed was 
9 2,3^0 . There were 59̂  contract violations on these farms revealed 
by the relief-roll survey and I76 turned up by the township survey.
Over lU,000 tenants were interviewed in the relief-roll survey and 7,$85 
in the township study. In the counties selected, there were 175,000 
relief cases, of which lh,319 were tenant farmers. Comparing the con­
tracts in force with the violations revealed by the two surveys, Green 
concluded that the cases of net displacement by landlords accounted 
for only .6 percent of relief-roll tenants and .2 percent of all tenants. 
About 81 percent of relief-roll tenants made use of the rented acres to 
grow food and feed.
Perhaps the most significant figures gathered by the survey 
were those showing the movement of tenants, for these indicated the 
extent of evictions. The statistical summaries of the Green Report 
were limited to the movement of tenants across state, county, and town­
ship boundaries. Moves within townships were not shown; however, it is 
possible to use the statistics presented in the various state reports 
to arrive at figures for all types of tenant movements. For instance, 
although the Green Report boasted that tenants moved no more across 
boundaries in 1935 than in 1933, the statistics for all kinds of moves
AAA-FERA Survey, Introduction, File II9, NA, RG 1̂ 5.
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show that in Arkansas 37-1 percent of tenants moved in 1933j 5̂-5 per­
cent in 193̂ , and 43-^ percent in 1935- This means that every year, 
more than 800 families in six counties in Arkansas were forced to move. 
The figures for Oklahoma (these are the years of the "Grapes of Wrath") 
show in the state report that as many as 66.6 percent of tenant families 
moved in 1935 and in Missouri the percentage reached 68.4 in 1934.^^
When landlords who had violated the contract were asked their 
reasons for evictions, 24 percent blamed crop failure, l4.2 percent 
named "financial difficulties," 11.2 percent attributed it to "unem­
ployment," and 4.1 percent said the tenants fired had an insufficient 
working force (too small a family). Of the tenants who were asked why 
they were on relief, 28.1 percent said it was because of crop failure, 
l4.4 percent blamed "unemployment," 28.4 percent attributed it to 
"financial difficulties," and 3-7 percent said they could not find a 
farm. Only 1 percent blamed AAA's acreage reduction.
One set of meaningful statistics was the percentage of moves 
made by tenants involved in contract violations by landlords. Full 
figures were not given on Arkansas, but in Oklahoma 92.7 percent of 
such tenants on relief made some type of move in 1934. In all the 
counties surveyed, 71-̂  percent made a move. A large part of them 
were sharecroppers and laborers.
Another vital phase of the survey was the determination of how 
many tenants on contract farms had been lowered in status or replaced. 
This information came from the tenants themselves, and because of fear
^^AAA-FERA Survey, Statistical Summaryj and Arkansas, Oklahoma, 
and Missouri Reports, File 119, NA, RG l45-
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of reprisal or sheer ignorance it may not be completely reliable. 
Nonetheless, in the entire Cotton Belt, 37*5 percent of relief-roll 
tenants were replaced in 1933, 7̂-1 percent in 193 ,̂ and U3.I percent 
in 1935- The percentage of those who had their status lowered was 
in 1933, 28 .9 in 193̂ , and 42.6 in 1935- And yet. Green was aGle to 
write that "the foregoing figures show definitely that there has been 
no wholesale displacement and change in status of tenants," even though 
the sainple on which he based his assertion was only .8 percent of all 
tenants on cotton contract farms.
In his conclusions. Green cited examples of unusual cases in 
which an apparent violation of the contract might not in reality be one. 
He also pointed out that on farms studied by the township survey, 
there was an increase since 1932 in the number of tenants in every 
category. From this he concluded that there had been a steady increase 
in the number of farm families covered by the cotton contracts and that 
there was no indication of an "abnormal change in status" of tenants 
on these farms.
One thing absolutely essential to the validity of the Green 
Report was the assumption that tenants on relief could be used as a 
representative sample of all tenants affected by the cotton program.
In order to establish this point, Green offered the explanation that 
14,319 families who were tenants on farms covered by cotton contracts 
ended up on the relief rolls of the fifty-two counties studied. Tliis, 
in itself, was a damaging statistic, but Green was forced to use it.
He neglected to add that there were 29,574 other tenants on the same
273
relief rolls.
Probably the most revealing part of the AAA-FERA study was the 
township survey. In this, the entire township was covered and con­
tract landlords and their tenants were interviewed. The Green Report 
made few conclusions about this survey, except where they could be 
used to support the findings of the relief-roll study. One important 
statistic whichs,Green did not mention but which can be computed from 
various data scattered through the report is that 20 percent of all 
tenant families living on contract farms had been involved in apparent 
contract violations. In Arkansas it was 2h percent. Moreover, deduc­
tive reading of the statistics indicates that I .3 percent of all ten­
ants on contract farms had been lowered in status in 1935* Projecting 
these percentages to the tenants on all contract farms in the South, a 
hypothetical total of 8,376 families would have been demoted in status 
and 400,000 would have been involved in contract violations in 1935»
The over-all tenor of the Green Report was to take pride in 
the fact that the conditions of tenants and sharecroppers had deteri­
orated only slightly since AAA began. But this viewpoint, in itself, 
was an admission that the government program for cotton had not helped 
tenants and croppers, a notable failure since the Agricultural Adjust­
ment Act was designed to benefit all farmers. Certainly, the economic 
position of most landowners had been improved by the cotton program, 
and yet Green felt it was no discredit to AAA that more than half of 
the cotton farmers, the landless ones, were only a little worse off I
The Green Report was intended for publication, but there were
^^AAA-FERA Survey, Conclusions, File II9, NA, RG 149.
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so many'flaws in It that several people in AAA objected. William T.
Ham, an economist in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, was given 
the task of writing a criticism of the report. Ham's commentary turned 
into a hatchet-job. He questioned whether the displacement under the 
cotton program was as small as Green stated and added that net dis­
placement was only one problem among many.
Ham's fundamental criticism was that the Green Report had a 
"narrow range of . . . subject matter" and that limitations imposed by 
the procedure and deficiencies in planning made the report unsatisfac­
tory. He felt critics were likely to assert that the report made a 
constant effort to give a more favorable impression of the cotton prog­
ram than was warranted by the data. To prove this, he cited Green's 
conclusion that tenants evicted and not replaced made up only I .5 per­
cent of tenants on relief. Ham asked, "Why compare the number of vio­
lations with the total number of tenants on relief rather than with the 
number of contract tenants on relief? In the latter case, the percent­
age would be H.5 percent." Again, the Green Report stated that tenants 
and former tenants from cotton contract farms made up only 8.2 percent 
of the total relief cases in the fifty-two counties. Obviously, said 
Ham, it would have been more to the point to compare the relief-roll 
tenants from contract farms to the total of relief cases from rural 
areas, which would yield a figure of about I6 percent. Ham commented; 
"One suspects that the reason was to avoid the higher percentage which 
would result." Even Ham did not care to point out that the tenants on 
relief from contract farms made up 32-6 percent of all tenants on relief 
and that in Arkansas the percentage was 68 .9 and in Mississippi 73-2.
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Although at first glance the township survey might seem the 
most valid, it too was criticized by Ham. He explained that only 
twenty-three townships were surveyed, and that even if they were se­
lected at random, which he doubted, this sampling was too small to be 
reliable. He feared that the county agents and supervisors who picked 
the townships to be investigated, chose those in which the cotton prog­
ram had been administered well in order to reflect credit on themselves 
and AAA. Ham's fears on this score appear well grounded in the light 
of some of the correspondence which took place between Washington and 
the various state supervisors. For instance, C. A. Hughes, supervisor 
in Arkansas, wired the Cotton Division during the early stages of the 
study that there was "no cause for alarm.Later, he wrote that "the 
Arkansas extension people" (who picked him as supervisor) were concerned 
that the survey be conducted in a manner that would "incite no addi­
tional unfavorable publicity" concerning tenant troubles in A r k a n s a s . 3̂ 
Another discrepancy found by Ham was the impossibility of learn­
ing from the landlord and tenant schedules whether the information had 
been gained by interview with the individual or from the relief rolls.
He also questioned whether an ordinary displaced tenant would know if 
there had been a contract violation in his case and if he had been 
replaced by a tenant of lower status. Ham criticized the readiness of 
the surveyors to take the word of landlords about the number of families 
on their land. Works Progress Administration officials had told him 
that little credence could be put in the verbal statements of landlords
CO
Hughes to Green (Telegram), May 11, 1935, File 119, NA, RG IU5 . 
^%u^es, "Progress Report," File II9, NA, RG 1̂ 5.
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on this score. Also, Ham felt it was "incredibly naive" to ask land­
lords guilty of contract violation the cause of their evictions and then 
use the data gained without pointing out the limitations involved.
Ham conceded that relief-roll tenants were probably "as fair a 
sample as could readily be secured" of tenants adversely affected by the 
cotton program, yet he felt the assumption that all displaced tenants 
eventually appeared on relief rolls was "doubtful." He pointed out 
that in some Southern areas, Negroes could not get on relief and that 
sharecroppers as a class did not appear on the rolls in as large pro­
portion as they did in the general population. The BAE economist con­
cluded that relief rolls did not give a true picture of the situation 
of cotton tenants.
Ham accurately defined the main grievances of the Southern ten­
ants under AAA's cotton program as displacement involving reduction in 
status and/or eviction, forced reduction in acreage of cash crops, and 
failure to receive a fair share of AAA benefits. The Green Report con­
sidered only the first of these, 'and Ham felt it was false of Green to 
claim that his survey was "fair and unbiased" and a general assessment 
of the effects of the cotton program on tenants. Ham feared that if 
the Green Report were published it miglit be justly accused of being 
"evasive and misleading" because it considered only the problem of net 
displacement. Tlie real problems, said Ham, were what happened to dis­
placed tenants and to tenants whose status was lowered. In addition, he
held that violations of the cotton contracts were seldom matters of 
outright eviction, but rather "a resort to numerous and varied arrange­
ments prejudicial to the interest of the sharecropper." The Green
Report, according to Ham, ignored these practices.
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Ham suggested to his superiors that if the Green Report vas 
released to the public, it should be carefully identified as a study of 
net displacement and nothing else. However, he seriously doubted that 
publication of the study would benefit AAA in any way.^^
In view of Ham's comments, Alfred Stedman, Head of AAA's Press 
Section, informed Cliester Davis that it would be "highly inadvisable" 
to publish the Green Report because of its "marked departure from the 
objective inquiry" which Davis had originally ordered.Paul Porter, 
USDA Information Director, commented that while the Green Report was 
completely favorable to AAA, it should not even become a reference 
source in the BAE library because of its "admitted deficiencies." 
Administrator Davis confirmed their opinions by ordering the report to 
be pigeon-holed.̂ *̂
The fiasco of the Green Report was a heavy blow to the Cotton 
Division, but in the summer of 1935 the Division received another. A 
clerk in the Correspondence and Filing Section of the Division became 
concerned about the accumulation of letters concerning cotton contracts 
which was piling up in his office. He had no contract files to put the 
letters with, and when his superior refused to be bothered about the 
letters, he took them in two large bundles to the section in the Cotton 
Division charged with tracing lost contracts. The tracing section at­
tempted to find the 1,200 contracts involved and learned that most of 
them were in the office of the Comptroller, where contracts were kept
^^Ham Commentary on Green Report, File 119, NA., RG 1̂ 5.
Stedman, Memo to Mr. Davis, February k, 1936, NA, RG 1̂ 5*
^̂ Porter, Memo to Miss Lacy, May 6, 1936, NA, RG l6.
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after payments on them were started.
It developed that most of the contracts had been paid, and that 
many would not have been if the misplaced correspondence nad been in 
the files when they were processed by the Comptroller. Immediately, 
the Administrator ordered an investigation which lasted more than eight 
months and caused considerable excitement in AAA. Special investigators 
appointed by Davis held hearings and questioned dozens of people, includ­
ing Cully Cobb, E. A. Miller, W. J. Green, and George Bishop. As the 
full story emerged, it became evident that members of the Cotton Contract 
Clearance Section of the Cotton Division had been stripping papers from 
the contract files which might bring the contracts under suspicion when 
they were processed for payment. Many of the letters removed were com­
plaints from tenants.
Witness after witness from the Clearance Section testified that 
they had been instructed by their superiors, including W. B. Camp, 
Assistant Chief ot the Cotton Division, to remove unfavorable corre­
spondence such as tenant complaints in order that the contracts might 
be approved for payment without difficulty. There were two t}-pes of 
cases in which this was done. One was when the person doing the file- 
stripping felt the landlord involved was honest and entitled to payment. 
The other was any case in which the Landlord-Tenant Relations Unit,
W. J. Green, E. A. Miller, and J. Phil Campbell, had approved payment. 
Evidently, there was a gentlemen's agreement that after the Landlord- 
Tenant Relations Unit had passed on a case, all materials which might 
impede its final approval by the Comptroller were removed from the file. 
The effect was that all decisions of the LTRU were final, and there was
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no opportunity for review by any authority outside the Cotton Division.
The defense offered by the Cotton Division was that the Comp­
troller’s Office liad been uncooperative in turning over contracts about 
which there was some question. In looking into this counter-charge 
investigators found a bundle of requests for the return of contracts in 
the Comptroller's Office which had never been acted upon. E. A. Miller 
and others also claimed that the Comptroller had caused a bottleneck in' 
the processing of the one million cotton contracts, and that out of 
desperation the Cotton Division developed the expedient of removing 
damaging papers from the contract files so that they would go through 
without a hitch. They said none of the people involved had acted out 
of dishonesty but only from a desire to expedite the adjustment program.
The first case of file stripping, which set the precedent for 
all the others, concerned a landlord who had signed as having only one 
managing share tenant. Letters in the file on this landlord stated that 
he had more than one, indicating that a new contract might have to be 
signed. However, a clerk in the Clearance Section took fourteen let­
ters out of this file concerning the other tenants and sent the contract 
to the Comptroller's Office where it was approved and payments started. 
The clerk who did this testified in the hearings that he discussed the 
matter with E. A. Miller, who authorized this procedure. Miller stated 
that he may have given that impression, but he had not intended to do 
so. Soon this practice was being used quite frequently. On several 
occasions, when contracts were returned by the Comptroller disapproved, 
the Clearance Section sent them back with the objectionable correspond­
ence missing and they were then approved.
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Mastin G. White, Solicitor of Agriculture, reviewed, the entire 
case of file stripping in the Cotton Division and reconmended to Sec­
retary Wallace that all the information gathered be turned over to the 
Attorney General because of possible violations of federal codes deal­
ing with destroying, concealing, removing or attempting to conceal 
government documents. However, Wallace decided not to follow this sug­
gestion. Perhaps he feared the scandal it would cause, especially since 
the landlord-tenant issue in AAA was already so touchy. To be sure, the 
top officials of AAA and USDA took immediate action to stop the practice 
of file stripping, but there is no evidence that they did anything to
rectify the injustices which may have been done to hundreds of tenants
57because their complaints never got outside the Cotton Division.
But this was not the end of the Cotton Division's troubles. As 
the Division was laying plans for the 1938-39 cotton, contract, it ran 
afoul of the Comptroller General of the United States, J. R. McCarl.
The General Accounting Office, headed by McCarl, learned that AAA had 
been making parity payments to landlords to be distributed to their 
tenants and that the agency was planning to continue this in 193°. It 
was the same practice to which Alger Hiss objected in writing the 
193̂ -35 contract. There was great concern in the Cotton Division that 
McCarl might force individual payments to all tenants, which would have 
caused much more work for the Division but which would have been joyously 
welcomed by many tenants.
"̂̂ White, Report of Investigation of Irregularities in Processing 
of Cotton Contracts, no date. File 31, MA, RG 1̂ 5-
^^Porter to Callender, November 2, 1935, NA, RG IU5 .
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In early October, word came from McCarl that separate pay­
ments 'would have to be made to landlords and tenants under all of 
AAA's programs. Frightened by the prospect of an almost certain out­
cry from Southern landlords, the Cotton Division drafted a letter for 
Secretary Wallace's, signature explaining their viewpoint. They stated 
that they planned to use trust agreements in 1936 whereby tenants au­
thorized their landlords to collect parity payments for them. In 193  ̂
and 1935 such agreements had been used although it had not been neces­
sary for all tenants to consent to them; however, the Division assured 
McCarl that in the future all tenants would be required to sign the 
trust agreements. The Division's letter carefully explained that it 
was essential to use the trust agreements in certain areas of the South 
because if the tenants were paid directly their landlords might with­
draw all credit and some irresponsible croppers might skip out with 
the payments without settling their debts to their landlords. This 
would leave insufficient labor. In answer to rather obvious argument 
that tenants could be paid separately after the harvest, the Cotton 
Division said weakly that this would "involve other difficult problems," 
meaning probably that the landlords would be opposed to this also.
The Cotton Division's letter pointed out that making payments 
directly to tenants would tremendously complicate the work of county 
agents. In many cases, tenants and croppers lived many miles from the 
county seat and had no means of transportation. The truth was that 
most tenants would have gladly walked the distances to get their checks, 
but the Division did not mention this fact. Another problem mentioned 
by the Division was that tenants would be hard to identify since many
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had no identification papers and could not sign their names. Evidently ■ 
it never occurred to the Division to have the county agents go to the 
plantations and distribute the payments as the landlords identified 
their tenants. Anticipating that someone miglit suggest mailing checks
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to tenants, the letter said "this class have inadequate addresses'."
Of course, the purpose of the Cotton Division's letter was to 
convince the Comptroller General of the necessity of continuing the 
trust agreements. However, it is not likely that Secretary Wallace 
ever saw the letter drafted for his signature. Chester Davis realized 
that the letter revealed clear bias, and he knew also that it would 
not pay to bandy words with the General Accounting Office. The GAO 
was a part of the legislative branch, created and maintained by 
Congress. Had the order to make separate payments come from the De­
partment of Treasury or the Bureau of the Budget, AAA might have ap­
pealed to the President, but to defy the GAO would have been risking 
the wrath of Congress. Accordingly, Davis wrote McCarl that every 
effort would be made to comply with his requirements. He indicated 
that it would be possible to make separate payments to tobacco ten­
ants even thou^ there were about eighty tenants for every 100 contracts. 
But in the case of cotton tenants, Davis said that, although constant 
attempts had. been made to develop a practical plan for direct dis­
bursement, "we have been unable to do so." He asked the Comptroller 
General to reconsider his decision and let AAA make payments to
RG 14$.
^^Draft of letter, Wallace to McCarl, November 2, 1935; NA,
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trustees under the cotton contracts in 1936 with the understanding
60
that thereafter AAA would comply with his wishes. McCarl turned 
down Davis' req.uest, hut the Cotton Division solved the problem by 
making joint payments to landlords and tenants. This procedure
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meant that both landlord and tenants had to endorse the checks.
Despite its earlier difficulties, the Landlord-Tenant Re­
lations Unit proved to be a moderate success, at least from the 
Cotton Division's point of view. Eventually, the unit perfected 
a method of processing complaints which worked smoothly. Most ten­
ant complaints were handled by county committees with a standar­
dized report made in each case to the state committee. If a case 
could not be decided locally, a field representative from LTRU 
went from Washington to settle the matter working closely with • 
the state committee. During 1935; tenant complaints continued to 
be much the same as before— lowered status, eviction, failure to 
receive AAA payments, and unfair county agents and committees--but 
the number of these complaints gradually declined. In addition,
AAA was slightly more inclined during 1935 to take corrective ac­
tion. For instance, some county agents and committeemen were fired
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for favoritism to landlords.
The Landlord-Tenant Relations Unit was also able to gain 
acceptance of several of its recommendations in the 1936-39 cotton
^°Davis to McCarl, October 28, 1935; NA, RG 14$.
^%SDA Form CAC No. 2, 1935, NA, RG 1^5•
^^Report of LTRU, November 1, 1937; NA, RG l45-
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contract and accompanying regulations. At the Unit's suggestion, the 
program contained a formula for distributing rental payments which 
gave landowners 37-5 percent and the person furnishing the workstock 
and equipment 12.5 percent, with the remaining 50 percent divided be­
tween landlord and tenant according to their usual arrangement. Thus, 
a sharecropper would get 25 percent of the rental as compared with 
nothing In 1934-35, and a share tenant would receive 50 percent whether 
or not he was a managing share tenant.
Another recommendation by the LTRU was that benefit payments 
be made directly to the person managing the farm, which was an Improve­
ment over previous policy, although It still excluded sharecroppers 
and many share tenants. Recognizing that It was hopeless for the 
government to try to "freeze" the status of tenants, the LTRU sug­
gested this policy be abandoned In 1936-39- Instead, It was recom­
mended that county committees have the power to allow landlords to 
keep fewer tenants than normal or to lower the status of their ten­
ants If they could satisfy the county committees that It would be 
"economically Impracticable" not to do so. Under this plan, county 
committees would have the power to disapprove contracts If the land-
63
lords did not treat their tenants fairly. On the surface, this 
policy might seem reasonable, but In the hands of the planter- 
dominated committees of the areas like northeastern Arkansas, It 
could become a means of completely circumventing the Intent of the 
Adjustment Act.
^ R̂ecommendations of the Landlord-Tenant Committee, no date, 
NA, RG 145.
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All of these recommendations by the LTRU were incorporated 
into the 1936-39 contract. However, Mastin White, the new Solicitor 
of Agriculture, raised some serious objections concerning them. In 
fact. White seemed to be experiencing some of the difficulties which 
Jerome Frank once had. Perhaps it was because the legal mind simply 
could not tolerate such intangible phrases as "economically imprac­
ticable," "each tenant's fair share," and "an equitable distribution." 
White removed many of these phrases from the contract only to have 
them put back by the Cotton Division. Also, he objected to requiring 
all contract signers to name a beneficiary since other contracts did 
not do so. He intimated that landlords might abuse this by having 
themselves named beneficiaries of their tenants, evicting them, and 
then collecting their benefit payments. Despite his protests, the
6h
contract required beneficiaries.
Generally, the administrative ruling which went with the 
1936-39 contract followed previous policies. There was a slightly 
improved definition of a managing share tenant, but not the one 
Mordecai Ezekiel suggested. Only managing share tenants could sign 
the contract, and no contract would be accepted if it appeared there
was a side agreement which might deprive one party of the benefits
due him. Each tenant was to receive a "fair share" of the available
65
acreage, and much more discretion was left to county committees in
66
making acreage allotments.
^Sftiite to Davis, November 27, 1939, NA, RG 1̂ +5- 
^%8DA, Form No. CAC 2, 1939, NA, RG 1^5.
^^SDA, Form No. CAC 1, 1939, NA, RG 1^5.
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The cotton program for 1936-39 vas all set and the sign-up 
campaign was in its beginning stages when judicial' lightning struck 
AAA. The Supreme Court on Januasy 6, I936, in the case of United 
States vs. William Butler, et al., Receivers of Hoosac Mills Corpo­
ration, invalidated the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933- Justice 
Roberts, speaking for the Court, held that the Adjustment Act, in 
setting up a plan to regulate and control agricultural production, un­
constitutionally invaded the rights reserved to the states. He said 
that the processing tax was merely incidental to the regulation of 
of agriculture and could not therefore be based on the constitutional 
right of Congress to levy taxes. He added that contracts with farmers 
for the reduction of acreage were outside the range of federal power 
since such agreements could not justly be said to come under the power 
of Congress to provide for the general welfare of the country, and 
since the contention that such agreements were not coercive was a 
fiction. Roberts further held that the wide-spread national emergency 
did not confer on Congress the powers reserved to the states or any
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powers not granted by the Constitution. In a stinging minority
opinion. Justice Stone berated the inconsistency of the majority's
position and warned against a "tortured construction of the Consti-
68
tution." Justices Brandeis and Cardoza also dissented.
Tne AAA was not destroyed by the Supreme Court's action. The 
men who ran the agency picked up the pieces and continued to operate.
^^296 U.S. 1 (1936); and 102 American Law Reports 91̂  (1936).
^James Smith and Paul Murphy (eds. ), Liberty and Justice (New 
York: Knopf, 1958); P- 0̂7-
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Within a few weeks Congress appropriated enough money to meet the obli­
gations incurred under the Act of 1933, and on February 29, it passed 
the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act. The new law provid­
ed crop controls and benefit payments for the ostensible purpose of 
soil conservation, but the old goals of enforced scarcity and parity
.69
prices were still there. In fact, the Hoosac decision may have been 
something of a blessing in disguise to AAA because it hastened a transi­
tion which had long been planned. This was a change from the temporary 
emergency phase of the adjustment programs to more permanent policies
which gave a larger place to soil conservation and improved farm man- 
70
agement.
The tenant provisions of the 193° soil conservation program
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for cotton were little chsuiged from what liad been planned originally. 
However, 1938 marks the beginning of a new era in the New Deal's han­
dling of tenant problems. The agitations of the Southern Tenant 
Farmers Union, the troubles in Arkansas, and the tenant difficulties 
encountered by AAA had their effect on the more positive future poli­
cies of the Roosevelt Administration such as the Farm Security and 
Resettlement programs.
^^Murray Bennedict, Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-
1950, pp. 3̂ 9-353.
^̂ AAA, Agricultural Conservation, 1936, A Report of the Activ­
ities of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1936), 1.
7^Tolley to McFarlane, April 6, 1936, Landlord-Tenant File, NA,
RG IL5.
CONCLUSION
Nearly two million Southern tenant farmers and their families, 
living in the direst proverty, constituted one of the most perplexing 
problems facing the United States in the 1930's, and yet during the 
hectic Hundred Days of 1933 the matter seemed far less imminent than 
the general economic distress which beset the country. Thus, wnen 
legislation to assist recovery of American agriculture was written 
and passed, no guarantees were made that tenant farmers would share 
equitably in the government aid, and the larger problem of reforming 
the Southern tenancy system was entirely ignored.
Moreover, little concern for tenants was shown by the leaders 
of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration in planning the cotton 
programs. The cotton experts in AAA were intent on reviving the 
cotton economy by a voluntary program of acreage reduction involving 
what they hoped would be a minimum of red tape. They should have 
realized that a drastic decrease in cotton acreage would be disastrous 
to Southern tenants, but if they did they refused to let the knowl­
edge deter them.
The cotton experts in AAA understood Southern tenancy well, 
and rather than attempting to reform the system— a task for which they 
had little enthusiasm and no authority-- they accepted it and adapted
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their plans to it. They made the landlords the administrators of the 
cotton program to their tenants; and they saw to it that the landlords 
received a far greater share of the government benefits than did the 
tenants. To have done otherwise would have seriously disrupted Southern 
tenancy structure. It is a tragedy that the system was not disrupted 
at precisely this time, for the opportunity was golden. Never in its 
long and cruel history had tenancy been more vulnerable. If, for in­
stance, AAA had made equitable payments for acreage reduction di­
rectly to tenants, the money would, have given the tenants greater 
independence and bargaining power with the landlords and might have 
begun the destruction of the tenancy system. The leaders of AAA argued 
that they had to favor the landlords or too few would agree to reduce 
acreage and there would be no program, but one suspects that in 1933 
and 193  ̂the landlords were desperate enough to accept government aid 
no matter what strings were attached.
The favoritism of the AAA toward landlords brought a storm of 
protests from tenants and radical groups. The huge agency responded 
only with make-shift corrections and half-hearted reforms; it could 
do no more because once the cotton programs were set, AAA was stuck 
with them. This dilemma points up one of the most serious diffi­
culties in government planning. When drastic new programs are under­
taken, there may be unforeseen problems for which there are no solutions. 
Only when administrators remain flexible and Congress maintains a 
watchful eye on new programs, can most unforeseen difficulties be over­
come. The administrators of the cotton programs, especially the agrar­
ians of the Cotton Division of AAA, were amazingly rigid, and Congress
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showed little interest in the plight of tenant farmers throughout 193  ̂
and 1955 •'
As news of tenant evictions and uprisings became more and more 
freq.uent during 193̂ , .the liberals of AAA, particularly in the Legal 
Division, realized that the agency had an opportunity to reform ten­
ancy or at least do something to help the tenants. When the youn'g 
lawyers started working toward these goals it caused a schism in AAA 
which threatened to disable the entire agency. The struggle reached 
a climax when the Legal Division, with great impracticality, attempted 
to re-interpret the cotton contract so as to guarantee the tenure of 
every tenant on a contract farm. Such a policy would have been diffi­
cult if not impossible to enforce, and Chester Davis and Henry 
Wallace were left with the alternatives of changing AAA into an agency 
of reform or of getting rid of the liberals. They chose the easier 
path and purged Jerome Frank, Gardner Jackson and the others.
The position of Davis, Wallace, and Cully Cobb throughout the 
tenant controversy was that the Agricultural Adjustment Act was not 
intended to reform the system of Southern tenancy. This was true, but 
to take this attitude was begging the question. The declared purpose 
of the act was to increase the purchasing power of all farmers. It 
did not exclude tenants and sharecroppers. The real question is 
whether AAA was completely fair to tenant farmers in the planning and 
execution of its cotton programs. The answer is no. The liberals, in 
their own inept way, were simply fighting to protect the tenants from 
exploitation under the unfair cotton progreims. It was a heavy blow to 
tenant interests when the liberals were fired.
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After the purge the tenant problem receded somewhat into the 
background, although it remained the largest single headache of AAA. 
There were some signs in 1935 of a softer attitude in the agency 
toward tenants, even by the agrarians; moreover, there was a slight 
improvement in tenant policies. The proposed program for 1936, for 
instance, seemed to be moving in the ri^t direction, and the Landlord- 
Tenant Relations Unit was finding a few solutions to the thorny matter
of handling tenant complaints. But AAA still had a long way to go.
In the spring of-1936, Senator Frederick Steiwer of Oregon, 
the keynote speaker of the 1936 Republican National Convention, 
launched an attack on AAA in the Senate. He charged the agency with
"wholesale frauds and . . . misrepresentations," the objects of which
had been to plunder the United States Treasury and to "deprive the 
sharecroppers and tenants of the benefits that had been intended for 
them." The Senator presented as evidence dozens of affidavits taken 
in sixteen counties of Texas which indicated various types of mal­
practice, especially in the distribution of Bankhead Act tax exemp­
tions. Steiwer had hardly begun his broadside when he drew fire from 
various Southern senators who wanted to know the source of the affi­
davits. They eventually forced him to admit that the statements were 
collected by a former employee of AAA who had since been indicted for
fraud and was probably now in the employ of the Republican National 
1
Committee.
Û.S., Congressional Record, 7^th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1936, LXXX, 
Part 10, 10512-1091 .̂
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Before Steiwer could nail home the points he wished to make, one 
of the Democrats' ace hatchet men, Tom Connally of Texas, caused a di­
version by attacking Steiwer personally. Connally charged that Steiwer 
had vice-presidential ambitions and added that the Oregonian, like many 
other Republicans, had clung tenaciously to President Roosevelt's coat­
tails in the perilous days of 1933 ("and some say he got under the 
President's coattails"), but now that the country was saved Steiwer was 
turning against the Administration and trying to discredit it. Said 
Connally, "Whenever you find one case of wrongdoing in the Agricul­
tural Adjustment Act, you will find 100 poor farmers who have been
2
benefited and lifted up from the very dregs of poverty . . . ." When 
Connally had finished, Steiwer was glad to drop the whole matter.
As indicated by Senator Steiwer's experience, it was almost 
impossible to talk about AAA without getting involved in the worst kind 
of partisan politics. If the Republicans attacked the agency or its 
programs, the Democrats came to its defense. It was that simple. A 
similar situation existed within AAA: if the liberals proposed, the 
agrarians opposed without even considering the merits of the idea. By 
the same toke^ any suggestion of the agrarians was automatically 
suspect to the liberals. There was even less understanding at the grass 
roots between the tenants and the landlords, where the differences led 
to violence and bloodshed.
Today, it is possible to look at matters more calmly. And yet, 
because of biased and conflicting sources, it is still difficult to
^Ibid., pp. 10521-10532.
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make sound judgments. For instance, the extent of AAA's responsibility 
for the displacement of tenants in 1933, 193 ,̂ and 1935 cannot be
determined precisely, even from the best sources. The conclusions of
each study, both government and private, seemed to depend on which
group made it and what it hoped to find. The best that can be said is
that the number of evictions was tragically large and that AAA's tenant 
policies not only gave the landlords a motive for evictions but offered 
the tenants little protection against them.
Perhaps the hardships to some tenants caused by AAA's tenant 
policies were offset by the general improvement in the cotton economy 
which helped many tenants. Here again no pat answer is possible. 
Certainly many tenants benefited from the government payments and the 
increase in cotton prices, but many others suffered by the acreage re­
duction. It must also be added that the landlords profited from the 
cotton programs much more handsomely than did the tenants.
What was the over-all effect of AAA on Southern tenancy? 
Although the Census of Agriculture of 1935 showed a continuation of 
the fifty-year-old pattern of growing tenancy throughout the country, 
it also indicated a significant decline in tenancy in the principal 
cotton-growing areas of the South. In fact, the decrease was con­
fined almost exclusively to Southern cotton and tobacco counties.
Some of the cotton tenants who lost their status had become wage iiands 
on the same plantations or other farms, and some had moved to the towns 
and cities. Many were on relief. Very few who were former tenants had
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become land owners, and in most cases the displaced tenants had moved
,3
down the agricultural ladder.
Combining the facts about the decline of cotton tenancy with 
a knowledge of the workings of AAA's cotton program leads naturally 
to the conclusion that AAA failed to benefit great numbers of South­
ern tenants and even harmed many of them. In a way, AAA accomplished 
an unintended reform in helping to drive tenants from the land, because 
those evicted were forced to seek new occupations and most of tnem 
eventually found a better life. However, it was usually years before 
they could make the adjustment, and in the meantime they suffered 
terribly. A great, humanitarian nation as rich as the United States 
can find better ways to achieve such reforms.
■3Turner, A Graphic Summary of Farm Tenure, p. 25.
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